When poverty meets affluence
Migrants from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals

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Preface

This report presents the first results from a quantitative study of a population that is not easy to reach by means of conventional survey methods. We have therefore applied a methodology specifically designed for use with such ‘hard-to-reach’ populations. Mapping and analysing the situation for street workers from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals has been a challenging and yet extremely rewarding task. 1,269 migrants have trusted us with detailed and extensive information about their coping strategies on the streets, their living conditions at home, their reasons for migration and their expectations for the future. We are grateful to each and every one of them. We are also grateful to the Roma informants in Romania who invited us into their homes or met with us in the streets or other places, and to the teachers and NGO representatives who shared their experiences and concerns with us. NGO representatives in all the three Scandinavian countries have also made valuable contributions to our understanding of the situation. We are also extremely grateful to our field coordinators who were in charge of the day-to-day implementation of the survey work in all three cities, Raluca Motei, Juliana Sandu and Alexandru Vasile, whose efforts, competence and dedication to the project have been crucial for its success. Our thanks also go to our staff of interviewers.

We would also like to thank the reference group, Grete Brochmann, Ada Engerbrigtsen and Karin Borevi, for their insightful comments on the research design and draft report. We also thank Jon Rogstad for his valuable comments on the draft report. Tim Caudery has competently and patiently proof-read all the chapters. Last, but not least, we wish to thank the Rockwool Foundation for making this research possible through a grant generous enough to permit a survey that has been costly to carry out, leaning as it did on new and pioneering methodology. Kaspar Kofod, our contact at the Rockwool Foundation, has made a major contribution through his coordination work and by keeping the project on track during the final phases.

The writing of the report has been a joint effort. Chapters 1 and 10 have been produced in collaboration by Anne Britt Djuve, Jon Horgen Friberg and Guri Tyldum. Jon Horgen Friberg has had the main responsibility for chapters 2, 4 and 5. Guri Tyldum for chapters 6 and 7, and Anne Britt Djuve for chapters 3, 8 and 9. The methodology appendix has been written by Guri Tyldum and Huafeng Zhang. Huafeng Zhang has also assisted with RDS estimations throughout the report. Anne Britt Djuve has been project director.

Oslo, 27.05.2015

Anne Britt Djuve     Jon Horgen Friberg     Guri Tyldum     Huafeng Zhang
Chapter 1
Introduction

Since the accession of Romania to the EU, and in particular in the wake of the economic crisis in Europe, the Scandinavian countries have experienced an influx of migrants from marginalised segments of Romanian society, in particular Roma, who make a living through begging, collecting bottles and other types of informal street work, and who sleep outside in parks, on street pavements, in parked cars or camped in the woods.

What kind of material living conditions do these migrants have in Romania and in Scandinavia? How can the economic and social organisation of migration for begging and street work best be understood? How are migrant beggars and street workers treated by host country populations and institutions? And what are the outcomes and potential consequences of migration for communities back in Romania? These are the overall questions that will be analysed in this report.

The movement of migrants who travel to other countries within the EU in order to beg, collect bottles, trade and do other types of informal ‘street work’ (Adriaenssen 2011) is an issue that has featured on the political agendas of most European countries over the past decade. While the EU framework encourages the free movement of labour, there is little regulation in place to address the free movement of poverty. The free movement of poverty from recently-joined EU member states in Eastern Europe creates difficult political dilemmas for the affluent and egalitarian Scandinavian welfare states. At the same time, EU regulations place significant limitations on the scope for political manoeuvrability. Policy responses vary from increased policing and bans on activities such as begging and rough sleeping to the provision of basic emergency services through NGOs. Given today’s European institutional context of free movement, options based on either border control or regular welfare policy appear unrealistic or unattainable. The origins of this poverty lie rooted in the history and social structure of Romanian society, and the options available in Scandinavia for dealing with the issue may well appear inadequate. The conspicuous presence of abject poverty and marginalisation in public spaces has created heated political debate. In the social media and in the comment sections of internet news sites it has also sparked a significant amount of racism and hatred towards the Roma.

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1 Some writers apply the term ‘street work’ to begging, and in our study, many respondents who beg would often refer to begging as ‘work’. We do not take a stand in the discussion of whether or not begging is ‘work’. We often write ‘beggars and street workers’, but sometimes for practical reasons we use the term ‘street work’ to include both begging and other informal income-generating activities.
Various claims relating to crime, to human trafficking and exploitation, and to the consequences of migration for children and for communities in the sending countries are routinely made in policy documents and in the public debate with regard to the migrants and the nature of their mobility. However, public debate on the issue has so far been informed by anecdotal evidence and popular myths more than research-based empirical knowledge. The most reliable sources of information about the backgrounds and income-generating activities of the Romanian migrants who live on the streets of Scandinavian cities are two qualitative studies conducted in Norway by Ada Engebrigtsen that were published in 2012 and 2014. In addition, NGOs in all three countries have published reports based on their experiences with the group (Kirkens Bymisjon 2009, Projekt Udenfor 2012 and Stockholm Stadsmission 2012). The present study nevertheless represents the first large-scale quantitative mapping of this migrant population and is the first study to implement a comparative perspective on the living conditions of these people in the three Scandinavian cities.

As already mentioned, this report will focus on four overall questions related to migrants’ living conditions, the social and economic organisation of migration, treatment of migrants by the local populations in the host countries and potential consequences for the sending communities. Within these overall topics, we will shed light on a wide range of more specific questions, including:

- How poor are the migrants, and what alternative economic options are available to them at home in Romania?
- What is the distinction between labour migration and migration for begging and street work?
- What is the relationship between begging and petty crime?
- Are beggars and street workers victims of exploitation and human trafficking?
- To what extent are migrant beggars and street workers subject to harassment and discrimination from Scandinavians?
- How does migration and sending of remittances affect the situation and schooling of children left at home?
- How do political responses to migration affect migration flows and migrant adaptation?

A comparative perspective on the differences among the three Scandinavian capital cities will be maintained throughout the report.
The political contexts in the three cities

The Scandinavian countries are often regarded as being very similar in terms of social models and political structures. All three countries are characterised by high standards of living, low levels of social inequality, generous and universal welfare systems, relatively egalitarian collectively-regulated labour markets, and open liberal democratic political institutions. Under EU/EEA regulations, all Romanian nationals have the right to enter Norway, Sweden and Denmark and stay for up to three months. They are not required to register with the police during this period. If they intend to stay longer, they must be active job-seekers, and register with the police or a service centre for foreign workers. In order to register, an EEA citizen must show evidence that he/she is employed, or demonstrate the availability of sufficient private means to be able to support himself/herself. However, the police in Oslo rarely register migrants who have not obtained employment (Friberg et al. 2013). This lack of registration, either of migrants on arrival or of job seekers, means that official registers are of little assistance in monitoring the length of stay of EU migrants.

EEA citizens who are not registered, or who are registered as job seekers, are in principle not entitled to welfare benefits. In other words, extremely poor migrants are allowed to enter, but they rarely receive any assistance from the public welfare services. And as long as they are able to support themselves they are in principle allowed to stay. However, the visible presence of abject poverty, begging and homelessness has created a new situation for the otherwise egalitarian welfare states. The Scandinavian countries have a long tradition of strict regulation of entry and residence on the one hand and generous welfare arrangements and redistribution of income among their own citizens and other legal residents on the other. However, when it comes to European migrant street workers, the room for political manoeuvrability is severely limited by EU regulations, as well as by concerns over the effect that extending welfare services to poor EU migrants might have on patterns of migration. Furthermore, the gravity of the social problems seen among the migrants may seem overwhelming. The Romanian Roma experience poverty and social exclusion rooted in centuries of slavery and oppression, and their problems may seem beyond the reach of what social policy measures within the Scandinavian welfare states can realistically be expected to ‘solve’. At the same time, Scandinavian welfare states are based on the ideals of social equality and a high quality of life. The political and emotional unease at having large groups living in abject poverty in plain public sight is therefore particularly accentuated here.

In light of these strains, the political impulse among politicians and the public has largely been to take one of two positions: either ‘keep them out’, or ‘alleviate their situation’. However, EU/EEA regulations prevent those who wish to keep these migrants out from resorting to border controls or visa requirements. Those opting for restrictions are therefore left with restrictions and deterrence through policing of street
activities and other types of what could be labelled ‘internalised border controls’ (Jo-
hansen et.al (eds) 2013). Those who wish to alleviate the migrants’ situation, on the
other hand, cannot resort to regular welfare state arrangements and are therefore left
with private NGO initiatives. It is within this arguably limited scope for policy-making
that the three Scandinavian countries have developed policy responses that explicitly or
implicitly target migrant street workers. These include on the one hand efforts to com-
bat organised crime and human trafficking, and the introduction or enforcement of
local public order regulations (including the banning/regulation of begging and rough
sleeping), and on the other hand assistance to voluntary associations providing hous-
ing and sanitary arrangements, and action related to child welfare.

The Scandinavian countries have arrived at noticeably different policy positions
in relation to migrant street workers.2 Denmark has adopted the most rigorous ap-
proach in order to reduce the influx of poor migrants, with a national ban that crim-
inalises begging, harsh police tactics against homeless migrants sleeping outdoors,
and very limited public funding of NGOs who provide basic services to homeless mi-
grants. Sweden has taken rather the opposite position, allowing migrants to beg and
sleep outside in public spaces, and allocating certain funds to NGOs which provide
basic services, shelter and food for homeless EU migrants. Norway has taken an in-
termediate position. In Oslo, a municipal ban on sleeping outdoors was introduced
with the explicit purpose of targeting homeless migrants. In 2014 a bill proposing
a national ban on begging was launched, but this was later withdrawn. Instead, a
provision allowing municipalities to enforce local bans on begging has been imple-
mented in some smaller cities, but not in Oslo. Some public funding for emergency
shelters and basic services has been allocated to NGOs.

Defining the population

The terms used to refer to the Romanian street workers in the public debate in the
three Scandinavian countries vary greatly. In Sweden, migrants who live on the
streets, begging and doing other kinds of ‘street work’ such as collecting bottles or
selling small items, are consistently described as ‘EU migrants’. In the public de-
bate, ethnicity is rarely mentioned, but the term ‘EU migrants’ is usually associated
with homelessness and begging, and not with the much larger numbers of regu-
lar working migrants coming from other EU countries such as Poland, Lithuania,
Germany and Spain. In Norway, the situation is different. Here, homelessness and
begging among migrants are almost exclusively referred to in ethnic terms, and the
population is consistently referred to with the rather recent Norwegian linguistic

2 Interestingly, this pattern seems to follow the patterns of policies adopted in response to immigration from outside Europe, whereby
Denmark has adopted relatively restrictive and assimilationist policies, Sweden exhibits an explicitly multiculturalist approach, and Norway
manoeuvres somewhere in between the two (Brochmann & Hagelund 2011).
When poverty meets affluence. Migrants from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals

coinage Romfolk (‘Roma people’), obscuring the fact that there are large numbers of non-Roma who are homeless and living from street work in Oslo. While the debate in Sweden refers to administrative categories, and Norwegians use ethnic categories, poor and homeless migrants in Denmark are usually referred to in nationality terms as ‘Romanians’.

For the purposes of our study we needed a clear definition of the target population that can be used for all three countries. Our target populations are ‘homeless street workers from Romania’ in the three capital cities, defined as persons who:

1. come from Romania;

2. do not have a regular place to live in Scandinavia; and

3. do not have a regular job in Scandinavia

This means that people who have succeeded in getting a job or an apartment in Scandinavia are excluded from our samples by definition. Our samples therefore cannot be generalised to the wider population of Romanian or Roma migrants living in Stockholm, Oslo or Copenhagen, but only to the population of ‘homeless street workers’ from Romania. It is important to note that ‘being homeless’ refers to the living situation in Scandinavia; very few of our respondents were homeless in Romania.

Ethnic identity: Roma and non-Roma migrants

The majority within our target populations – although far from all – can be identified as Roma. The Roma are among the most marginalised and discriminated-against population groups in Europe, and the social situation for Romanian Roma today can only be understood in light of a long history of slavery, persecution and discrimination, as well as the development of oppositional identities and social practices (see Engebrigtsen 2007, Steward 1997 and Troc 2005). In light of this, ethnic identity is an important factor for understanding the situation of our target population today. However, the population groups referred to here as Roma in reality cover a wide variety of different groups that only to some extent share a common identity or social situation. In this report we follow the terminology used by the Council of Europe, which states that “The term “Roma” used at the Council of Europe refers to Roma, Sinti, Kale and related groups in Europe, including Travellers and the Eastern groups (Dom and Lom), and covers the wide diversity of the groups concerned, including persons who identify themselves as “Gypsies”.”

Ethnic identity is a dual and relational concept, relating not only to how people identify themselves, but also to how they are identified by others (Barth 1969). On the one hand, it is obviously important whether one feels and identifies oneself as Roma. Today, identifying oneself as Roma is in particular related to knowledge and use of the Romani language, although far from all Roma speak Romani. On the other hand, given the high level of discrimination in today’s Romania (Marin and Csonta 2012), it is just as important for identity whether everyone else identifies a person as Roma. The term ‘Romanianised Roma’ refers to groups of Roma who have collectively tried to assimilate into mainstream Romanian society, usually through abandoning the use of the Romani language as well as traditional clothing and other signifiers, but who still see themselves as Roma, and who are usually still regarded by others as being Roma.

In this complex landscape, measuring ethnic identity can be challenging. We started out by simply asking the respondents what term they preferred to use about their own ethnic identity. In this question we included a wide range of alternative options. Some picked ‘Roma’, but the majority in fact preferred ‘Tsigan’ (which roughly translates as ‘Gypsy’). However, given that the Council of Europe recommends using ‘Roma’ to refer to both the Roma and related groups, we have chosen to use this term throughout the report. In addition, a large group in all three cities defined themselves as ‘Romanianised Roma’, while in Stockholm, a small number reported themselves to be ‘Rudari’. There were also groups of significant size in all three cities who reported that they preferred the term ‘Romanian’ about their ethnicity. Most of these belonged to the ethnic majority population. However, as the Romani language is often argued to be the principle identifier of Roma ethnic identity, respondents who said that they spoke Romani at home were also classified as Romanianised Roma. A more systematic description of differences between the Roma, the Romanianised Roma and the non-Roma population is presented in Chapter 2. The purpose is to illustrate the significant diversity within the groups commonly referred to as Roma. From Chapter 3 and onwards, however, we will not distinguish between Roma and Romanianised Roma.

Research method
In this report we present results from three large surveys conducted in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen, supported by qualitative interviews and fieldwork in each city and in Romania. The report is primarily based on three separate surveys which have provided data about a total of 1,269 migrants in the three Scandinavian capitals. The surveys were conducted during the summer and autumn 2014. We used Respondent

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4 The ‘Rudari’ are a group which claims a separate ancestry and do not speak the Romani language. They are usually classified as ‘Romanianised Roma’, including in this study.
Driven Sampling (RDS), a survey method that utilises social networks to produce data on, and provide representative estimates for, hard-to-reach populations (Tyldum and Johnston, 2014). We give a presentation of the RDS methodology and our adaptations of it in the methodology appendix in the end of this report. In this section we will give a short introduction to RDS, discuss the benefits and limitations of using the method in studies of rare and elusive populations, and present an overview of the data on which we base our analyses.

RDS is a sampling method that utilises social networks to identify survey respondents and provide representative estimates for hard-to-reach populations. Until recently it was most widely used in public health research for the study of HIV prevalence in high-risk populations, but in recent years its application has been extended into other fields, including migration research. RDS is characterised by both a particular method of recruitment of respondents and a distinct set of estimators.

In RDS peers recruit their peers, using coupons with unique code numbers. There is a double incentive structure whereby respondents are paid both to take part in interviews and to recruit new respondents. This is to motivate people both to take part in the survey themselves and to influence their peers to enrol as well. The survey starts out with a few respondents (seeds) who are interviewed and subsequently given two coupons to pass on to their friends (the number of coupons can be higher or lower). If these friends come back to the researchers with the coupon, they are interviewed for the survey, and will receive a small incentive payment for this (the primary incentive). Their recruiter will also be paid a small amount for passing on the coupon and explaining to the respondent what participation in the survey entails (the secondary incentive). This double incentive structure enables recruitment to the survey to take place without interviewers actively seeking out respondents. The approach has several advantages for the study of rare and elusive populations. First, it gives access to respondents who can participate in the survey and still remain fully anonymous, as it is not necessary to record names, addresses or any other contact information. The fact that respondents seek out the interviewers, and not the other way around, as is most common in survey research, helps to reassure the respondents that the interviewers do not have any other information about them beyond what they choose to reveal. Second, in studies of populations with little trust in social institutions, the respondents serve as guarantors for the survey, as they have themselves been interviewed and know what this entails, and will therefore be in a better position to convince new recruits to participate. Thus, the combination of economic incentives, peer recruitment and anonymous participation can provide access to population groups and information that would otherwise be difficult to reach. However, the main advantage of RDS is that it can, when certain conditions are fulfilled, provide unbiased estimators for population groups where there is no available sampling
frame from which a sample can be drawn. All the shares of the population presented in this report are thus estimated percentages of the relevant population groups, not percentages of the sample groups.

However, the analysis of RDS data does require the use of specialised software and RDS estimators, and the estimators will usually have more variance than those used in an ordinary random sample. A thorough presentation of the organisation of the survey, a description of the use of incentives, a thorough assessment of the data quality and the reliability of information provided, a discussion of the challenges faced in recruitment and a presentation of the variance and other properties of the variables of the survey can all be found in the methodology appendix. It should, however, be kept in mind that RDS estimates usually have relatively high design effects, which means that the estimates have broad confidence intervals even for relatively large samples. The design effects are variable-specific, and depend on the compositions of the networks, how clustered they are, and how likely they are to recruit across groups. (For a more extensive description of the survey and the sample, please refer to the appendix.)

**TABLE 1.1.** Descriptive statistics for the samples in the three cities: gender, ethnic identity, age and sample size. Unweighted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Oslo</th>
<th>Copenhagen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of the sample</td>
<td>Estimated share of the total population</td>
<td>Design Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age below 30</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size (n)</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the three surveys, a large amount of qualitative data was collected before and during the survey fieldwork. Part of this material was collected as ordinary qualitative interviews during the spring of 2014. This included collection during two weeks of intensive fieldwork in Romania in Gorj, Arges and Vulceau counties and Bucharest Municipality in May 2014. A total of 50 qualitative interviews were conducted during this field trip. Most of the interviews (approximately 30) were carried out with migrants and family members of migrants. In addition we interviewed local ‘Roma experts’, a position held by Roma community leaders and meant to function
as a channel of communication between the Roma communities and the local authorities. We also interviewed school personnel at four schools (teachers at all four schools, as well as two headmasters and a school inspector), the leader of a Roma rights organisation, two employees of Save the Children in Romania (Salvati Copii), and a professor of sociology at the University of Bucharest. In Oslo, Stockholm and Copenhagen we interviewed representatives from all the NGOs that provide services for migrants, as well as migrants from different groups within the target population, and a few representatives of municipal services. Close to 50 qualitative interviews were conducted in the three cities prior to the start of the RDS surveys. Furthermore, in addition to the formal qualitative interviews, a large number of shorter and more informal interviews were carried out with members of the target population during the conducting of the surveys. The RDS methodology requires close monitoring of the recruitment process, and the researchers were constantly going out into the field and talking to members of the target population about specific topics and challenges that arose in the survey data collection, using interviewers as interpreters. This extensive qualitative material was used for several purposes. One was to help design the quantitative questionnaire and sampling strategy for the RDS surveys. Another was to monitor the recruitment and conduct of the RDS study (for example, to understand why recruitment sometimes slowed down, or how the respondents interpreted certain questions). Finally, we used the qualitative data to triangulate and contextualise the findings from the quantitative surveys.

**Data quality**

We assess the data from our survey to be of high quality. The methodology appendix to this report presents thorough discussions of various aspects of the data quality. Here we will highlight only a few of these points. First, on the basis of previous research among beggars and street workers, we feared as we embarked on this study that our questions might not prompt responses that would describe the real conditions of life and work for this group, but rather tap into what we have called the ‘beggar narrative’ — exaggerated stories of suffering — which would then lead respondents to choose the worst available responses in attempts to evoke sympathy and even prompt donations. Consequently, we placed much emphasis on designing our survey and our field organisation in ways that would reduce the chances of this happening. As we describe in the appendix, these strategies appear to have succeeded, and we find few traces of these ‘beggar narratives’ in the responses collected. Respondents who spoke of deprivation in one area also reported other aspects of their lives which were better. Some respondents told us that they owned cars or mobile phones, and only a few said that they feared their children were going hungry, or that they had houses in Romania without electricity. As we will document in this report, the analysis of the
data discloses patterns of correlation in line with what could expected from sociological theory and previous studies of this population. This strengthens the credibility of our data. All in all, we find that the data are a rich source of knowledge about the lives of the migrants and their families. As is the case for many other marginalised groups in society, opportunities for our respondents to voice their opinions about their own situation are quite limited. Many of them cherished the opportunity to be heard, and put great effort into telling their stories accurately.

**Estimations of population size**

The survey did not enable us to produce size estimations for the populations, for reasons described in more detail in the appendix. The populations of street workers in the three cities are socio-demographically very different from one another, as are the contexts of reception the migrants encounter in the various Scandinavian capitals. In the summer of 2014, visitors to the three Scandinavian capitals would easily get the impression that the population of street workers in Stockholm is much larger than that in Copenhagen; while one would meet Romanian street workers on every corner in Stockholm, they were hardly to be seen in Copenhagen. However, Copenhagen has introduced a ban on begging that makes the street workers move around when they beg, trying to avoid too much attention. The ban on begging also makes them more likely to seek other sources of income that are less visible. As we will see later, the street workers in Copenhagen are also subject to stronger policing than the ones in Stockholm, for instance with more frequent ID checks. Consequently, they move around in smaller groups, and the groups contain fewer Roma in traditional dress than in Stockholm, and to some extent fewer than in Oslo as well. All of these are factors that make them less visible. When we started our work in Copenhagen we wondered whether it would be possible to reach our target sample size of 450, as we assumed the population to be much smaller than was in fact the case. However, when the network recruitment started, we reached into population groups that we did not know existed, and it would not have been difficult to recruit far more respondents than the target 450. The same was the case in both the other cities; there were no indications that we were even approaching having interviewed all the members of the population. Recruitment did proceed more slowly in Copenhagen than in the other cities, however, mainly due to the networks being smaller, resulting in a somewhat smaller sample because of the time constraints for fieldwork (see the methodology appendix). We therefore warn against ‘guesstimates’ of population size that are based on visibility or use of services. Although we cannot say anything about population size, we can still generalise to distributions of characteristics within networks, in line with RDS methodology.
Structure of the report
The present report consists of ten chapters and an appendix describing the RDS methodology applied. Chapter 2 gives a brief introduction to the survey population and the context in which the surveys were carried out, while Chapter 3 describes the basic living conditions in Romania for the migrant population and their families. In Chapter 4 we analyse the different economic survival strategies employed by migrant street workers in Scandinavia and how they are related to each other, including begging, collecting bottles, taking on casual work in the informal economy, doing street performances and engaging in petty crime, while in Chapter 5 we explore how migration and street work within this population are organised, including the extent to which beggars and other migrant street workers are victims of or vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Chapter 6 gives a brief overview of the living conditions of the migrants while in Scandinavia, while Chapter 7 describes how they are received by the local populations and public authorities, including limitations on access to public spaces and experiences of harassment. Chapter 8 evaluates the consequences of this type of migration for the sending communities, with particular focus on remittances and how migration affects school enrolment rates and attendance for the children of migrants, and Chapter 9 analyses the temporal aspects of migration and thereby evaluates the extent to which this type of migration is likely to be a permanent phenomenon in Scandinavia. In Chapter 10 we sum up our findings and draw conclusions.
Chapter 2

A tale of three cities

In this chapter we will provide basic socio-demographic information about the populations of homeless street workers in the three cities. Many of the points mentioned here – such as group structure and socio-economic background – will be analysed in more detail in later chapters. The aim in this chapter is only to provide rough descriptions of the three different populations in the three cities. These descriptions quickly reveal that the populations are in fact very different. We find substantial differences in a wide range of basic variables, usually with Stockholm at one end of the spectrum, Copenhagen at the other, and Oslo in between. We cannot be certain why there seem to be such differences in the selection of the migrants going to the three cities. Given the highly networked structure of this migration, it could be the result of cumulative or path-dependent effects of initial migratory links that may have been more or less random at the outset. However, we believe it to be more likely that the differences in the selection of migrants going to the three cities are related to the very different local environments that they encounter there, related to the different contexts of reception described in Chapter 1.

Selection of migrants going to the three cities

Homeless Romanians living on the streets of the three Scandinavian capital cities share many common characteristics and circumstances. Most of these migrants are quite recent arrivals in Scandinavia, and almost all of them have found their way to Scandinavia after Romania joined the EU in 2007. They are mostly drawn from relatively marginalised segments of Romanian society, few have any educational qualifications or occupational skills that can be marketed in Scandinavia, and most of them identify themselves as belonging to the Roma minority. As EU citizens, they have the right to enter the Scandinavian countries, but have no access to regular social services and benefits. They brave harsh conditions on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals, trying to eke out a living through begging and other kinds of informal ‘street work’, and they are for the most part subject to relatively negative receptions from the resident populations.

However, despite these obvious similarities in backgrounds and conditions of life, a striking feature of our three city samples is their distinctiveness from one another. Across a wide range of variables, at least in terms of average scores and population composition, the populations of homeless street workers from Romania in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen differ from one another in significant ways,
suggesting that there is clear selection of migrants in terms of who travels to which city. This goes for ethnic identity, gender composition, network structure, human capital, educational and occupational backgrounds, migration experiences, economic livelihood strategies in Scandinavia, and a wide range of other related variables. Our data do not enable a causal analysis to be made of the links between the local policies adopted in the three cities and the characteristics of the migrants they attract, but one possible explanation for the differences in the three migrant populations is that it takes different resources to succeed as a poor migrant in Copenhagen to those required in Stockholm. The population in Stockholm displays a consistent pattern of being the most marginalised from mainstream society in terms of their lack of basic formal education and work experience. At the same time they appear to be the ones who are most integrated into the traditional Roma communities where they come from. They convey strong ethnic identities and distinct cultural values, and often travel in large kinship and family-based groups. The migrant population in Copenhagen, on the other hand, is relatively less marginalised from mainstream society, in that the migrants have a greater amount of basic formal education and work experience. They also appear less integrated into the Roma ethnic groups in Romania, having less strong traditional values and identities, coming from less segregated communities, and generally operating outside ethnic kinship groups. The population in Oslo appears to lie somewhere in the middle, as will be evident throughout the analyses in this report. In this chapter we illustrate this finding with some basic indicators regarding the ethnic identities, cultural attitudes, group compositions and socio-economic backgrounds of the migrants.

Ethnic identity
The three populations differ in terms of their ethnic composition. In Stockholm, only 14 percent identified themselves as ethnic Romanians, or non-Roma as they will be labelled throughout this report, while the overwhelming majority identified themselves as either ‘Roma’ or ‘Romanianised Roma’. In the subsequent chapters of this report, those who identify themselves as ‘Roma’ and ‘Romanianised Roma’ will be combined into a common category called ‘Roma’. However, in this chapter we will make a distinction between the two, in order to show some of the variation within the populations of Roma migrants. In Oslo, 35 per cent identified themselves as non-Roma, while a majority – although a smaller proportion than in Stockholm – identified themselves as Roma or Romanianised Roma. In Copenhagen, however, non-Roma made up about half the population, while the other half is equally divided between Roma and Romanianised Roma.
FIGURE 2.1. Ethnic identity.

The Roma have traditionally been organised into different kinship-based subgroups. Until recently, these subgroups have determined which traditional crafts are carried out and which occupational niches are held by many of the Roma, and to some extent this continues to be the case. Most of those who define themselves as traditional Roma report that they belong to such subgroups, while fewer of the Romanianised Roma say they do. In Stockholm, the largest groups are Calderari (traditional metalworkers) from the Bacau and Buzeau regions in Romanian Moldovia, and Turkish Roma from the Tulca region. In Oslo, the largest groups are Caramizari (brick-makers) from Gorj County and Ursari (entertainers) from Bacau County. In Copenhagen, some identify themselves as Calderari (metalworkers), but the vast majority say that they do not identify with any such traditional subgroup.
TABLE 2.1. Subgroups among the Roma.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroups among the Roma</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>Calderari from Bacau and Buzau and Turkish Roma from Tulca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>Caramizari from Gorj and Ursari from Bacau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>No subgroup, Calderari</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cultural attitudes**

The three ethnic categories we have described here differ in terms of language use and cultural values, in that those we have called ‘Roma’ are usually more traditionally-oriented and have a stronger sense of identity as Roma than those who call themselves Romanianised Roma. However, even within these categories there are significant differences between the three cities. For example, while in all three cities Romanianised Roma are generally less likely than other Roma to say that they speak Romani at home with their families (and non-Roma usually do not speak Romani at all), members of all three groups living in Copenhagen are considerably less likely to have Romani as their mother tongue than those living in the other two capitals. When we asked our respondents about whether they find it unacceptable or inadvisable for women to wear trousers in public (a traditional taboo among many Roma groups), we found that those in Stockholm are generally quite conservative (e.g. that they find this unacceptable), while those in Copenhagen are far less observant of this rule. The same pattern was found when we asked whether the respondents find intermarriage between Roma and non-Roma to be unacceptable or inadvisable. The Roma in Stockholm and Oslo are generally against the idea of intermarriage, while those who identify themselves as Romanianised Roma in those two cities as well as the Roma in Copenhagen are less disapproving. Interestingly, however, the non-Roma are also opposed to intermarriage in Oslo and Copenhagen. This illustrates how the ethnic boundary between Roma and non-Roma is maintained on both sides. Only the Romanianised Roma in Oslo and Copenhagen appear to feel positive towards intermarriage.
FIGURE 2.2. Language use and cultural values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Oslo</th>
<th>Copenhagen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Speak Romani at home</strong></td>
<td>Point estimate</td>
<td>95% conf. interval</td>
<td>Point estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>92% (89-96)</td>
<td>83% (76-89)</td>
<td>57% (46-68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanianised Roma</td>
<td>54% (44-63)</td>
<td>42% (32-51)</td>
<td>29% (18-41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Romanian</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1% (0-2)</td>
<td>1% (0-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64% (58-70)</td>
<td>41% (34-47)</td>
<td>23% (17-29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Find it unacceptable or inadvisable for women to wear trousers in public</strong></td>
<td>Point estimate</td>
<td>95% conf. interval</td>
<td>Point estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>87% (83-92)</td>
<td>56% (48-64)</td>
<td>30% (20-49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanianised Roma</td>
<td>77% (69-85)</td>
<td>28% (20-36)</td>
<td>25% (13-35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Romanian</td>
<td>12% (3-20)</td>
<td>9% (0-17)</td>
<td>3% (0-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73% (66-79)</td>
<td>30% (25-36)</td>
<td>16% (11-21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Find intermarriage (Roma/non-Roma) unacceptable or inadvisable</strong></td>
<td>Point estimate</td>
<td>95% conf. interval</td>
<td>Point estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>81% (76-87)</td>
<td>46% (38-54)</td>
<td>24% (15-33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanianised Roma</td>
<td>76% (70-83)</td>
<td>19% (13-25)</td>
<td>21% (12-30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Romanian</td>
<td>38% (20-56)</td>
<td>63% (53-73)</td>
<td>45% (35-55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73% (67-78)</td>
<td>46% (40-51)</td>
<td>34% (28-39)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Group composition

The populations of Romanian street workers in the three cities also differ in terms of group structure. While some tend to travel in family groups, others – usually men – tend to travel without their families, either alone or in smaller, less-cohesive groups of more distant friends and acquaintances. We will provide a more in-depth analysis of group structure and social organisation in Chapter 5, but for now we will only emphasise how the cities differ, in that migrants going to Stockholm tend to do so with their families, while those who go to Copenhagen go alone or in smaller, less-cohesive and predominantly male groups of non-relatives or more distant relatives. The gender compositions of the populations in the three cities are therefore very different. Since migrants going to Stockholm tend to do so in family groups, women make up almost half (44 percent) of the Stockholm sample. This share is slightly larger for the Roma and smaller for the non-Roma. In Oslo, 29 percent are women, while women make up only 13 percent of the sample population in Copenhagen. To some extent – but only to some extent – this gender difference reflects the differences in the ethnic compositions of the migrant populations, as the populations of non-Roma tend to be more male-dominated in all the cities, while the populations of Roma tend to be more evenly divided between men and women. However, even within the different sub-populations of Roma and non-Roma, male dominance becomes increasingly greater as we move from Stockholm, to Oslo, to Copenhagen. Especially in Copenhagen, there appear to be very few women among both the Roma and the non-Roma populations.

FIGURE 2.3. Gender composition and share who travel with close family.
The same pattern appears in the responses to questions about the social composition of the groups in which people travel. For example, 73 percent of the respondents in Stockholm report that they are travelling together with close family members, and about half are living in Stockholm together with their spouses. In Oslo 48 percent report that they are travelling with close family members, and 28 percent are with their spouses. In Copenhagen, just 30 percent are travelling with close family members and only 15 percent are in Copenhagen together with their spouses. Once again, this is not purely a reflection of the differences in the ethnic compositions of the groups. Although Roma more often travel in family groups and non-Roma more often travel with people from outside their immediate family circle, we also find that the likelihood of travelling in groups of close family members and being together with a spouse is greatest in Stockholm and smallest in Copenhagen for both Roma and non-Roma.

The age compositions of the populations in the three cities are relatively similar. People in their twenties, thirties and forties dominate in all three cities, and the average age within all ethnic categories lies somewhere in the mid-thirties. Oslo, however, appears to have a slightly larger group of people over 50 years old, while the population in Stockholm contains a larger share of persons under 20.

FIGURE 2.4. Age composition.
Socio-economic background

We can extend this pattern of differences between Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen to the educational and occupational backgrounds of the respondents. Most of the respondents in all three cities have very modest educational experience. The Roma in particular have very little basic schooling, reflecting both a traditional scepticism towards school as a mainstream institution and discrimination and exclusion in the Romanian school system. But there are nevertheless significant differences. In Stockholm, the average number of years of schooling that the respondents report having completed is only 3.6, and 79 percent report that they have not completed the obligatory eight years of primary education. In Oslo, respondents report an average of 7.1 years of schooling, while 41.5 percent report that they have not completed primary education. In Copenhagen respondents report an average of 7.8 years of schooling, and ‘only’ 36.8 percent report that they have not completed obligatory primary education. This difference in educational background is also reflected in basic literacy skills among the respondents. In Stockholm, only 28 percent report that they know how to read and write. In Oslo, the corresponding figure is 61 percent, while in Copenhagen, 70 percent report that they can read and write. The large differences in average number of years of schooling among the three cities to some extent reflect the differences in ethnic composition and the fact that the Roma tend to have very little schooling. However, even within the ethnic categories, the differences between the three cities are significant. In fact, the majority of Roma migrants in Stockholm – in particular among the large group of Turkish Roma from the Tulca region – report that they have never gone to school at all. Roma who live in Copenhagen also have very limited basic schooling, but nevertheless they consistently have more than those in the other cities, particularly those in Stockholm.
In terms of occupational experience, the same pattern appears once more. In Stockholm, only 25 percent report that they have ever had a formal job in Romania. 52 percent report that they have worked in informal jobs in Romania, while 22 percent have never had work at all. In Oslo, 38 percent report that they have experience in formal work from Romania, while 18 percent have never had any work. In Copenhagen, 44 percent have had formal work in Romania, while only 10 percent report that they have never had work at all. (We should note, however, that many of our respondents have also had work in other countries – especially as labour migrants in southern Europe; see Chapter 3).
When poverty meets affluence. Migrants from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals.

**FIGURE 2.6.** Occupational experience in Romania.

**FIGURE 2.7.** Occupational experience in Romania.
When we examine the figures more closely, we find that the majority of non-Roma in all three cities have formal work experience, while the Roma more often tend to have experience from work in the informal economy. Our respondents in Stockholm also have less experience of migration – 39 percent report having previous migration experience, as opposed to 67 percent in both Oslo and Copenhagen.

Implications for comparative analysis

Those migrants who are categorised as traditional Roma tend to be the most marginalised from mainstream institutions (although they may be well integrated into their own communities), and also tend to be the most socioeconomically disadvantaged. Lacking in economic capital and educational skills, they rely more on the social capital derived from close family networks, travelling in groups consisting of close family members, both male and female. Those categorised in our survey as Romanianised Roma differ from those categorised as traditional Roma in terms of identities, attitudes and cultural orientation. Socioeconomically, however, they tend to be only slightly better off, suggesting that their attempts to assimilate into mainstream Romanian society have only provided them with very moderate pay-offs in terms of material living conditions. In the analyses in the following chapters we will for the most part not distinguish between these two groups, labelling both the Roma ‘proper’ and the Romanianised groups as Roma. Ethnic majority Romanians, or non-Roma, although underprivileged compared to the general population back home, consistently have more resources than the Roma in terms of formal schooling and formal work experience. However, they tend to have far fewer resources in terms of the kind of social capital that is embedded in close-knit family networks, often travelling alone or together with more distant friends and acquaintances. An episode observed during our fieldwork in Oslo may serve as an illustration. On a particularly cold winter night in early 2014, we were conducting interviews in the queue for the emergency night shelter in Oslo. As a large forest camp had been dismantled by the police and the tents of the residents confiscated earlier the same day, leaving more than 60 of them without a place to sleep, the shelter was completely overwhelmed and the people seeking refuge there had to draw lots. Those who drew a green token could enter; those who drew a red one were refused. Most of those drawing a red token would make a little fuss and complain, but then quickly moved on in small groups. An elderly woman, however, appeared to be in particular distress after drawing a red token, sitting motionless on the pavement and crying before moving off into the night. The other people in the line also appeared to pity her. A woman explained to us that ‘We will always manage, we stick together with friends and family and we look out for each other. For her it is different – she is a Romanian, she doesn’t have anyone.’

There is also a consistent pattern that migrants living in Stockholm are generally
more economically disadvantaged and more traditionally-oriented than those going to the two other cities. They have fewer educational and occupational resources, even compared to others within the same ethnic groups as themselves, and they also have less migratory experience. The corresponding population in Copenhagen appears to be more dominated by men. They are slightly more educated, they know how to read and write, they come from slightly less marginalised populations in Romania, and they have more work and migration experience (see Chapter 3). While they also travel in small groups, they rely less on close family members. In many ways, the Roma in Copenhagen share more traits with their non-Roma compatriots in the same city than they do with the Roma in Stockholm. For all of the variables listed above, the population of Romanian migrants in Oslo falls somewhere in between those in Stockholm and Copenhagen.

The differences in migration experience also apply to the length of stay in Scandinavia. While migration to Oslo and Copenhagen seems to be an established practice, most of the population in Stockholm had only arrived very recently: 60 percent of our interviewees in Stockholm had spent less than three months in Stockholm in 2014, and had never been to Stockholm before. In Oslo and Copenhagen the same was true for 30 percent of the interviewees. This obviously had some consequences for how they had adapted to local conditions.

This systematic variation also corresponds well with our qualitative data and impressions during fieldwork. While respondents in Stockholm often appeared to be confused and bewildered in what was for them a new city, our respondents in Copenhagen much more often came across as being ‘street smart’ and knowledgeable about how to access resources and to find their way around the city. At the same time, however, they often seemed to lack the support and security derived from close-knit family groups whose members looked after one another: support which seemed much more highly developed within the groups of migrants living in Stockholm, and to some extent those in Oslo.

These apparently systematic differences among the three populations are significant for two reasons. First, they present us with a methodological challenge in comparing the three cities. We know that the contexts of reception – as manifested by the strictness of policy measures in force as well as the level of support from NGOs – are very different in the three cities. However, when comparing the average outcomes for homeless migrants in the three cities, we cannot know for certain whether the differences in living conditions and outcomes are a result of the different contexts of reception or of the differences in educational and other resources that the migrants possess. In comparing outcomes across the three cities, therefore, we need to control for gender, ethnic identity and the level of formal and informal resources that the migrants possess before we can infer anything about the causes of the disparate outcomes.
Second, the differences are significant because they show that the characteristics of the migrants going to each of the three cities are quite different. As noted previously, we cannot form conclusions regarding the causal effects of the contexts of reception and patterns of migration. However, our qualitative material does support the interpretation that the policies adopted in Denmark encourage the selection of able-bodied men who are willing to accept considerable risk. As one of our respondents in Romania explained, ‘You can make good money in Denmark. But you have to be able to run fast because the police will always be after you.’ It is considered safer for families and women to go to Stockholm, where beggars are usually left alone and allowed to sleep in parks and on street pavements. The further implications of these selection mechanisms for the outcomes of migration – and the social challenges that follow in their wake for the host societies – will be discussed in Chapter 10.
Chapter 3

Worlds apart: The migrants’ living conditions in Romania

Migration from Romania to Scandinavia can hardly be understood without taking a closer look at the migrants’ living conditions and income opportunities in Romania. In this chapter we will discuss the living conditions and income alternatives that the migrants had at home in Romania. The findings are based both on the data collected through the survey in the three capitals and on our qualitative fieldwork in six different localities in Romania. In Chapter 9 we will make a closer examination of the practice of making remittances and of how the money gained from migration is spent in Romania.

Romania is among the poorest countries in Europe. Although the poverty rate in Romania has dropped significantly since the turn of the millennium, the country still has the highest poverty rate in the EU, and in Europe is surpassed in terms of poverty only by Moldova. Half of the population live in rural areas. There is a large gap in living standards between rural and urban areas, and thus Romania also has the highest level of rural poverty in the EU (World Bank 2015). A large proportion of jobs are in the informal sector, youth unemployment is about 24 percent (OECD 2015), and wages are low relative to EU standards. (In 2007, average wages in Romania were only 12 percent of the average in Western Europe, according to the OECD).

The majority of the migrants to Scandinavia identify themselves as Roma. Roma communities can be found all over Romania. Although not all Roma are poor, they are without doubt amongst the poorest and most vulnerable groups in the country. Moreover, their poverty has a higher spatial concentration: not only individuals, but also the communities in which they live tend to poor, typically reflected in poor social and physical infrastructure (World Bank 2005). A World Bank survey from 2005 indicated that 11 percent of all Roma communities in Romania lacked access roads altogether, and a further 55 percent only had access by gravel roads. In 10 percent of Roma communities more than half of the households lacked a source of potable water. In 74 percent of the communities the main income sources were reported as being the minimum income guarantee provided by social benefits or occasional informal work activities. The report also stated that poverty is unevenly distributed between traditional subgroups of the Roma, with the Carimizari (brick-makers) at the bottom and the Rudari and Vatrasi at the top of the income distribution (World Bank 2005).
The same survey found that the poorest Roma communities at that time were also low on human capital: they had very low education levels, and little experience with migration abroad. Migration seemed to be less prevalent in the poorest and least-educated communities. This correlation may of course result from a self-reinforcing mechanism: extreme poverty makes migration difficult, and at the same time, migration increases income opportunities (World Bank 2005).

EU membership has eased access to migration opportunities, and this fact, in combination with the ongoing crisis in Europe and diminishing job opportunities in Romania, may have diminished or eliminated the negative correlation between poverty and migration in the ten years that have passed since the World Bank survey. Since migration to Scandinavia started, largely after 2007, other migration strategies may also have been established. During our fieldwork in Romania we interviewed a number of Roma with migration experience to Norway and Sweden, including some in very poor communities, and including some members of the Carimizari subgroup. This qualitative fieldwork is obviously not suited as a basis for drawing conclusions about the selection of migrants compared to non-migrants, but it is suitable for documenting that even the very poorest members of some poor Roma communities have had extensive migration experience. As we shall see, the data we have collected do not support the hypothesis that the migrants are a positively selected group.

Living conditions in Romania among the migrants interviewed in Scandinavia vary within and between groups, but poor living conditions are widespread. In the next section we will present our findings about the situation of the households of the migrants in Romania, using classical measurements of living conditions: education, income, sources of income, labour market participation and housing.

Regions of origin
Romanians from a number of local communities migrate to Scandinavia, but some regions stand out as major migrant sending areas. These regions differ with regard to the migrants from them going to the three Scandinavian cities, suggesting that there are relatively separate migration channels to each city. Most migrants to Oslo come from the counties of Gorj, Buzau and Bacau. The migrants to Stockholm mainly come from Tulcea, and there are also large groups from Neamt and Iasi. The migrants to Copenhagen are less geographically clustered, but the largest number come from Buzau.
The Roma migrants to all three cities are relatively evenly distributed across three types of ethnic neighbourhoods in Romania: neighbourhoods where most people are Roma, neighbourhoods where most people are ethnic Romanian, and neighbourhoods with a more or less equal mix of Roma and ethnic Romanians. Slightly more (50 percent) of the Roma migrants to Oslo and Stockholm than of the Roma migrants to Copenhagen (32 percent) come from neighbourhoods where most people are ethnic Roma. The majority (63-77 percent) of the ethnic Romanian migrants in all the three cities live in predominantly majority ethnic Romanian neighbourhoods in Romania, while 10-15 percent of the ethnic Romanian migrants live in neighbourhoods that are predominantly Roma. In our qualitative fieldwork in Romania we found that Roma and non-Roma from the same village sometimes travel together, typically in a car owned by an ethnic Romanian.
FIGURE 3.2. Ethnic compositions of migrants’ neighbourhoods in Romania.

FIGURE 3.3. Responses to the question ‘What best describes the community in which you live(d) in Romania?’
Housing
The housing standards in Romania, in particular in the rural areas, are substantially lower than in Western EU countries (Alber et al 2007). In 2012, 52 percent of the people in Romania lived in overcrowded dwellings (less than one room per person), 36 percent had no bath or shower, and 37 percent did not have an indoor toilet (Eurostat 2015).

A large majority of the migrants say that they have access to housing in Romania, by either owning or renting a house. In Copenhagen, 98 percent of respondents said that they have access to housing in Romania; the corresponding figures for Oslo and Stockholm are 93 percent and 87 percent respectively. Overcrowding of dwellings is much more common in the households of the migrants than in the population as a whole. By the standard definition of overcrowding (more than one person per room), 91 percent of the migrants to Stockholm, 79 percent of the migrants to Oslo and 75 percent of the migrants to Copenhagen live in overcrowded houses in Romania. Nine out of ten Roma migrants to all three cities live in overcrowded houses, and slightly fewer of the non-Roma migrants (Stockholm 81 percent, Oslo 60 percent and Copenhagen 61 percent).

The extent of overcrowding can also be indicated by the average number of persons per room. By this measure, Roma migrants to Stockholm constitute the group that come from the most crowded households in Romania, with an average of 3.8 persons per room. Ethnic Romanians in Oslo make up the group in our survey who live in the least crowded conditions in Romania, with an average of 1.8 persons per room.

Roma respondents live in houses with significantly poorer standards than do the non-Roma. A majority report that they lack piped water inside their houses. Most have access to running water outside the house, at less than two minutes’ walking distance. Nevertheless, two out of ten migrants to Oslo and Copenhagen, and as many as one in four in Stockholm, do not have access to either piped water inside or running water outside their houses. Only six percent of the non-Roma that migrate to Copenhagen report that they live in households in Romania that lack both piped water and running water outside the house, while roughly one in ten non-Roma migrants to Stockholm and Oslo lack this kind of access to water in Romania. Access to water is poorer in rural areas than in urban areas. We find the largest group with poor access to water among the Roma migrants to Stockholm are those who live in rural areas in Romania; in these areas, one-third of households of these Roma migrants lack both piped water and access to running water outside within two minutes’ walking distance.

Most of the Roma that migrate to Scandinavia do not have toilets inside their houses in Romania. The rate of presence of water closets in the homes of migrants in
When poverty meets affluence. Migrants from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals

Romania differs according to ethnicity, urbanity and city of destination. Of the Roma migrants in the three Scandinavian cities, only 6 percent in Stockholm, 11 percent in Oslo and 16 percent in Copenhagen report living in houses with flushing indoor toilets. A significant number of non-Roma migrants also have houses in Romania that lack inside toilets; this is the case for 72 percent of the respondents in Stockholm, 43 percent in Oslo and 40 percent in Copenhagen. According to Eurostat, in 2012 63 percent of the population of Romania lived in houses with indoor flushing toilets, indicating that the Roma migrants in particular, but also the non-Roma migrants in Stockholm, come from living conditions in Romania that are far below the average.

Many of the migrants live in houses in Romania that are not equipped with a kitchen inside the house. This is the case for two out of three Roma who migrate to Sweden, half of the Roma who migrate to Oslo, and four out of ten Roma who migrate to Copenhagen. The same is also true for 45 percent of non-Roma who migrate to Sweden, two out of ten non-Roma who migrate to Oslo and one in ten non-Roma who migrate to Copenhagen. The majority of Roma live in houses that do not have a bathroom or shower, which is not surprising since the houses do not have piped water. A large majority of the houses of Roma migrants also lack a connection to the mains sewage system. Six out of ten households from which migrants to Stockholm have come do have electricity, as is the case for nine out of ten households sending migrants to Oslo or Copenhagen. On this measure there is little difference between Roma and non-Roma households. When the urban/rural factor is taken into consideration, we find that access to electricity is clearly poorest among migrants to Stockholm who live in rural areas, where only half the households are connected to mains electricity. This goes for both Roma and non-Roma migrants. Even when they are connected to mains electricity, very few Roma households use electricity (or gas) for heating. Heating from electricity or gas is most common in the houses of non-Roma migrants to Copenhagen; in this group, three out of ten responded that they have this kind of heating in their houses in Romania.

Summing up, we find that a large group of the Romanian migrants to Scandinavia live in dwellings that are overcrowded and lack a number of modern facilities such as mains water, bathrooms and heating. The most severe problems are found in the Roma households, and in particular among Roma households with members who migrate to Stockholm. Non-Roma migrants also have severe problems with the quality of housing.

According to Tarnovschi (2011), 36 percent of Roma households were connected to the drinking water mains in 2011. We find that 20, 24 and 33 percent among the Roma migrants to Stockholm, Oslo, and Copenhagen respectively live in houses in Romania that have piped water inside. The questions were not identically phrased in the two sur-
veys, however, and some respondents with access to a water supply outside the house may have responded affirmatively in the Romanian census. In the 2011 survey from Romania, 24 percent of Roma households were found to be connected to the mains sewage system. In our surveys, the figures were 19, 26 and 25 percent respectively among the Roma migrants to the three cities. Tarnovschi (2011) reports that 16 percent of Roma households had a water closet in the dwelling, and 91 percent of the households were connected to mains electricity. Our surveys produce the estimates 6, 11 and 16 percent respectively for water closets, and 59, 89 and 88 percent respectively for electricity, for the Roma migrants to the three cities. In other words, we find housing conditions in Romania that correspond quite well to the findings of the 2011 survey, but for some of the facilities there is substantial variation between the three city surveys. If the 2011 survey gives a representative picture of Roma living conditions, and housing conditions is an acceptable proxy for socioeconomic position, the migrants in Oslo seem to be socioeconomically quite representative of Roma people in Romania. Migrants to Stockholm seem to be negatively selected, while migrants to Copenhagen are slightly positively selected.

Some of the differences may be due to differences between suburban and urban localities in Romania.

**TABLE 3.1. Mean numbers of persons per room in migrants’ households in Romania.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Mean number of persons per room</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oslo</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</table>
When poverty meets affluence. Migrants from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals.

TABLE 3.2. Household amenities in migrants’ dwellings in Romania. Percentages of households with access to various amenities.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urbanity of neighbourhood in Romania</th>
<th>Piped water inside</th>
<th>Toilet inside</th>
<th>Toilet outside</th>
<th>Kitchen inside</th>
<th>Shower or bathroom inside</th>
<th>Connection to mains drainage</th>
<th>Electricity supply inside</th>
<th>Heating by electricity or gas</th>
<th>Running water outside</th>
<th>Water inside or outside</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>84%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8%</td>
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<td>59%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>74%</td>
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<td>5%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<td>19%</td>
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<td>6%</td>
<td>73%</td>
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<td>92%</td>
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<td>10%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>79%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>90%</td>
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<td>66%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td>4%</td>
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<td>71%</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<td>92%</td>
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<td>39%</td>
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<td>89%</td>
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<td>64%</td>
<td>81%</td>
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<td>83%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>99%</td>
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<td>99%</td>
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<td>48%</td>
<td>77%</td>
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<td>57%</td>
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<td>43%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>91%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>76%</td>
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<td>23%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>42%</td>
<td>94%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stockholm</strong></td>
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<td>11%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>77%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Oslo</strong></td>
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<td>40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>36%</td>
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<td>68%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Copenhagen</strong></td>
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<td>42%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Education and literacy**

The migrants to the Scandinavian capitals are not a highly educated group. 62 percent of the migrants to Stockholm never went to school at all (report zero years of schooling). The same is true for 14 percent of the migrants to Oslo, and 12 percent of the migrants to Copenhagen. Non-attendance at school is mainly a phenomenon found in the Roma population. In Stockholm, 69 percent of the Roma and 10 percent of the non-Roma population report zero years of schooling. In Oslo and Copenhagen, roughly two out of ten of the Roma migrants never went to school, while only
3 percent and 0.2 percent respectively of the non-Roma migrants in these two cities report no schooling. Among those Roma migrants who did complete some level of education, lower secondary is the most common educational level. A few also completed both lower and upper secondary education (see Figure 3.4).

Very few (only 11 percent) of the Roma migrants to Stockholm completed any education at all. 45 percent of Roma migrants to Copenhagen and 40 percent of Roma migrants to Oslo are also in this category. Educational levels for non-Roma migrants are significantly higher, and roughly one third (Stockholm 28 percent, Oslo 30 percent and Copenhagen 39 percent) completed upper secondary education or higher. About ten percent of the non-Roma migrants completed post-secondary education. We interviewed a total of three Roma migrants with post-secondary education, one in each city.

There are also strong gender differences in education. The female Roma in Stockholm on average have less than one year of education, while the men have three. The Roma women in Oslo and Copenhagen have an average of about four years of education, while the men have on average slightly more than six years of education. There are not enough female non-Roma migrants in the surveys to make the same comparison for them, but if we combine the three surveys we find an unweighted average of eight years of education for the non-Roma women and ten years of education for the non-Roma men.

Illiteracy is widespread in the Roma population, particularly among women. Only about one in three of the Roma women who migrate to Oslo or Copenhagen report that they are able to write in Romanian without difficulty. Literacy is even rarer among the Roma women who migrate to Stockholm; only 11 percent of them report that they can write in Romanian without difficulty. Most Roma women do however know at least basic maths, although 34 percent of the Roma women in Oslo, 39 percent of the Roma women in Copenhagen, and 20 percent of Roma women in Stockholm report that they do not know basic maths either. Male Roma report somewhat better knowledge of basic maths. Nevertheless, 12 percent of the men in Stockholm, 14 percent of the men in Oslo, and 18 percent of the men in Copenhagen report that they do not know basic maths. Among the non-Roma migrants a solid majority know more than the basics of maths, and very few (Stockholm 4 percent, Oslo 1 percent and Copenhagen 1 percent) report that they do not know basic maths at all. Literacy is also the norm among the non-Roma. Nine out of ten non-Roma migrants to Oslo and Copenhagen report that they are able to write in Romanian without difficulty, and eight out of ten non-Roma migrants to Stockholm say the same. Four percent of non-Roma migrants to Oslo, two percent of migrants to Copenhagen and ten percent of non-Roma migrants to Stockholm report that they do not know how to write in Romanian at all.
**FIGURE 3.4. Highest level of education completed.** Homeless street workers from Romania in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen. Fafo survey 2014. N=1269

![Graph showing highest level of education completed by Roma and Non-Roma migrants in Stockholm, Oslo, and Copenhagen.](image)


![Graph showing shares of Roma migrants who can write in Romanian without difficulty by city and gender.](image)
FIGURE 3.6. Roma migrants’ responses to the question ‘Do you know basic maths.’


Employment and income

Access for the Roma to the formal labour market in Romania has clearly deteriorated over the past few decades. The Roma population was hit hard by the collapse of the Ceauşescu regime in 1989. A large number of Roma lost their formal employment, and found it extremely difficult to find new formal employment. The dramatic changes in the situation for the Roma in the Romanian labour market are reflected in the fact that among the Roma street workers in Scandinavia, a substantial proportion of men above 39 years of age have been in formal employment at some time. This is the case for 62 of such respondents in Oslo, 43 percent in Stockholm and 46 percent in Copenhagen. In the younger generation – those under 39 – the comparable numbers shrink to as little as 13 percent and 14 percent in Oslo and Stockholm respectively, and 17 percent in Copenhagen. In other words, formal employment used to be the norm for Roma men, but it has now become almost unattainable. Looking at the migrants who were old enough to have held a job in 1989 (born before 1976), we find that the bulk of those who ever had formal employment actually lost their jobs in 1989 – and never re-entered the formal labour market again. For the non-Roma population, 1989 was also a bad year in terms of employment, but the real *annus horribilis* turned out to be the pre-crisis year of 2006. The high number of non-Roma who lost their employment for the last time in 2006 reflects the difficulties of re-entering the labour market in the European crisis period that followed.
FIGURE 3.7. Year of last formal employment. Shares of migrants born in 1975 or earlier who have been in formal employment some time.
Homeless street workers from Romania in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen. Fafo survey 2014. N=806

FIGURE 3.8. Shares of migrants who have been out of formal employment since (year of last formal employment). Cumulative percentages of never having had formal employment + year of losing last formal employment.
The difficulties for the Roma in (re-)entering the labour market since 1989 have had a devastating effect on formal employment rates. Analysing both age groups together, we find that the majority of the Roma migrants have never had formal employment (Stockholm 82 percent, and Oslo and Copenhagen each 76 percent). There are striking differences between Roma and non-Roma in all the three cities with regard to previous labour market participation in Romania: among the non-Roma, a clear majority have had formal work in Romania. However, a majority of both Roma and non-Roma in all three cities have had informal or casual work. Nine out of ten non-Roma migrants to the three cities have had either formal or informal work. A large majority of the Roma migrants have also had either formal or informal work (Stockholm 77 percent, Oslo 81 percent and Copenhagen 90 percent). These findings correspond very well with those of Engebrigtsen (2014), who discovered that most of the Romanian Roma migrants in Oslo had had formal work in Romania during the Communist era, and later had relied on informal work in Romania and countries in southern Europe. As we shall see later in this chapter, we also find that a substantial share of the migrants in our survey also have migration and work experience from southern Europe. For the younger generations of Roma, work experience in either Romania or abroad is almost entirely restricted to informal employment.

FIGURE 3.9. Responses to the question ‘Have you ever had formal work in Romania?’.
**FIGURE 3.10.** Responses to the question ‘Have you ever had formal work in Romania?’, by age.
Homeless street workers from Romania in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen. Fafo survey 2014. N=1266

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Non-Roma</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Non-Roma</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Non-Roma</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 3.11.** Responses to the question ‘Have you ever had informal or casual work (zilier) in Romania?’
Homeless street workers from Romania in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen. Fafo survey 2014. N=1266

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Roma (No)</th>
<th>Roma (Yes, paid)</th>
<th>Roma (Yes, self-employment)</th>
<th>Non-Roma (No)</th>
<th>Non-Roma (Yes, paid)</th>
<th>Non-Roma (Yes, self-employment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Income sources**

The migrants’ households in Romania rely on a number of income sources. The most common are remittances from abroad, casual day labour, child benefit and social assistance. The difficult labour market situation for the migrants’ households is perhaps most noticeable in the low occurrence of income from formal employment. Income from formal employment is very rare in the Roma families in our survey, and somewhat less rare in the non-Roma families (Stockholm 28 percent, Oslo 32 percent and Copenhagen 30 percent). Remittances from migrants constitute the most common income source for the families of Roma migrants in Oslo, while child benefit is the most common income source for the families of Roma migrants to Stockholm. These two income sources are also the most common for Roma migrants to Copenhagen. The non-Roma households have a more diverse mix of income sources. Although remittances from abroad are less common than among the Roma families, this is still the most common income source for the families of non-Roma migrants to Oslo and Copenhagen. Child benefit is the most common income source in the households of non-Roma migrants to Stockholm.

**TABLE 3.3. Sources of income for respondents’ households in Romania.**
Case study:

The recent economic history of the Roma in Gorj county

The network of villages surrounding the county capital Targu-Jiu in Gorj County constitutes a major sending area for migrants going to Oslo and Copenhagen. During our fieldwork in the area in 2014 we interviewed a large number of people in this region, including migrants, public officials and village elders. This account of the recent economic history of the Roma in Gorj County can serve as an illustration of how the severely marginalised situation of the Roma has become accentuated over the past few decades.

Under Communist rule, ethnic identities were seen as relics of the past and an obstacle to achieving the new communist society. Traditional markers of Roma identity – such as using the Romani language and the maintenance of traditional crafts – were the targets of repressive assimilationist policies. However, ethnic discrimination was also to some extent repressed, and the rural population of Roma was mobilised along with the non-Roma population to work in collectivised agriculture and state-owned mining and manufacturing plants. Older people among the Roma tend to remember life under Ceauşescu as a golden era, when the Roma of Gorj were provided with employment and income from work in agriculture or in the mining industry located in the northern part of the county.

However, the revolution in 1990 and the transition to a market economy marked the beginning of a gradual downward spiral for the Roma. Freed from Communist dictatorships, populations in many Eastern European countries sought to redefine their national identities. Ethnicity – and in particular the difference between Roma and non-Roma – became increasingly significant. The majority constructed their new identities in contrast to the Roma ‘Other’, and discrimination became increasingly fierce (Steward 2009). In the transition to a market-based economy and the national reconstruction, the Roma became the biggest losers. After the revolution the mining industry in Gorj was shut down, leaving thousands of both Roma and non-Roma out of work. At the same time, the collectively-owned lands were privatised, and land was granted to those who could document a historical claim. This included much of the Romanian rural population, whose forefathers had been small-scale farmers and sharecroppers before communism. The Roma – having been slaves up until the mid-19th century – could not document any such claims, and were excluded from the privatisation process. Many Roma continued to work as agricultural labourers for their ethnic majority neighbours, but the increasing mechanisation of agriculture during the 1990s quickly diminished the need for manual work. During the 1990s many Roma belonging to the Caramizari neamuri turned to their traditional craft of brick-making. Using traditional techniques to mould and fire bricks, many fam-
ilies made and sold them for a living during the 1990s. Around the turn of the millennium, however, new factory-made bricks were introduced onto the local market, driving traditional brick-makers out of business. Today one can still see large stacks of traditional bricks all over the villages around Targu-Jiu, but no-one uses them to build houses any more.

Besides traditional crafts, travelling to other parts of Romania in order to perform casual work was, and still is, a common source of income for many families. This type of work, called zilier, typically involves well-connected individuals setting up teams of workers who travel to different parts of the country to dig ditches, gravel roads, etc. Most of the elderly people we spoke to, however, emphasised that new technologies had reduced the need for manual labour, not just in agriculture, but also in road construction and public works, and that the market for zilier work had dwindled in recent years.

In the early 2000s many Roma in Gorj started migrating abroad to earn money. Typically, they travelled to Italy and Spain, where they found work in agriculture, harvesting tomatoes and other vegetables. Over time, however, competition from the increasing numbers of illegal African immigrants became increasingly fierce, reducing both earnings and employment opportunities. With the onslaught of the financial and economic crisis from 2008 and onwards, there were no longer any opportunities for work or income in southern Europe. When Romania joined the EU, some individuals started seeking out new destinations, and within a few years migrating to Scandinavia had become the primary source of income for the Roma community. By 2011-2012, our informants told us, almost every household in many of these villages would have at least one member either currently living in or planning to go to Scandinavia.
Experiences of ill treatment

One might expect that the significantly poorer living conditions experienced by the Roma population would be reflected in a greater tendency to feel badly treated by society. There are, however, surprisingly small differences in the Roma and non-Roma responses to the statement ‘People like me are treated badly by Romanian Society’. Three out of ten completely agree to this statement, and there are hardly any differences by ethnic group or city of destination. In almost every other indicator of living conditions we have looked at, there are substantial and consistent differences among the Romanians who migrate to Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen respectively. The migrants to Stockholm have exceptionally low literacy rates and poor housing in Romania. The migrants to Copenhagen are significantly better off, and the migrants to Oslo are consistently somewhere in between the two other groups. When we also include the respondents who partially agree with the statement, however, differences do emerge among the three capitals, with the highest levels of agreement with the statement being found in Copenhagen and the lowest in Stockholm, perhaps indicating an effect of higher expectations among the relatively better off.

FIGURE 3.12. Responses to the statement ‘People like me are treated badly by Romanian society’.

Previous migration experience
In her qualitative interviews with beggars in Oslo, Engebrigtsen (2014) found that many of them had had previous migration experience, especially through seasonal migration to work in the informal sector in southern Europe. Our results corroborate this finding. A majority of the migrant street workers have had previous migration experience, although somewhat less frequently in the case of women and migrants to Stockholm.

**FIGURE 3.13. Shares of migrants who have had previous migration experience before coming to Stockholm/Oslo/Copenhagen, by gender.**

![Graph showing previous migration experience by gender and city]

Italy is the country to which by far the largest share of respondents have been previously, followed by Spain, Germany, France, Portugal and another Scandinavian country than the one they are in now. Once again, the migrants in Stockholm diverge from those in the other capitals in that they have less diverse migratory experiences, few of them having been anywhere other than Italy.
Most of those who have had previous migration experience made their income then from work in the informal labour markets (and sometimes in the formal labour markets) of the countries they visited, most often within the agriculture or construction sectors. Qualitative interviews suggest, however, that labour market opportunities of this type have now disappeared, due to the financial and economic crisis in southern Europe in combination with competition from illegal African migrants. However, the Stockholm population appears to have more experience from migration for begging before they came to Scandinavia, predominantly in Italy. Migrants in Oslo and Copenhagen more often have experience as (informal) labour migrants, and begging is for many something they started doing in Scandinavia rather than in previous destination countries.
FIGURE 3.15. Means of earning money during previous migration experiences, by city.
Homeless street workers from Romania in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen. Fafo survey 2014. N=759 (Stockholm=198; Oslo=299; Copenhagen=262)

Concluding remarks
The living conditions in Romania among the migrants to the Scandinavian countries and their families are frequently very poor as a result of limited sources of income, poor housing, low education and illiteracy. The extremely low educational level in some Roma communities would obviously constitute a serious obstacle to transition into any kind of formal labour in the Scandinavian countries, as well as in Romania. Factors making living conditions difficult are gendered and also very unevenly distributed between Roma and non-Roma. The poor situation for the Roma communities seems to have been seriously and continuously exacerbated since the fall of the Ceauşescu regime in 1989, when many Roma lost the jobs they had held in the formal labour market, mainly in factories and agricultural cooperatives. In the subsequent years many Roma worked in the informal sector, and migration to southern Europe started in the early 2000s. With the financial crisis, demand for labour in the informal sector in Romania dropped. This, in combination with fierce competition from extremely cheap African labour in the agricultural sector in southern Europe, meant that many income opportunities, both in Romania and former destination countries for (informal) labour migration, disappeared. In other words, we do not find any support for the claims that the migrants belong to some kind of elite among the Romanian poor. In our fieldwork in Romania we visited some extremely poor neighbourhoods, and interviewed a number of migrants who had been to Norway or Sweden. They told us a consistent story of migration to the Scandinavian coun-
tries being perceived as the only remaining option for making an income. In several neighbourhoods, migration had developed into a practice shared by more or less the whole community, including poor non-Roma Romanians. In opposition to this narrative, one might argue that non-migrating Roma in Romania do also survive. The evidence of crumbling income sources does, however, strongly suggest that competition for the already small resources has hardened further.
Chapter 4

Street work as a livelihood strategy

Migration and street work are ultimately economic activities. The migrants have certain valued goals that they want to achieve, and they choose among different means of achieving them. They have available to them certain resources and face certain risks trying to achieve their goals. The differences between the activities of migrant street workers and activities within the formal economy are, in other words, differences in degree rather than kinds of difference: most people try to make the best out of their circumstances, but for the migrants within our population, options are limited, resources are few and the risks involved are high. In this chapter we will describe and analyse the economic survival strategies that people adopt regarding different types of income-earning activities and the earnings which they can obtain from them. We focus in particular on the relationship between migrating for work and migrating for begging, asking to what extent it is reasonable to distinguish between work mobility and mobile poverty. We focus in particular on begging as a survival strategy and explore the extent to which begging can best be understood as a result of structural marginalisation and an option of last resort, or whether it can also be understood as a culturally-embedded practice. Finally, we explore the relationship between begging and petty crime.

Sources of income

Migrants from Romania living on the streets in the Scandinavian countries – and in particular the Roma – are mostly associated with begging in the Scandinavian public debate. In reality, however, they pursue a wide variety of strategies to earn money. Most of them combine a range of different activities. Many combine begging and collecting bottles, but several other combinations are common. Selling magazines is often combined with other income sources, and so is performing different types of services in the street. Some supplement street work with casual work in the informal economy, typically for construction or demolition services, removal firms, etc. There are, however, significant differences among the three cities in our survey. There are also significant differences between the Roma and the non-Roma migrants in the types of activity that are most commonly pursued.
In Stockholm, collecting bottles and begging for money are the main activities which the respondents report engaging in; in addition, it appears that a very small number of mostly non-Roma find some casual work.

In Oslo, the respondents engage in more varied income earning-activities. Collecting bottles for recycling is the most common activity here as well. Begging for money is also common among the Roma, but less so among the non-Roma, although this distinction is not absolute. Many Roma do not engage in begging, while some non-Roma do also beg for money. Many Roma in Oslo also sell the street magazine *Folk er Folk*. This is a magazine especially designed by an organisation of the same
name to give Roma migrants a dignified means of earning income, inspired by similar magazines that are sold by native drug addicts. As we shall see later, this has given rise to conflicts with local drug addicts in Oslo. Some also play music, perform as ‘statues’ or sell small items in the street. Among the non-Roma, about half report that they engaged in casual work during the preceding week, and this is also the case for about ten percent of the Roma. This is usually casual day labour in the informal economy, typically involving extra help for removal agencies, construction work and cleaning.

In Copenhagen, income-earning strategies are fairly similar to those employed by street workers in Oslo. However, there are two important differences. First of all, fewer respondents report that they beg for money. This is not surprising, given the Danish ban on begging – which apparently has the effect of keeping some potential beggars out, and pushing others into finding alternative means of income. Nevertheless, a significant number – almost 40 percent among the Roma and almost 10 percent of the non-Roma – begged during the preceding week despite the ban. Walking through the streets of Copenhagen, one can easily spot the differences from Oslo and Stockholm. In contrast to the other two cities, beggars in Copenhagen cannot sit down in one place, but have to move around the streets and in crowded places in order to be able to quickly avoid the police. This appears not to be the case for native drug users, who seem to be able to sit and beg in peace, suggesting that the ban is enforced discriminatively. Some also sell magazines, but unlike in Oslo, there are no magazines designed especially for Roma, and both Roma and non-Roma sell magazines that are designed for the general population of homeless people. Another distinctive feature of the income-earning strategies among homeless street workers in Copenhagen is the relatively large share of respondents – about 20 percent – who report that they engage in ‘other’ income earning activities. At first, we were not sure what this meant, but qualitative interviews suggest that this largely refers to collecting or stealing metal, in particular copper, for recycling as scrap. According to many informants, this is a common enterprise among homeless Romanians in Copenhagen. The practice was not reported to us in either Stockholm or Oslo, and in Oslo we were told that the market for scrap metal is controlled by other domestic groups and that the newcomers are not welcome to engage in this type of work.

Are street workers ‘unsuccessful labour migrants’?
In the public debate, mobile poverty is often portrayed as a distinctly different phenomenon from the free mobility of labour within the EU. In reality, as has been pointed out by Engebrihtsen (2014), the two phenomena appear to overlap. ‘Successful’ labour migrants who actually manage to obtain regular work are by default excluded from our target population. However, as we have seen, there are quite a few
people within our population who have managed to find casual work. Men are more likely to engage in work than women, non-Roma are more likely to work than Roma, and engaging in casual work is most common in Copenhagen and least common in Stockholm.

**FIGURE 4.2. Have tried to find employment during last week, and have worked during last week.**


However, there are actually majorities within most groups who report that they tried to find work. This means that a significant proportion of the homeless Romanians in Scandinavia – both Roma and non-Roma – could be classified as ‘failed’ labour migrants. Men are more likely to have tried to find work than women, respondents in Stockholm are less likely to have tried to find work than those in the two other cities, and non-Roma are more likely to have tried to find work than Roma. Nevertheless, a majority of male Roma in both Oslo and Copenhagen report that they have tried to find work. This also includes about half of those who beg in Oslo and Copenhagen, and one-third of those who beg in Stockholm.

If we compare the share who report that they have actually found work during the preceding week with the share who say that they have tried to find work, it is found that the ‘success-rate’ – meaning the share who found work divided by the share who tried to find work – differs considerably among groups. The Roma tend to have very low success rates, meaning that although quite a large number of them try to find work, only a few actually succeed. The non-Roma have slightly higher success rates than the Roma. Success rates tend to be higher in Copenhagen than in Oslo,
and in particular in Stockholm. It should be noted that quite a few respondents – although still only a small minority – also tried to register officially as job-seekers at the public employment offices. However, almost none of them succeeded, suggesting that labour market authorities in all three countries are highly reluctant to register these migrants. It is also worth mentioning that virtually none of the homeless street workers from Romania receive any social benefits in the Scandinavian countries. Very few have tried to obtain such benefits, and those who have, have not succeeded.

**Begging – cultural and structural explanations**

Begging is most common in Stockholm and least common in Copenhagen, and women are more likely to beg than men. There is also a clear ethnic pattern in terms of who begs as opposed to using other survival strategies. While collecting bottles seems to be an almost universal strategy among the respondents within our population, there is a division between those who beg (and combine this with collecting bottles, selling magazines, etc.) and those who manage to find some casual work (and combine this with bottles, etc.). This division tends to follow an ethnic pattern, in that the former group tend to be Roma while the latter tend to be non-Roma. But there are still significant numbers of non-Roma who beg, and there are many Roma who do not beg.

**FIGURE 4.3. Begged for money during last week.**


How do we explain this pattern? Scholars have described how centuries of persecution and marginalisation from mainstream society has produced what can be described as an ‘oppositional’ or ‘reactive’ identity among many Roma groups
(Engebrigtsen 2007, Troc 2012). This includes strong social and moral boundaries between insiders and outsiders, cultural norms regarding purity and pollution, particular culturally-embedded economic niche strategies, and high levels of mobility. According to this perspective, these cultural practices have developed as a type of protection against both physical and symbolic violence. This implies that a strong sense of identity and pride related to Roma ethnicity and culture and a rejection of the values and ideals of the majority population to some extent work as a shield against denigration and contempt on the part of the majority, thus allowing them to follow strategies for survival – such as begging – which people from the majority population would shun for fear of humiliation. We asked our respondents whether or not they agreed with the statement ‘Begging for money is just as good as having a job – as long as it brings money to the family’. This statement would indicate a type of oppositional identity, whereby the norms of mainstream society which looks down upon begging are rejected. Despite the fact that majorities of respondents in all groups disagreed with the statement, the Roma were significantly more inclined to agree than the non-Roma. This could of course simply reflect adaptive preferences – since there are more Roma who beg, they would be more inclined to justify their own survival strategies. It could also reflect a culturally-embedded acceptance of begging. However, the majority of Roma – as well as the non-Roma – rejected this statement.

An alternative explanation is that the high prevalence of begging among the Roma as opposed to the non-Roma can be explained entirely by structural factors such as poverty, marginalisation and a lack of formal education and basic skills which render the Roma migrants unable to compete even on the fringes of the casual informal labour market. Among those who beg, there are as already noted quite a few who have tried to find work, but very few seem to have succeeded. The beggars, in other words, appear to be the least successful in actually obtaining casual work or finding other means of earning an income. In order to explore how the beggars felt about begging for money, we asked our respondents to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements. Figure 4.4 shows the beggars’ responses to the statements ‘If I could find a regular job in Scandinavia, I would prefer that to begging and other street work’ and ‘It is humiliating for a decent person to beg’. Almost all of those who beg indicate that they completely agree with the statement that they would prefer a regular job over begging or other street work. Furthermore, a majority of those who beg say that they either completely or partially agree with the statement that ‘It is humiliating for a decent person to beg’. These statements suggest that begging is an option of last resort, and something that many find humiliating. However, given the very low levels of basic education and work skills among the migrants, realistically they do not have much chance of actually obtaining regular work in Scandinavia.
FIGURE 4.4. Completely or partially agree to two statements about begging.

The facts that most beggars say that they would prefer to work and that they find begging humiliating, and that many of them have actually tried to find work, would tend to support the structural-factor hypothesis. However, in order to further explore the cultural explanation, we can further test the cultural and structural hypotheses by performing a logistic regression, with ‘begged during the preceding week’ as our dependent variable, and then introducing the independent variables measuring cultural and structural factors in three separate steps. In the first step of the analysis we use male non-Roma in Oslo as our constant, and find that the probability of begging is significantly higher in Stockholm and significantly lower in Copenhagen. Roma are much more likely to beg than non-Roma, and women are much more likely to beg than men.

In the next step of the analysis we introduce some cultural variables. The first is subscribing to traditional Romani values and identities, as indicated by respondents referring to themselves as traditional Roma (as opposed to Romanianised Roma), and by stating that they find it unacceptable for women to wear trousers in public. This variable implies adherence to more traditional Roma identities and values. The second cultural variable is whether the respondents come from a segregated Roma community in Romania, indicating some type of ‘ethnic embeddedness’. We find that both of these variables have a significant positive effect on the likelihood of begging, suggesting that both traditional Roma values and ethnic embeddedness
in Roma communities are in some way related to begging as a survival strategy. Introducing these cultural variables removes some of the explanatory strength of the city, gender and ethnic effects, suggesting that they account for a small part of the observed differences.

In the third step we introduce structural variables. These are not having completed basic education, not having any formal work experience, and living in overcrowded housing in Romania (more than 4 people per room) as an indication of extreme poverty. We find that all of these variables have a strong impact on the likelihood of begging. When we introduce these variables, we find that the city effects remain, suggesting that there is an independent effect of the context of reception, in this case the Danish ban on begging and the more lenient Swedish public attitude towards beggars. However, the independent effect of being Roma is significantly reduced, suggesting that structural deprivation can account for at least some of the ethnic effect. Furthermore, we find that when we introduce the structural variables, the effect of traditionalism disappears, suggesting that poverty and deprivation are more important for determining whether people beg for a living than whether they have traditional Roma values and identity.

**TABLE 4.1. Logistic regression: Having begged for money during the previous week.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.054 (+)**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.989 (+)**</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>1.655 (+)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.243 (-)**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.247 (-)**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.226 (-)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>6.826 (+)**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>6.346 (+)**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.829 (+)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4.815 (+)**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4.429 (+)**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.537 (+)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in segregated community</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>1.908 (+)*</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>1.275 -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No form. work exp.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.253 (-)**</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>0.239 (-)**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.194 (-)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke’s R Squared</td>
<td>.482</td>
<td>.491</td>
<td>.194</td>
<td>.514</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All in all, the results indicate that both structural and cultural explanations may have some merit in understanding begging as a livelihood strategy among the Roma. The main reasons why Roma more often tend to beg definitely appear to be related to structural deprivation, poverty and lack of resources. In other words, those who have the opportunity to find work or to find other means of income typically choose not to beg, and those who do beg, do so primarily because they have few other options. At the same time we do find some weak indications that begging can also be understood as a culturally-embedded survival strategy, although not a preferred one. Even when structural factors are controlled for, there is still an effect of being Roma and coming from a segregated Roma community. However, having traditional values and identities – as opposed to being more acculturated into the mainstream – does not have any effect. It should also be noted that the effects of ethnicity and ethnic embeddedness that we identify here could also be attributed to discrimination. Either way, the analyses strongly suggest that although begging to some extent appears to be a cultural adaptation, it is an option of last resort.
Street work and petty crime

In general, there is a strong connection between poverty and petty crime, and there is little doubt that there is a certain prevalence of petty crime among the populations of homeless migrants and street workers from Romania in Scandinavia. In the public debate, criminality is one of the main characteristics that are attributed to this group of migrants. In a survey based on self-reporting, it is impossible to obtain reliable measurements of criminal activities. We will therefore base this discussion primarily on our qualitative interviews and on general impressions obtained through our fieldwork. In addition, we will use some indicators of criminal engagement that we were able to obtain in the survey. The purpose is to discuss to what extent there are differences among the three cities in terms of the levels and types of criminal activity that people within this population engage in, and the extent to which these types of criminal activity are linked to begging.

All in all, based on the large number of interviews carried out and our close engagement with this population, it is our impression that there is a significant prevalence of petty crime among the homeless street workers, although we cannot determine the exact extent. At the same time there are also a large number of homeless Romanian migrants in all three cities who actively seek to distance themselves from those who engage in crime and who complain that criminals give law-abiding beggars and street workers a bad reputation. Our qualitative interviews give us fairly consistent pictures of the different types of crime in which some street workers were involved, and these pictures appear to be quite different for the three cities.

The Stockholm population appears to be the least criminal. There is no doubt a certain prevalence of petty crime among the street workers in Stockholm, but our impression, based on conversations with street workers and NGO representatives, is that most of the homeless street workers in Stockholm are not engaged in criminal activities at all. There were rumours and talk about certain individuals who were involved in petty stealing, and we also interviewed a couple of individuals who told us that they mostly made their living from shop-lifting and pick-pocketing. These tended to differ quite a bit from the majority, being younger men who were not travelling with their families and who were mostly non-Roma. The typical migrants in Stockholm – traditional Roma travelling in family groups – appear to focus on begging and collecting bottles, and not very much else. Professional crime requires both skills and contacts (fences, etc.), and the majority of homeless migrants in Stockholm have neither.

In Oslo, the picture is different. Here, we quickly learned that there are particular groups who specialise in certain types of criminal activity. For example, one particular group of Roma from one particular village, a group which during the summer of 2014 consisted of around 50 people camped out in one particular area in the city,
were known to be involved in smuggling prescription pills from Romania which they sold to Norwegian drug addicts. Members of this group rarely begged for money, and seemed to derive most of their income from smuggling pills. Another group located in a different part of town specialised in stealing phones. These two groups represented a small minority of the total population of homeless Romanian street workers, but their activities were well known, and among the majority of the street-working population there was considerable indignation towards them for giving the Roma a bad reputation. In particular, those who made their living from begging and selling magazines, and who were dependent on the goodwill of Norwegians, were frustrated over this. In addition to these two groups of Roma who were involved in petty street crime, we also learned about smaller groups of non-Roma who specialised in more serious crime, such as burglary from houses. Engebrigtsen (2014) interviewed police representatives in several Norwegian cities. She found that there was considerable variation in how the police in different districts evaluated the crime-related problems associated with migrants from Romania. A police report from 2013 (referred to in Engebrigtsen 2014:69) concluded that out of 21 police districts where Romanian beggars were observed, 13 districts reported that they had no indications of crime-related problems with this group, 7 reported that they had observed some problems, while only Oslo reported that they faced substantial challenges related to petty (and more serious) crime in this population.

In Copenhagen, yet another picture emerged. Here, the migrants are even less traditional and less family-oriented than those in Oslo and in particular than those in Stockholm. Most are young men travelling alone or in small groups, and alcohol and substance abuse appear to be far more common among elements of the population than in the two other cities. In contrast to the situation in Stockholm, and to some degree to that in Oslo, sections of the Romanian population of homeless street workers are partly integrated into the existing Copenhagen drug scene, in particular around Istedgade, and quite a few of those we spoke to appeared to be heavy drug users. In fact, one of the field coordinators who is a Romanian psychologist and who has previously worked with drug addicts in Bucharest met some of her old clients in Copenhagen. The fieldwork also yielded information about the presence of more highly organised criminal cartels involved in a wide range of underground activities in the city. Members of these criminal organisations are usually by definition excluded from our target population, since homelessness in Scandinavia is one of our criteria for inclusion, and most successful criminals have apartments and places to live. People within our population nevertheless reported having some contacts with these groups. Furthermore, many homeless migrants are involved in collecting and selling scrap metal, which in many cases involves stealing metal from building sites, etc. All in all we got the firm impression that a larger share of the population in Copenhagen
than that in any of the other cities is involved in petty crime, such as pickpocketing and drug sales, and that this is linked to some extent to more organised and more established groups. It should be noted, however, that this does not mean that the majority of homeless Romanians in Copenhagen are engaged in criminal activities, only that a significant minority appear to be so.

We do not have the full explanation for this pattern. Copenhagen does have a larger and in many ways more ‘attractive’ drug scene than Oslo or Stockholm. In fact, Copenhagen has functioned as a magnet for drug users and homeless people from the other Scandinavian countries for decades. It may be a magnet for poor drug users from Romania as well. Also, since begging has been made difficult by the ban, criminal activity is simply one of the few remaining options for making a living for migrants who are unable to integrate into the labour market.

A second point of interest is the extent to which criminal activities are linked to begging. In the discussion regarding the possible introduction of a ban on begging in Norway (and to some extent Sweden), crime reduction is often given as a motive for introducing such a ban. The differences among the three cities would suggest that there is no such obvious link. After all, Copenhagen – which is the only city that has banned begging – also appears to be the city with the most crime committed within this population. Our qualitative interviews further support this: without exception, those we came across or heard about who were engaged in serious crime typically did not beg, and only in a few cases did they have very close links to any groups of beggars.

In order to test the extent to which there is a link between begging and crime we can use an indicator for which information was obtained through the survey. A small but not insignificant share of the population in all three cities report that they have been fined by the police for theft, possession or sales of drugs or violence.

If we compare beggars and non-beggars in terms of how many report having been fined for criminal offences, the results suggest that criminal activities in these populations are not closely linked to begging. In fact, those who beg for money are significantly less likely than non-beggars to have been fined for theft, drugs or violence in all three cities. It therefore seems very unlikely that the banning of begging has any effect in terms of reducing the level of crime within the Romanian migrant population – in fact, given our data, the opposite appears more likely.
Earnings from begging and street work

In all types of survey research, income data is usually considered to be among the most sensitive issues to report, and in consequence income data tend to be considered less reliable than many other types of self-reported data. On the basis of the evaluations made by the team of interviewers in the collection of quantitative data as well as by the researchers conducting our qualitative interviews, we nevertheless believe that the majority of our respondents provided relatively reliable information about their earnings. However, the impression of our interviewers was that a minority – and in particular those who were believed to be engaged in various criminal activities – appeared reluctant to state their real income and would to some extent under-report their earnings.

However, we have no reason to believe that misreporting on the income variable is systematically biased among the three cities. When we find significant differences among the three cities, we can expect this to reflect real differences. For example, when we asked the respondents how much they earned the last time they collected bottles, the average amount was lowest in Stockholm and highest in Copenhagen (Stockholm 7 euro, Oslo 11 euro and Copenhagen 14 euro) (one should remember that collecting bottles is for many an additional income source, and thus does not produce high average incomes). Begging tends to generate higher daily earnings, but the relationship of the three cities to one another remains the same (Stockholm 10 euro, Oslo 16 euro and Copenhagen 19 euro). The same pattern extends to the
total earnings of the Romanian migrant population. In Stockholm, street workers on average earned 14.50 euro the day before they were interviewed. In Oslo they earned 23.50 euro, while in Copenhagen they earned almost 27 euro. At the same time, migrants in Stockholm have substantially lower daily expenses leaving their net earnings rather similar to those in Oslo. Daily expenses among migrants in Oslo and Copenhagen are roughly the same, leaving those in Copenhagen with a much larger net income. It should be noted that since prices are much higher in Oslo, this means that the migrants in Copenhagen in reality have higher levels of consumption.

FIGURE 4.6. Average daily income from collecting bottles, average daily income from begging, average daily total earnings, and average daily total expenditures, by city. Euro.

How can we explain this pattern? One hypothesis is that differences in the selection of migrants going to the three cities mean that those going to Copenhagen are more capable of generating income. If the Danish ban on begging has had the effect of reducing the number of poor migrants to the city, the higher average income there may also be an effect of there being less competition over scarce resources in the streets (such as bottles and donations). However, as indicated previously, we have not been able to estimate the size of the migrant populations in the three cities.

Our estimate of total income provides a reliable indicator of the average difference among the three cities. However, because we asked the respondents how much they earned the previous day, and there is probably large day-to-day variation
in income, this estimate is not very well suited to measuring individual variance in and determinants of income. In order to determine which groups tend to be more economically successful we will instead use the level of expenditure, since this will probably not vary as much from day to day and can be expected to be a relatively good indicator of income.

We performed an OLS regression using daily expenditures as the dependent variable, and using as the constant someone residing in Copenhagen who is not a beggar, who is not a Roma, who has not had any casual work during the preceding week, who has not been fined for a criminal offence in Scandinavia, and who has zero years of schooling. We then entered the dependent variables. Those residing in Stockholm have significantly lower levels of expenditure – on average 3.4 euro per day, all else being equal. There are no differences in expenditures between Copenhagen and Oslo. However, as the general price level is higher in Oslo, this means that real purchasing power is probably in fact higher among those in Copenhagen.
We tested a wide range of variables in order to see which might have a positive effect on level of expenditure (which we expect to work as a reliable proxy for income level). Four variables produced strongly significant effects, each thus suggesting a possible route to success among the street workers.

First of all, years of schooling has a significant positive effect, suggesting that having some basic education does correlate with being better able to survive and make a living – also when living on the streets. Second, having been invited home by a local resident has a strong positive effect. This is probably an effect of what Engebrigtsen (2014) has called ‘the good helpers’. She found that among beggars and homeless people from Romania in Norway, there were many who had managed to form close bonds with natives, who would act as their patrons and help them out in various ways. As a proxy for this type of patron relationship, we asked our respondents if they had ever been invited into the home of a local resident. A total of 7 percent of the Stockholm population, 16 percent in Oslo and as many as 19 percent in Copenhagen report that they have been. As the regression table shows, this has a significant positive effect on average expenditures, suggesting that forging such bridging ties to natives has a decisive positive economic effect. Third, we find that having found casual work during the preceding week, not surprisingly, has a strong positive economic effect. Fourth, we find that having been fined for a criminal offence.

### TABLE 4.2. OLS regression. Daily expenditures as the dependent variable.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>-3.368</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>0.027 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling (x10)</td>
<td>3.070</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.046 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has been invited home by a local</td>
<td>4.325</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.008 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has engaged in casual work</td>
<td>4.641</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.003 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have been fined for a criminal offence</td>
<td>4.774</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.021 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begged during the preceding week</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma identity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>7.900</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: Total expenditures the previous day
Constant: Copenhagen, non-beggar, non-Roma, no work in the preceding week, never been fined for a criminal offence, never been invited into the home of a local resident, no schooling

We tested a wide range of variables in order to see which might have a positive effect on level of expenditure (which we expect to work as a reliable proxy for income level). Four variables produced strongly significant effects, each thus suggesting a possible route to success among the street workers.

First of all, years of schooling has a significant positive effect, suggesting that having some basic education does correlate with being better able to survive and make a living – also when living on the streets. Second, having been invited home by a local resident has a strong positive effect. This is probably an effect of what Engebrigtsen (2014) has called ‘the good helpers’. She found that among beggars and homeless people from Romania in Norway, there were many who had managed to form close bonds with natives, who would act as their patrons and help them out in various ways. As a proxy for this type of patron relationship, we asked our respondents if they had ever been invited into the home of a local resident. A total of 7 percent of the Stockholm population, 16 percent in Oslo and as many as 19 percent in Copenhagen report that they have been. As the regression table shows, this has a significant positive effect on average expenditures, suggesting that forging such bridging ties to natives has a decisive positive economic effect. Third, we find that having found casual work during the preceding week, not surprisingly, has a strong positive economic effect. Fourth, we find that having been fined for a criminal offence.
offence (stealing, selling drugs or stolen goods, violence, etc), is strongly associated with higher expenditures, suggesting that criminals earn and spend more money. We include here two variables which did not have any significant effects, namely begging (non-significantly negative) and being Roma (non-significantly positive).

In other words, our findings suggest that the most lucrative strategies employed by homeless street workers are either to find casual work, to engage in petty crime or to forge close relations with native local residents who may help them. In addition, all things being equal, it always helps to have some basic education.
Is begging and street work ‘organised’? This has been a central question in the public debate in the Scandinavian countries, and has become for many a crucial point in arguments for and against the criminalisation of begging, and in shaping policies towards migrant groups. The answer to this question depends, however, on what we actually mean by ‘organised’.

There are two different understandings of this concept that people often draw on when describing this population. On the one hand, there are claims that the economy of begging and street work is controlled by ringleaders or criminal networks who remain in the shadows but who organise travel and migration routes, distribute spots and collect earnings from the beggars. According to this view beggars have been fooled, manipulated or even forced into going to Scandinavia; they are not allowed to keep the money earned from begging for themselves, but are forced to give all or part of it to traffickers or organisers. Such claims are sometimes backed up by references to people in Romania living in so-called ‘beggar-palaces’ that have supposedly been built with money earned from organising beggars in Scandinavia. It should be noted that there is no reason to doubt that there are organised criminal networks in which Romanians are involved in all three cities (drugs trade, illegal work, etc.). However, our interest here is in whether these networks are involved in the organisation of and profit from begging and street work.

At the same time, ‘organisation of begging’ can also be understood in a more sociological sense. Street work is, like all other human activities, socially organised within networks and relationships, and the street workers who come to the Scandinavian capitals often travel in family groups or with other people from the same community. These are networks that can provide information, support and protection under harsh circumstances, and they constitute an important source of social capital for the migrants. However, dependency on this type of social network can at the same time potentially render migrants vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Patriarchal family structures can in some cases be abusive towards women or children, but when there are few institutions to rely on outside the family and kinship groups, breaking with family networks is obviously difficult. This may be even more challenging while abroad, in particular for migrants who have little education and language skills and limited formal rights, and who are potentially exposed to harassment from outsiders.
Tight-knit relationships and networks within families and kinship groups are thus a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they provide protection and support. On the other, they can leave some people vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. These are forms of exploitation that can occur irrespective of whether there are criminal networks that organise the mobility of these groups, and profit from them.

In this chapter we will address the issue of organisation of street work in Scandinavia, focusing on three topics. First, we describe the networks that the street workers depend on in order to travel to and work in Scandinavia. In order to shed light on the organisation of migration itself, we describe the travel routes the migrants use and how they finance their journeys. We then go on to explore the possibility that there might be organised ringleaders involved, asking the question of whether the description ‘organisation’ as it appears in media accounts and some policy documents is a realistic one. We conclude the chapter by discussing the different types of exploitation to which the migrants are vulnerable.

Groups and networks
It is frequently reported in the migration research literature that migration as a livelihood strategy is transmitted through social networks (Castles, de Haas & Miller 2014). This is also the case for our target population of street workers from Romania. Most of them have limited economic resources in terms of savings or access to formal credit, and few have the type of education or formal skills which would make them attractive as potential employees on the labour markets in Scandinavia. This leaves them highly dependent on their networks of extended families and people from their home communities. Among the Roma in particular, solidarity and reciprocity are often key values in extended family networks which work in opposition to outsiders. The non-Roma Romanians are also highly dependent on informal social networks as part of their migration strategies, but these are less often based on family ties.

Most Romanian street workers come to Scandinavia as members of small groups of neighbours, family members and relatives who not only travel together, but also cooperate in finding shelter, places to sleep and means of accessing an income, as well as providing mutual social and emotional support in order to ease the hardship of street life.

We asked the respondents how many people were members of their group – meaning people who travelled together and helped each other on their travels in Scandinavia – and what their relationships were to the people in their groups. The results are summarised in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Although there are some who travel alone (in particular among the non-Roma), most travel in pairs or in small groups of three to five people. Some travel in larger groups, but the groups rarely consist of more than ten people. The Roma tend to travel in slightly larger groups than the
non-Roma, and groups in Stockholm tend to be slightly larger than groups in the two other cities. Average group size varies from nearly six among the Roma in Stockholm to less than three among the non-Roma in Oslo.

**FIGURE 5.1: Group size. People who travel together.**

**FIGURE 5.2: Relationship to other people in group.**
The differences among the three cities, as well as between Roma and non-Roma, are larger when it comes to the relationships among people within the groups. While the Roma in Oslo and even more so those in Stockholm tend to travel with spouses or together with close family or household members, this is less common among the non-Roma and among all the groups in Copenhagen, where it is more common to travel with more distant friends and acquaintances or even people met while travelling.

This corresponds well with the findings from our qualitative interviews; some people tell us of the benefits of travelling in small family groups who cooperate on everything, including finding places to sleep, obtaining sources of income, mutual protection, eating together and socialising. However, these groups should not be understood as economic units. While group members might eat or drive together, we were consistently told that if income is shared, it is mainly between spouses.

Although most migrants stick together in such relatively small groups consisting of strongly-linked close friends and relatives, they also maintain weaker ties with larger groups of people staying in the same areas. We asked our respondents how many other homeless people from Romania there were currently in the same city whose names or nicknames they knew and who they talked to if they met. The answers to these questions revealed that the migrants are also part of larger, more loosely-connected networks. Here, there were no differences between the Roma and the non-Roma, but there were significant differences among the cities. In Oslo and Copenhagen, the migrants reported having on average 24 and 27 such acquaintances respectively, while in Stockholm they reported an average of 44 such acquaintances. Usually, people from particular villages and areas would settle in the same parts of the city, so that many of them would have some acquaintance with each other from home.

**Information, travel routes and financing**

Networks are important not only because they provide protection and support during travel and while staying in Scandinavia; they are also useful in conveying information about travel routes, destinations and opportunities to others at home, thereby increasing the likelihood that others will follow in the footsteps of those who travel. Having friends and relatives who have migrated to a particular destination makes it easier and more feasible for people to undertake the journey themselves. We asked our respondents how they had accessed information about travel routes and income opportunities in Scandinavia. Most of them reported that they got their information from others who had been to Scandinavia before, either family members or people from their villages at home. The Roma rely almost exclusively on such family and community networks, while the non-Roma also use some additional information.
sources, such as the Internet, television and newspapers. There were all in all just a couple of respondents who reported that they had obtained information from agents, recruiters or people involved in transporting them to Scandinavia.

People use several different means of transport in order to get to Scandinavia. The most common way is through formal bus services (defined as those where passengers buy a ticket before departure). This method is followed in frequency by informal minibuses (defined as those where no formal tickets are issued – typically they are driven by their owners); private cars owned and driven by members of migrants’ own households, by friends or relatives, or by others; planes; and trains. However, there are significant differences among the three cities as well as between Roma and non-Roma in the means of transport most frequently used.

**FIGURE 5.3. Means of travel to Scandinavia.**

In Stockholm, the vast majority of both Roma and non-Roma use regular formal bus services. A few come by informal minibuses services, and some non-Roma drive private cars or take trains. But all in all, taking a regular bus service is by far the most common way of travelling to Stockholm. During the summer of 2014 there were several bus companies operating direct routes to Stockholm from several of the main regions where the migrants come from. In Oslo, the Romanian street workers follow a very different pattern of travel. Here, Roma migrants rely to a large extent on informal minibuses that run on a regular basis between Oslo and all the major regions of origin in Romania, and it is also quite common for migrants to come in private cars. The non-Roma in Oslo, on the other hand, often travel by plane. In Copenhagen,
migrants use a variety of different means of travel. Formal bus services are the most common, but some migrants also use the informal minibuses (which sometimes stop in Copenhagen on their way to Oslo), as well as private cars and planes or trains (among the non-Roma).

The migrants use a variety of sources in order to finance their travels. Many use their own savings or even sell belongings in order to pay for the journey, but a majority have to borrow the money, and this is more often the case for the Roma than for the non-Roma.

**FIGURE 6.4. Sources of financing for the cost of travel.**

In Stockholm and Copenhagen the majority borrow money from friends or relatives, although some borrow from others. Oslo stands out, however, with more than half of the Roma respondents saying that they borrowed money from the minibus drivers who arranged their journeys. In other words, the informal minibus services that are set up between some of the communities of origin and Oslo also function as suppliers of credit. Our qualitative informants also told us the same story. Migrants may travel to Oslo without paying up front, but in order to return home both the cost of the return ticket and any amount still owing from the outward journey have to be paid first. Those who pre-pay the journey pay about EUR 150 or NOK 1,200. Those who travel on credit told us they would pay an additional EUR 50-60, or about NOK 500, in interest (it is not known to us whether the amount of interest may increase over time). The average cost of travel to Stockholm and Copenhagen is slightly lower (EUR 135 and EUR 125 respectively), and there do not appear to be any opportunities for travelling on credit from those organising the transport.
Depending on credit from strangers may create vulnerability to exploitation, in particular if the migrant is not able to earn as much as expected while abroad, and we shall return to this below. As the literature on human trafficking has demonstrated, migrants with extensive debts that they are not able to pay back will often need only a little encouragement in order to consider ways of earning money they did not consider before leaving home (Brunovskis and Tyldum 2004).

**Vulnerability and exploitation**

An important aim of this study has been to investigate the extent of vulnerability and exploitation among the street workers in Oslo. As indicated in the introduction, we have tried to find evidence or indications that people are being exploited in two slightly different meanings of the word. Our first ambition was to find out if the ‘market’ for begging and street work is in some way controlled by ringleaders and organisers who systematically profit from the activities of others. This is an important question because it is often claimed in policy debates, media discussion and official documents that this is the case. Such claims were instrumental in the Norwegian government’s attempt to ban begging, for example (see Justisdep 2015). Our second ambition was to identify factors that may put people at risk of being exploited or abused by others on a more individual and less systematic basis. We have employed both qualitative and quantitative data in order to explore these issues.

**Do ringleaders and traffickers exist?**

From previous studies of vulnerability and exploitation among migrant groups, we know that when widespread practices of exploitation and abuse take place in a community, these practices tend to be taken for granted. In consequence, migrants may not talk about extensive exploitation in their current situation, but they may talk about previous experiences, or less severe forms of coercion in the current situation. We therefore expect that the migrants themselves would give some indication during interviews of exploitation in some form or other if it exists, or that the social workers dealing with this population would have some knowledge about possible ringleaders and traffickers. We interviewed numerous outreach workers working among homeless street workers in all three cities, and none of them could tell of any indication of the existence of such organised networks. Furthermore, the street workers we interviewed talked about the organisation of their daily lives, their grievances against others and their complaints about a wide variety of issues. Not once did anything resembling the media portrayals of ringleaders and traffickers come up. None of our interviews with either migrants or social workers in the three cities indicated any such forms of organisation outside the immediate family and household. All our respondents were asked to calculate their income, spending and savings from different
sources, as well as their relationships to other people in their network. Most of them had only rudimentary knowledge of basic maths, and needed considerable help from the interviewers in calculating total income from different sources and spending on different items during a day. This would often take quite a time, and the interviewers were given instructions to be particularly attentive to any possible indications of money being passed to others, payments for ‘protection’ services, and other types of information which did not add up, or which would indicate some type of network operating behind the migrants. If the respondents gave up substantial parts of their incomes to ringleaders or organisers, we would have expected more inconsistencies in this reporting. However, not once did anyone indicate that part of their income was given to non-family members, nor that they did not have good understanding of how much they had earned, and how much they had spent.

In other words, we find no indication of human trafficking in terms of organised criminal networks manipulating the street workers into coming to Scandinavia and then taking part of their income. This, however, does not mean that no-one among the homeless street workers is ever subject to exploitation. Homeless migrants are a vulnerable group; they live in an environment marked by poverty and desperation, and they do so mostly outside the protection of mainstream legal institutions (as we will see in Chapter 7, the street workers in Scandinavia seldom contact the police to ask for protection in spite of being subject to extensive harassment and violence). The risk of being subjected to abuse is therefore real enough even without the existence of highly organised ringleaders and traffickers. Our quantitative data provide us with quite a lot of information about how this type of exploitation may occur. The information we were able to collect regarding these issues supports the conclusion that the migrants may be vulnerable to abuse, but suggests that the existence of highly-organised ringleaders controlling begging and other street work is largely a myth.

**Paying for spots to beg?**
One way of exploiting beggars would be to control the spots where people beg and to claim payment for using these spots. We asked all beggars (both those who had fixed spots and those who did not) whether they had to pay someone for using the space where they beg. Almost all the beggars in the three cities answered ‘No’ to this question. However, while there were only one and two individuals in Copenhagen and Oslo who said they had paid money for a spot to beg, ten of our respondents in Stockholm reported that they had paid money in order to use their particular spots. Although this represents less than three per cent of the Romanian beggars in Stockholm, it was still a sufficiently large number to warrant further investigation. We therefore made additional qualitative interviews with the explicit purpose of finding out what this practice of paying for spots actually entailed.
Three different informants told us a consistent story. In an area around Sveavegen in central Stockholm were living a large group of ‘Turkish’ Roma from the Tulca region in Romania. This group came from a population that was even more deprived in terms of basic education, literacy skills and economic resources than most other groups. When we spoke to them, many were in a state of disappointment. They told us that too many people had come at the same time, and there was no sustainable basis for survival through begging and collecting bottles for so many people in the relatively small area in which they had settled. During the summer of 2014, beggars were sitting on virtually every street corner, outside every shopping outlet and outside every subway exit along Sveavegen. We were then told that earlier that summer, a small group of men from another region in Romania had approached many of the newly-arrived beggars and tried to extort money from them, saying that they ‘owned’ the spots and that the beggars would have to pay SEK 100-200 to use them. Our informants told us that they had just refused to pay and moved somewhere else. But some people did pay, and we assume that these included the ten people who reported paying for begging spots in our survey.

Although apparently not as common as in Stockholm, we heard of similar episodes of extortion in Oslo, although only through second-hand information. Extorting money from beggars in this way obviously constitutes exploitation of people who are in a vulnerable situation, and is a criminal offence. However, it is important to note that the culprits in the cases we heard about were complete strangers to the victims. They were not in any way involved in the organisation of their journeys or the provision of their accommodation while abroad. Neither did they take any active part in organising their income-earning activities. In other words, this cannot be classified as human trafficking. However, it does show that beggars and other street workers are vulnerable to becoming victims of crime.

False promises and broken dreams
During our qualitative field work and interviews we sometimes came across stories of people who felt they had been fooled and manipulated during their travels. The most serious incidents were a few stories of people who had been recruited to work in Scandinavia and later had been dumped without receiving any payment. For example, we heard of one village in the Arges County of Romania where two years earlier a group of men had been contacted by a firm from the UK and brought to Sweden in order to work as bricklayers and asphalt workers. After two weeks of work, they were dumped in Stockholm without payment. Stories such as this – of people who had actually performed work and been robbed of their wages – can qualify for the legal definition of human trafficking. Stories of this type were, however, very rare. More common were stories of people who had been given promises of work
which did not materialise in the end. While some insisted they had been given very specific job-promises, others just had a vague sense of having been given false hopes regarding how easy it would be to find work. Some also felt they had been given unrealistic expectations regarding how easy it is to make money through begging and collecting bottles. Without specific knowledge about the people who gave them such false hopes – and the extent to which these deceivers actually profited from their migration, if at all – it is difficult to determine whether these were cases of exploitation, or just of people having unrealistic expectations. Minibus-operators and others who receive payment from the migrants may obviously have a financial motive for raising peoples’ expectations. But many cases turned out to be nothing more than wishful thinking. We heard stories about large groups of migrants from one community in southern Romania wanting to go to Stockholm, hoping that migration would be an easy way to earn money. However, as they arrived in large groups at the same time, incomes from begging were low, and many were very disappointed when they realised how difficult it actually was to make money. All in all, however, even these cases were not very common. The majority of people we spoke to appeared to have had fairly realistic advance knowledge of what they could expect as migrants in Scandinavia.

FIGURE 5.5. ‘On your trips to Norway/Sweden/Denmark, have you ever been fooled, lied to or manipulated by people helping you or organising your journey, or by others?’


![Graph showing the percentage of people who were fooled, lied to, or manipulated by people helping them.](image-url)
In order to measure the extent of these types of situations, we asked our respondents the question ‘On your trips to Norway/Sweden/Denmark, have you ever been fooled, lied to or manipulated by people helping you or organising your journey, or by others?’ As Figure 5.5 shows, about 7-8 percent in each city responded ‘Yes’ to this question. To the follow-up question, ‘By whom?’ most replied that it was another Romanian, either from their own village or from outside their village. In yet another open follow-up question, respondents were then asked to explain in their own words how they had been fooled or manipulated. Their responses corroborate the findings from our qualitative interviews. The majority of those who reported having been fooled or manipulated said they been promised a job in Scandinavia which did not materialise. In some cases this was described as a specific job offer that fell through. In other cases it was a more a matter of general disappointment after being told it would be easy to find work. Two people in Copenhagen also reported having worked without getting paid. These responses (along with the findings from the qualitative study) suggest that exploitation and abuse is prevalent in the market for informal casual work, and that those who search for work in this market are vulnerable to being abused. The second most common answer was from people who felt they had been given false hopes regarding how easy it was to make money through begging and street work in Scandinavia. Interestingly, the survey suggests that this mainly concerns migrants in Stockholm and Oslo. In Copenhagen, where begging is forbidden and authorities have adopted more repressive policies towards homeless migrants, the respondents seem to have had much more realistic expectations regarding life as a migrant beggar.

A similar picture can be found using regression analysis to see if certain traits would increase the likelihood of experiencing exploitation. Table 5.1 shows a logistic regression on the probability of answering ‘Yes’ to the question concerning being fooled or manipulated. Several variables that might be assumed to have such an impact did not produce any significant results. There were, for example, no significant differences among the three cities. Roma respondents were not significantly more likely to have been deceived than non-Roma respondents, and people with no education or literacy skills were no more inclined to say ‘Yes’ than others: if anything, the opposite was the case. Coming from segregated Roma communities and travelling together with close family have non-significant negative effects, suggesting that if anything, embeddedness in close ethnic kinship networks has the effect of protecting people from abuse rather than increasing the risk.
TABLE 5.1. Logistic regression. Have been fooled or manipulated concerning migration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>.319</td>
<td>1.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>1.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>1.581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No completed education</td>
<td>.288</td>
<td>0.745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From segregated Roma community</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>0.694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelling with family</td>
<td>.594</td>
<td>0.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>2.158  (+)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beggar</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>1.775  (+)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job-seeker</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>2.396  (+)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>0.013  (+)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke's R Squared</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, three variables were found to have significant effects. First, men are significantly more likely to say that they have been fooled or manipulated than women. Second, there is a rather weak but significant positive effect for begging, meaning that all things being equal, beggars have a slightly higher propensity to report that they feel they have been deceived or manipulated than those who do not beg. When we look more closely into the follow-up questions, the respondents are mostly found to have been given false expectations regarding how easy it would be to make money. By far the strongest effect, however, comes from being a job-seeker. Those who report that they are looking for work are much more likely to say that they have been fooled and manipulated than others. All in all, these findings strongly suggest that exploitation of migrants is most prevalent on the fringes of the labour market.

Factors that increase vulnerability
In addition to these vulnerabilities related to being exploited for casual work and unrealistic expectations regarding the rewards from begging, we can identify certain vulnerabilities that are specific to each of the three cities. These are more general characteristics of the migratory patterns in the three cities which may produce slightly different forms of vulnerability.
In Stockholm, migrants are particularly vulnerable, due to the extreme poverty of many of them. Lacking the most basic schooling and literacy skills, many of the migrants in Stockholm appear ill-prepared to survive on the streets, and easily fall prey to crime and abuse. Their main protection and asset is their large kinship-based networks of people who travel together, but given the highly patriarchal family structures within these societies, such dependency on family networks can be a double-edged sword.

The population of homeless Romanian migrants in Copenhagen is in many ways a far more resource-rich group – at least in terms of resources that are valued by mainstream society. They appear to be more street smart and are far less dependent on family networks. In Copenhagen, however, the migrants are more vulnerable to alcohol and drug abuse and to the risks associated with being tied to criminal networks and the indigenous Danish drug scene.

The population in Oslo lies somewhere in between those in Stockholm and Copenhagen; the migrants are neither as poor in formal resources and as dependent on kinship networks as those in Stockholm, nor as involved with the criminal underground and local drug scene as those in Copenhagen. In Oslo, however, we can identify a particular risk associated with the means of travel and finance. Because many migrants borrow money through the informal minibus services, many start their careers in Oslo with a considerable debt to people outside their own families. As we will see in Chapter 4, the Roma in Oslo spend considerably more of their incomes on paying off debts than do Roma in the other cities. According to information obtained through qualitative interviews, those who do not pay off their debts risk not being able to get back home. This can place migrants in a potentially desperate situation if they do not manage to earn enough income, and this situation can be exploited by others.

Are beggars and street workers victims of human trafficking?

According to the Palermo Protocol of 2000, human trafficking is defined by the existence of three elements in the relationship between trafficker and victim: mobility, the use of force, and some form of exploitation (Tyldum, Tveit & Brunovskis 2005). A statistical survey like the present one cannot be used to identify individual cases of human trafficking. Nevertheless, our findings can provide the basis for evaluating whether it is reasonable to claim that human trafficking is widespread within the Romanian migrant population in Scandinavian capitals, as well as for identifying factors that may increase the vulnerability of the migrants.

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1 Article 3a in the Palermo protocol defines trafficking as ‘…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth [above] shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth [above] have been used.’
We find that begging and street work is very often ‘organised’ in the sense that people cooperate in finding transportation, shelter and income. This cooperation is usually organised within households and families. Many Roma communities in Romania are organised along highly patriarchal family lines. On the one hand, these family networks can protect migrants from abuse from strangers; on the other, it is widely recognised that strong patriarchal family structures can leave family members, and in particular women and children, vulnerable to abuse by their husbands and fathers. However, patriarchal and unequal marriages do not qualify as human trafficking. It is our firm impression that our female respondents also tended to have good oversight and control over their own incomes. We find no evidence that the activities of migrants in Scandinavia are usually controlled by ringleaders and organisers outside the family and household who profit from the efforts of others.

Nevertheless, we do find that many of the migrants can be vulnerable to exploitation. This vulnerability comes in many forms. First, they are vulnerable to becoming victims of crime and extortion from people outside their own networks. In such cases, family networks can provide some protection. Those who participate in the labour market for casual informal work also appear to be vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. One possible explanation would be that exploitation of people for casual work most probably offers far higher profit margins than exploiting people for begging and other types of street work, and therefore is more attractive to potential exploiters. Some beggars also feel that they have been given false expectations about their prospects in Scandinavia, but we find no evidence that this is related to systematic abuse or wider forms of exploitation. Furthermore, we show that the easy access to informal credit from minibus operators for people in the Oslo population can potentially render them vulnerable to ending up in difficult situations – for example, if they do not succeed in generating sufficient income to repay their debts. The closer integration of the migrant population in Copenhagen with more organised criminal networks and the local drugs scene also poses particular risks to some of the migrants there.

Many of the documented cases of organised human trafficking related to migrant Roma communities in Europe involve the trafficking of children for the purpose of begging and delinquency. In the case of children, there is no need to document forms of coercion in order to argue that human trafficking has taken place, and the legal discussion is therefore different where children are involved. The Scandinavian countries have been quite restrictive in the sense that children who are brought along to live on the streets are routinely taken in by child protection services. Most migrant communities in Romania are by now fully aware that bringing children to Scandinavia is associated with risk, and we therefore find very few underage migrants; however, as reported in Chapter 8, there are some respondents in Copenhagen who report bringing children there, and a few underage respondents were interviewed.
in Stockholm. It should be noted that Sweden constitutes a partial exception from the pattern of restrictive policies towards bringing children. While child protection services in Stockholm have the same policy as those in Norway and Denmark, other municipalities (for example Gothenburg) follow a different policy, allowing the migrants to bring their children.

Despite these various kinds of vulnerability, we are confident in rejecting the widespread claims that begging and street work in the forms that they usually take in the Scandinavian capitals are generally related to human trafficking. It should be noted that this is the same conclusion as that reached by Ada Engebrigtsen in her qualitative studies conducted in Norway (2014).
Chapter 6
Life as a street worker in Scandinavia

When the EU countries set out on the road towards a single European labour market the framework that was developed was designed to encourage the free movement of labour, while the mobility of poor people who had no significant chances of getting formal jobs was hardly on the agenda. When the internal European labour market was expanded to include Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, there was little regulation in place to address the issue of the mobility of the poor. It is sometimes argued that services should not make life too comfortable for homeless street workers who arrive from the new member states, in the hope that this will discourage people from coming. At the same time, faced with the visible presence of poverty on their streets, all three Scandinavian countries have taken steps to provide even this population with some basic services. The stark contrasts between the harsh living conditions of the immigrant street workers and the conditions of life for the majority populations have prompted private responses as well, with both NGOs and individuals attempting to alleviate some of the hardships faced by this population. In this chapter we investigate the basic living conditions for those who live on and off the streets in Scandinavia, focussing in particular on the provision of and access to basic services.

Sleeping rough
As Table 6.1 illustrates, the clear majority of Romanian street workers in the Scandinavian capitals sleep outdoors – in tents, under tarpaulins or other covers, or under the open sky – or in abandoned buildings (Copenhagen 60 percent, Oslo 68 percent and Stockholm 93 percent). Of those who sleep outdoors, more than half do not have a tent or other kind of covering to protect them from the wind and rain; however, most do have some kind of sleeping bag or blanket. Apart from the obvious discomfort of sleeping rough without proper covering, there are three other factors that make this rough sleeping difficult for many. First, only 9-16 percent of the population have access to cooking equipment, which means they have to rely on eating cold, ready-made foods such as bread and cold tinned products. Some migrants allow themselves the luxury of buying hot coffee at MacDonald’s, or sometimes a roast chicken for dinner. However, buying ready-prepared food is costly, and few can allow themselves to do this on a daily basis. Voluntary organisations serve hot food to the homeless; however, as we will discuss below, between half and two-thirds of the
Romanians in the Scandinavian capitals did not use these services at all during the week before the interview (Copenhagen 49 percent, Oslo 69 percent and Stockholm 68 percent).

Second, the homeless often lack a safe place where they can leave their belongings in the daytime. Some carry these belongings with them at all times; others take the risk of leaving their belongings in the woods while they are out earning money. This leaves them vulnerable to theft by other poor homeless people, vandalism by nearby residents who do not like to have the homeless camping too close to their dwellings, or the removal of their belongings by the city authorities. Between one-third and half of the street workers in the Scandinavian capitals (Copenhagen 33 percent, Oslo 51 percent and Stockholm 34 percent) have experienced having belongings such as sleeping bags, tents or clothes stolen from their hiding places. Given the scarcity of items of property for this group, and their vulnerability to the cold if tents and sleeping bags are stolen, these are indeed high numbers. As is to be expected when things disappear when hidden away, most respondents do not know who removed their belongings. The ones who claim that they do know the identity of the culprits mostly accuse either the city sanitation workers (Copenhagen 3 percent, Oslo 11 percent and Stockholm 2 percent) or other Romanians (Copenhagen 5 percent, Oslo 6 percent and Stockholm 2 percent).

A third hardship that comes with sleeping outdoors in the Scandinavian capitals is not being able to find a place where it is possible to sleep without being disturbed. Figure 6.1 shows the shares of the homeless population who had been woken up and told to move on during the week prior to the interview. In Oslo, the city council has passed a law criminalising sleeping outdoors, and during the summer of 2014, when our fieldwork was carried out, the police expended significant resources in tracking down homeless people sleeping in the city or the nearby woods. In Oslo, 37 percent of the street workers who slept outdoors reported being woken up and told to move on at least once in the week before the interview; 14 percent had been woken up 3 times or more. In Oslo it is mainly the police that tell the homeless to move on; 69 percent were told to move by a police officer and 94 percent were told to move by either a police officer or a security guard. Street workers sleeping on the streets in Copenhagen are likely to be woken up and told to move on as well, although not quite as often as in Oslo; 31 percent reported being woken up and told to move on during the week prior to the interview, and 9 percent were told to move more than three times in that week. While only 6 percent of the street workers in Oslo reported being woken up by people other than a security guard or police officer, 20 percent of the Romanian migrants sleeping on the streets in Copenhagen reported being woken up by people they perceived to be Danish drug addicts or other Danes. This probably reflects the fact that about a third of the street workers in Oslo sleep in the woods on
the outskirts of the city, where few people other than police officers in search of the homeless roam around at night.

**FIGURE 6.1. Have been woken up during the previous week, by last person waking them.**
Homeless street workers from Romania who sleep outdoors or in cars in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen. Fafo survey 2014.

The street workers in Copenhagen and Oslo report spending a lot of time hiding from police officers, security guards and others, hoping to avoid being woken up and chased at night. In Oslo, where the homeless are fined and risk being deported if caught more than once, the fear of being found by the police was particularly marked in our interviews. In qualitative interviews people talked about running away to avoid being caught, resulting in the police confiscating their sleeping bags, clothes or other property.

In Stockholm, the situation is quite different. The street workers in Stockholm do also face restrictions on sleeping in public places. However, the implementation of the regulations for street workers is more in line with the procedures for the eviction of other population groups, and it seems to be normal to give a formal warning to the rough sleepers, telling them they will have to move. Official evictions are not carried out at night. During the summer of 2014, large groups of street workers were sleeping right on the streets in the centre of the city, and did not try very hard to hide from passers-by. In spite of this, they were less likely than street workers sleeping outdoors in the other two cities to be woken up at night and told to leave; 25 percent of those sleeping outside reported being woken up during the week prior to the in-
terview. Only a third of these were woken by police officers, another third by security guards and the final third by ordinary people or drug addicts.

There is an interesting dimension to these data with regard to ethnic identity. If we consider non-Roma Romanians alone, we find no significant differences among the three cities in the shares that report being able to sleep through the night without being disturbed (Copenhagen 72 percent, Oslo 75 percent and Stockholm 79 percent). In the Roma population, however, there are significant differences; in Oslo the Roma are much more likely than the non-Roma to be woken up and told to move on by the police, while in Stockholm the Roma are more likely to be woken up and told to move on by ordinary Swedish citizens than are the non-Roma. Ordinary Scandinavians rarely bother the non-Roma Romanians who sleep outdoors. In Stockholm there were no non-Roma who reported being woken up by ordinary Scandinavians in our study. However, they are the people most likely to wake up the Roma. In Copenhagen and Oslo, too, we find that the Roma are much more likely to be woken up by ordinary citizens than are the non-Roma (see Figure 6.1).

**TABLE 6.1. Where did you sleep last night?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oslo</th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Copenhagen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shelter/apartment</strong></td>
<td>26% 22 - 30%</td>
<td>1% 0 - 1%</td>
<td>28% 23 - 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Car/caravan</strong></td>
<td>7% 6 - 7%</td>
<td>6% 2 - 10%</td>
<td>11% 7 - 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public/abandoned building</strong></td>
<td>5% 4 - 6%</td>
<td>9% 4 - 14%</td>
<td>15% 10 - 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outdoors</strong></td>
<td>62% 58 - 66%</td>
<td>79% 72 - 85%</td>
<td>43% 37 - 49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>1% 1 - 1%</td>
<td>5% 2 - 9%</td>
<td>2% 1 - 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the summer of 2014, when the survey was conducted, only Oslo had night shelters specifically targeting immigrant street workers. These shelters offered about 120 beds at that time, and were run by two NGOs, largely funded by the central government. In Oslo 16 percent of the population reported sleeping in shelters the night before the interview.¹ For this they paid NOK 15 per night. A further 6 percent slept in private apartments where beds were rented out on a daily basis at an average price

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¹ This variable is associated with some uncertainty for Oslo, as it does not converge or stabilise over the time of the survey. Recruitment went more quickly among the shelter users than in other population groups, and we seemed to have covered most of this population about half-way through the survey (see the methodology appendix).
of NOK 60 per night. Four percent slept indoors in acquaintances’ apartments free of charge. In Copenhagen, street workers who had CPR cards (Civil Personal Registration card, also referred to as a sundhedskort (health card) or ‘yellow card’) could get access to shelters for the Danish homeless. They were able to stay in these shelters free of charge, and 10 percent of the Romanian street workers in Copenhagen reported sleeping in such shelters in the summer of 2014. A further 18 percent slept in private apartments; half of them paid an average of DKK 52 per night, but the other half stayed with friends or acquaintances for free.

The lodging arrangements appear to have been very different in Stockholm during the summer of 2014, when four out of five Romanian street workers slept out in the open. Only two people reported sleeping indoors, paying SEK 60 per night. There were no shelters for migrant street workers in Stockholm at that time, and neither had any private actors made arrangements to offer lodging in apartments on a day-to-day basis as they had in Copenhagen and Oslo.

There are three factors that can account for the lower rates of indoor sleeping in Stockholm. First, as the street workers have significantly lower incomes in Stockholm, there is less of a market for agents who want to earn money from offering indoor lodging to this population group; there are fewer among the homeless who can be expected to prioritise spending their money on this. When we run a logistic regression on probability for sleeping indoors, we find that most of the variation is explained by the city (being in Stockholm vs Oslo or Copenhagen), but also people reporting income above the median are more likely to sleep inside, as are people with some education.

Second, the street workers in Stockholm are less likely to feel that there is a need to pay for indoor lodging in the warmer summer months, as they are less likely to be bothered by police or others while sleeping outside. As described above, street workers in Oslo and Copenhagen need to hide in order not to be chased by police and security guards at night. In some areas of Stockholm in the summer of 2014 pedestrians would have to walk around street workers who were sleeping on the pavements. In spite of this, they were less likely to be woken up at night and told to move on than the street workers in Oslo hiding in the woods outside the city. This is also reflected in the fact that the street workers in Stockholm who slept outside reported feeling safer than did those in Copenhagen and Oslo (the shares of those sleeping outdoors who felt totally safe while sleeping were Stockholm 24 percent, Copenhagen 10 percent and Oslo 15 percent). These factors taken together may result in a smaller market for private accommodation for street workers, as the street workers in Stockholm may be less willing to pay to sleep indoors. However, we should also take into account the fact that homeless street workers from Romania made their appearance later in Stockholm than in Oslo and Copenhagen, and that may at least
in part explain why the infrastructure was less developed at the time of the survey. In the spring of 2015 there were shelters in place in Stockholm as well.

**Access to basic services**

The street workers in Scandinavia do not have access to the ordinary social services, but depend on assistance from NGOs. In all three cities, NGOs engage in the distribution of groceries, in serving food, in providing access to showers and bathroom facilities, and in giving advice to poor travellers. In all three cities, there are many more people who know about these services than there are who report using them the previous week. The migrants in Stockholm are less likely to be familiar with services; fewer than half have heard about the distribution of free groceries, and fewer than 60 percent know about places to get a free meal or take a shower. This reflects the fact that the Romanian street workers in Stockholm had been in Scandinavia for a much shorter period on average at the time of our survey, and had not had time to familiarise themselves with these services.

**FIGURE 6.2. Use of and knowledge about services.**


There were no significant differences in knowledge about services and use of services between Roma and non-Roma, with the exception of the use of counselling in Oslo. Only one percent of the Roma population reported using the information centre run by Caritas in Oslo during the week before the interview, compared with 7 percent among the non-Roma population. This reflects the strategy of Caritas of explicitly targeting job-seekers who are looking for formal employment.
Healthcare and medical needs

Among the population of Romanian homeless street workers, many are elderly and many have lived their lives in extremely poor social and economic circumstances, leading to extensive health problems. However, as the migrants are familiar with the hardships of living on the streets before they leave Romania, we can assume that there is selection into migration in that the family members with better health are the ones who come to Scandinavia to work. When we ask them to describe their health, about half the Romanian street workers in Oslo and Stockholm, and two-thirds of those in Copenhagen, say they are in good or very good health. However, life on the streets of Scandinavia and in particular sleeping in the open cause health problems, and many need medical care and assistance. A relatively large share of the population have been in contact with the health care services while in Scandinavia (Oslo 22 percent, Stockholm 9 percent and Copenhagen 14 percent). On the basis of initial qualitative interviews we realised that many migrants are not aware of the difference between the public healthcare and emergency services, and of the clinics available to immigrants without documents. We therefore decided not to ask them to specify what kinds of facility they had used.

FIGURE 6.3. Contact with the healthcare facilities while in Scandinavia, by self-reported health status.


Street workers in Stockholm are those least likely to have used health care services (13 percent), which can be explained with reference to this population having been in Scandinavia for less time than the migrants in the two other cities. Oslo has a larger share of the overall population that use health care facilities than the
other two cities, and here the health services also appear to be better targeted, as close to half of those who claim to be in bad or very bad health say they have used health care services, compared with 15 and 13 percent in Stockholm and Copenhagen respectively (see Figure 6.3). We believe this can be explained by the presence of Romanian social workers in Oslo. These social workers are hired by an NGO to do outreach work and provide information and assistance to people in need of this. At the time of the survey, one of the social workers had an agreement with the clinic for immigrants without documentation to bring in Romanian street workers in need of medical assistance once a week. The social worker both distributed information about this service to people in need of healthcare and improved the quality of the care, as she could make sure the street workers found the way to the clinic and translated for them while there.

When asked to evaluate the health services, the majority of users in all three countries say they were treated very well and that they got all the medical assistance they needed. But around 10 percent of the migrants who used health care services in all three cities say either that they were treated badly or that they were not given the necessary medical help.
Chapter 7

Discrimination, harassment and lack of protection

People spitting on them, pouring beer or other liquids on them, beating, pushing or kicking them. People stealing money from their begging cups, or the magazines they are trying to sell. More than half the street workers in Oslo, and one-third of those in Stockholm and Copenhagen, have experienced one or more of these forms of harassment. Even more tell that they are refused access to stores to buy groceries, claim return deposit money on empty bottles or buy a cup of coffee. The differences between the three cities can in part be explained by differences in the period of time the migrants have spent in them, as the probability of experiencing harassment increases with duration of stay. But even after we control for length of stay there is a higher prevalence of experiencing harassment in Oslo than in Stockholm, possibly reflecting a harsher Norwegian public discourse concerning migrants than that in Sweden. There is also a significant ethnic dimension to harassment in Oslo, where the Roma population systematically report more harassment than the non-Roma. In Copenhagen harassment takes other forms. Roma and non-Roma appear to be more equally at risk, but in addition to harassment by ordinary people in the streets, there are several reports, in both quantitative and qualitative interviews, of police violence and of police confiscating money and belongings without giving receipts.

Access to public spaces

The respondents in our survey rarely have a place to which they can retreat when they want some privacy. They earn, live and sleep in the public spaces of the Scandinavian capitals. Some hang around close to railway stations; others find places in parks, under bridges or in abandoned buildings in the city centres, or retreat to woods or a car park on the outskirts of town when they are not trying to earn money. These are places that are generally considered to be available to everyone, providing that they do not disturb the public order, or behave in such a way that they are a threat to their own or others’ safety. In qualitative interviews we heard several accounts of people who were told by police, private security guards or shop owners to leave a public place without any valid reason for their exclusion. The survey shows that this is far from an uncommon experience for street workers in the Scandinavian capitals; however, there are significant differences between the three cities. In Stockholm one in eight of the Romanian street workers say they have experienced being asked to
move from a public place when they were not begging, compared with one in three in Copenhagen and every second street worker in Oslo (see Table 7.1).

**TABLE 7.1. Have been told to leave a public places even though not engaged in begging.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oslo</th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Copenhagen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>95% conf interval</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever been told to move from a public place when not begging?</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>48-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Roma</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>32-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44-55</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of these differences can be attributed to length of stay, as the street workers in Stockholm have on average been in Scandinavia for a much shorter period than the street workers in the two other capitals. Almost two-thirds of the respondents in Stockholm had been in Stockholm for less than three months at the time of the interview, and had never been in Stockholm before. In Oslo and Copenhagen migration is a more established practice, and we estimate that in the summer of 2014, 70 percent of the Romanian street workers in these two cities had been in the area for three months or more, including 25 percent who had arrived for their first visit to the country before the start of 2014. However, when we examine the figures for groups of migrants that had been in Scandinavia for an equal period of time, the relationships among the cities remain roughly the same; migrants who have been in Stockholm for less than three months are 2.5 times less likely to have been told to move on than street workers in Copenhagen and Oslo who have been in the area for a similar period of time, and if we look at the migrants who arrived for the first time before 2014, we consistently find that larger shares of the street workers in Oslo report having been moved on than in the other two cities (see Figure 7.1).
Within these overall figures, there are significant differences in who tells the respondents to move on. While 42 percent of the street workers in Oslo had been told to move by private security guards or police officers, this was the case for 25 percent of the street workers in Copenhagen and only 5 percent in Stockholm. There is, in other words, a greater likelihood of being told to move on from a public place by a police officer or a private security guard in Oslo than in Copenhagen, while the chances of this happening in Stockholm are small. On the basis of qualitative interviews with NGOs and street workers, we expected to find that private security guards would tell the Roma to move on more often than they moved on the non-Roma, and would also discriminate against the Roma in limiting their access to public spaces. However, our data do not support this; when we look more closely at the variation in the propensity for being told to move on by a security guard, length of stay is the only significant factor, and there is no effect of ethnicity in any of the cities. The only actors who seem to ask the Roma to move on from public places to a disproportionate extent are police officers in Oslo.

Most people living in Scandinavia tend to take for granted that they will be given access to grocery stores to buy groceries or reclaim deposits on empty bottles, or to fast food restaurants to buy a cup of hot coffee. For the Romanian street workers in Scandinavia, access to these public spaces cannot be taken for granted; in qualitative interviews we were given numerous accounts of people being told to leave a grocery store for no reason, of people having to stand on the street while the shop employees
gathered the groceries they needed, and of cashiers tearing up street workers’ empty bottle return deposit vouchers and refusing to give them the money due. We tried to conduct some of our interviews in cafés in Oslo, but were surprised to find that many of our respondents preferred to be interviewed outside in parks, as they feared the humiliation of being refused entry to a café.

**TABLE 7.2. Have been refused access to grocery store, shops or cafés, or to reclaim deposits on bottles, by ethnic identity.**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oslo</th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Copenhagen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>estimate</td>
<td>95% conf interval</td>
<td>estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever been refused access to shop in a grocery store?</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>22-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Roma</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever been refused access to a café, restaurant or fast food restaurant?</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Roma</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever been refused access to a machine to return empty bottles?</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>33-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Roma</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>13-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27-37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 7.2 illustrates, there are again significant differences in rates of being refused access among the three cities. However, as Figure 7.2 shows, the differences between Copenhagen and Stockholm can largely be attributed to differences in length of stay. Once again, however, Oslo stands out, in that there are much more frequent reports of street workers not being allowed to reclaim deposits on empty bottles in particular, but also of their being denied access to stores and cafés, for the part of the population that arrived before 2014. For the population that arrived less than 3 months before the survey, the differences between the three cities are less marked, and not statistically significant.
FIGURE 7.2. Have been refused access to grocery stores, shops or cafés, or to reclaim deposit on bottles, by time of first arrival in city.

In both Stockholm and Oslo, Roma are more likely than non-Roma to have been refused access to grocery stores or cafés. In Copenhagen there are no significant differences in the experiences of Roma and non-Roma migrants.

Harassment on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals
Our respondents were often reluctant to talk about harassment, but rather wanted to talk about the kindness they had received from people they had met in Scandinavia. However, they admitted that they needed to be careful with certain individuals, in particular when those individuals were drunk. When these experiences are reflected in our survey answers on specific types of incidents of harassment, a different picture emerges. For street workers in Scandinavia, being spat on, having beer poured on them and being yelled at by strangers appear to be common experiences.
As Figure 7.3 illustrates, between one-third and a half of the street workers in Copenhagen, Stockholm and Oslo have experienced someone shouting bad things at them in the street. One in ten Stockholm, one in seven in Copenhagen and one in five in Oslo have experienced someone pouring beer or other liquids on them in the street. And from one in ten in Copenhagen to one in four in Oslo have had someone spitting at them in the street.

As Figure 7.4 illustrates, the differences among the three cities are less marked if we look only at the shares of the migrants who arrived less than three months before the interview. But for the shares of the population that arrived before 2014, we see that the street workers in Oslo more often report being yelled at, spat at or having beer poured on them.
FIGURE 7.4. Experiences of harassment, by time of arrival.

We also asked the respondents who had done these things to them. Most of these acts of harassment are performed by ordinary Swedes, Danes and Norwegians. Ordinary people are reported to yell bad things at migrants in the street (Stockholm 14 percent, Oslo 25 percent and Copenhagen 24 percent), to spit at them (Stockholm 7 percent, Oslo 13 percent and Copenhagen 5 percent), and to kick over the cups beggars collect money in or to knock the magazines or flowers they are selling from their hands (Oslo 24 percent, Stockholm 13 percent and Copenhagen 7 percent). While the Roma and non-Roma street workers in Copenhagen and Stockholm are relatively equally exposed to harassment, there are clear differences between the Roma and the non-Roma in their experiences in Oslo of harassment by ordinary people.

In Oslo the street workers experience extensive harassment from Norwegian drug users as well; 23 percent report that drug users have yelled at them, compared with 7 percent in Stockholm and Copenhagen; 12 percent report drug users spitting at them (as opposed to 4 percent in Stockholm and 1 percent in Copenhagen), and 17 percent that drug users have kicked over their begging cups or knocked magazines or flowers from their hands (Stockholm 6 percent and Copenhagen 1 percent). The strong negative attention from Norwegian drug users stems from the competition between these groups, as magazine sales are an important source of income for both Romanian street workers and Norwegian drug users. The establishment in 2005 of
When poverty meets affluence. Migrants from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals

The magazine Oslo for drug users to sell as an alternative to begging was a great success, and after a few months there were hardly any beggars left in Oslo; they had all become magazine sellers. When the Romanian and other Eastern European street workers came to Norway to beg, it was decided that they would not be given the opportunity to sell Oslo. Another NGO then founded the magazine Folk er Folk for Eastern European street workers to sell. These sales came into direct competition with Oslo, and magazine sales became a significantly less profitable activity for the drug users. Our data indicate that some drug users may blame the street workers for this. On the begging scene in Oslo, two of the most vulnerable groups seem to have been pitched against each other.

As it is mainly the Roma street workers who sell magazines in Oslo, this probably accounts for a part of the large difference between the Roma and the non-Roma in the harassment they experience, but far from all of it. A logistic regression shows that in Oslo, the Roma are much more frequently exposed to people yelling bad things at them, spitting at them or subjecting them to other harassment than are the non-Roma, regardless of whether they beg, sell magazines or engage in other income-earning activities.

So far we have concentrated on instances of abuse and humiliation. But street workers are also vulnerable to more severe harassment. In all three cities, the street workers are exposed to physical violence, mainly from ordinary Scandinavians who hit, kick or push them. Again Oslo stands out, with the highest levels overall, and with significantly higher exposure to violence among the Roma than non-Roma (see Table 7.3). One in four street workers in Oslo have been hit, kicked or pushed, compared with about one in six in Copenhagen, and one in nine in Stockholm. And while Stockholm and Copenhagen do not exhibit significant differences between the Roma and the non-Roma, the Roma in Oslo experience violence twice as frequently as the non-Roma. Again, we find that some of the differences among the three cities can be explained by variation in length of stay, but when we compare groups that have been present in the cities for equal periods of time, we still find that Oslo stands out with greater exposure to violence (see Figure 7.5.)
TABLE 7.3. While in Scandinavia, have you been exposed to violence, for instance someone hitting, kicking or pushing you? By ethnic identity and person responsible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Non-Roma</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stockholm</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by police officer</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%-0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by private security guard</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%-0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by shop owner</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%-1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by drug user</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%-3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by ordinary Scandinavian person</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%-9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by other Romanian</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%-2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by other person/don't know who</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%-3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oslo</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by police officer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by private security guard</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%-3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by shop owner</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%-3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by drug user</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%-21%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by ordinary Scandinavian person</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>13%-22%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by other Romanian</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%-4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by other person/don't know who</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%-4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Copenhagen</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by police officer</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%-2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by private security guard</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%-0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by shop owner</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%-3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by drug user</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%-8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by ordinary Scandinavian person</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%-11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by other Romanian</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%-5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by other person/don't know who</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%-4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is worth noting that the non-Roma have relatively equal levels of exposure to violence in all three cities – most of the differences among the cities can accounted for by variations in the experiences of the Roma street workers. This can in part be explained by the conflict over magazine sales with drug users in Oslo, as the rates of violence from drug users are much higher in Oslo. However, there are also significant differences among the cities in how ordinary people treat the Roma, making Oslo stand out with higher levels for violence towards this group.

The street workers in Copenhagen stand out with regard to a significantly higher level of violence by police officers being reported. Only one person in Stockholm and one person in Oslo reported experiencing violence at the hands of the police, while a total of 17 persons, an estimated 4 percent of the population of Romanian migrant street workers, reported experiencing violence from the police in Copenhagen.

The Scandinavian police and street workers
The street workers in Scandinavia are regularly checked by the police, in particular in Copenhagen and Oslo. In these two capitals about one-third of the Roma population report that they have been stopped by the police and asked for ID or searched during the previous week. The level of ID checks is significantly lower in Stockholm (see Table 7.4).
When poverty meets affluence. Migrants from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals

If we examine the street workers’ experiences with the police more closely, we find that there are marked differences among the three capitals. 7 percent in Oslo and 15 percent in Copenhagen report that the police have taken their money, telephones or other property (see Table 7.4). Some reported having several different things confiscated, so the categories listed in the table are not mutually exclusive. Only one in four in Copenhagen, and one in five in Oslo, say they were given a receipt for what was confiscated. In contrast, in Stockholm only one respondent said that he had property confiscated, and he reported being given a receipt for this. The clear difference between Oslo and Copenhagen on the one hand and Stockholm on the other makes it difficult to reject the validity of these findings as unwarranted accusations against the police. If this is a population that systematically over-reports police violence and illegal confiscations, why do we not find the same pattern in Stockholm? The issue of police confiscating money and mobile phones was regularly raised by respondents in the qualitative interviews, in particular in Denmark. Several respondents claimed that the police would systematically take away their money or phones, as they did not believe they could have acquired them in a lawful manner.

Although the Roma street workers in Stockholm are much less likely to be exposed to violence, harassment or theft than the Roma in Copenhagen or Oslo, there is a somewhat greater share of our Roma respondents in Stockholm who have been to the police to report a crime than in the other cities (see Figure 7.6). The street workers in Stockholm have been in Scandinavia for a shorter time, have a lower ed-

### TABLE 7.4. Contact with police: ID checks and confiscation of belongings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oslo</th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Copenhagen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Point</td>
<td>95% conf.</td>
<td>Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>estimate</td>
<td>Interval</td>
<td>estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you been</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stopped and asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for ID or searched</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by the police last</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>week?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>(26-37)</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Roma</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>(9-32)</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>(22-32)</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the police take</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anything from you</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on these occasions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, money</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, telephone</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, other property</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>(4-9)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you get a receipt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for what they took?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% of people who</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>had something</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confiscated)</td>
<td>yes:</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>(12-27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no:</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>(71-86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ucational level and are less likely to know other languages, factors that should have lowered the probability of their going to the police in comparison with the equivalent populations in Oslo and Copenhagen. When, in spite of this, and in spite of much lower exposure to crime, we find that Oslo and Copenhagen have lower rates of people reporting abuse to the police, we assume that this can be attributed to the Stockholm police treating this population in a different way from the police in Copenhagen and Oslo. The police in Oslo and Copenhagen make regular ID checks on the street workers, and wake them up at night, and tell them to move on from public places. This does not induce trust in the police, and seems to lower the likelihood of these groups going to the police when they are in need of protection. Police violence and confiscation of property without receipts does not help to increase trust either. As we have illustrated in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 5, the street workers in the Scandinavian capitals are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, and are often in need of protection. Our data indicate that the police in Copenhagen and Oslo prioritise control over protection in their relations with these groups. This increases the vulnerability of the population to exploitation and abuse.

**FIGURE 7.6.** Romanian street workers who have been to the police to report a crime committed against them, by ethnic identity.

Chapter 8

Social remittances and community

How does migration to Scandinavia affect families and communities at home in Romania? In Chapter 3 we described the poor living conditions and scarcity of sources of income that characterise the situation for many migrants and their families in Romania, and in Chapter 4 we described the income-generating activities pursued by the migrants on the streets of the Scandinavian cities. In this chapter we will shed light on the impact of migration and income from migration for the migrants and for their families at home in Romania. One important question is whether or not migration actually improves conditions of life for the migrants and their families. The situation of the children of migrants is of particular interest. The low educational level, particularly in some Roma communities, is a topic that has been given much attention in the debate on Roma integration into Romanian society. Is the practice of migration among parents a factor that impedes the participation in education of Roma children, or is migration rather a source of financing for children’s education? These are the issues that will be explored in this chapter.

Remittances

Not all migrants send money home. More than half of the migrants in Stockholm, one in three migrants in Oslo, and four out of ten migrants in Copenhagen report that they have never sent money home. We know from our fieldwork in Romania that some migrants carry the money back to Romania themselves. A more important reason for the differences among the cities is the average length of stay of the migrants. The migrants need some time to find out how to earn an income, and to save up enough to be able to send something home. Some migrants never find out how to earn enough money to send anything home – but these migrants return home quite quickly. This combination of mechanisms produces quite a strong correlation between length of stay – measured as how many out of the previous 12 months the migrants were in Oslo/Stockholm/Copenhagen – and the practice of sending money (see Figure 8.2).

The strong correlation between length of stay and sending money home means that whether or not we include recent migrants in the calculation has a strong impact on the calculation of remittances. If we include all migrants, the Roma in Stockholm send home an average of EUR 82 per month, with the corresponding amounts being EUR 180 for the Roma in Oslo and EUR 182 for those in Copenhagen. On average,
the non-Roma migrants send home slightly smaller sums each month (an average of EUR 38 in Stockholm, EUR 106 in Oslo and EUR 152 in Copenhagen). The lower averages among the non-Roma are due to the fact that many of them do not send money at all. However, those who do send remittances send more than the Roma on average. The average remittances sent home by migrants who have stayed for at least 5 out of the previous 12 months in Stockholm/Oslo/Copenhagen increase to EUR 199, EUR 257 and EUR 293 per month for the Roma in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen respectively. The corresponding figure for non-Roma in Copenhagen is EUR 221 (there are too few non-Roma who have stayed for long periods in the other two cities to calculate means). When we calculate mean remittances only for those who actually send remittances – that is, when we exclude all who do not send money – the mean remittances sent by Roma migrants per month are EUR 206 in Stockholm, EUR 270 in Oslo and EUR 361 in Copenhagen, while the corresponding figures for non-Roma are EUR 365 in Oslo and EUR 339 in Copenhagen (in Stockholm, the number of respondents is too low to calculate this mean). It should be noted that the means are pulled higher by a few people who report sending relatively large sums of money. A majority of the migrants in Oslo and Stockholm who send money and about half of those in Copenhagen send less than EUR 200 per month.

Western Union is used by many Roma migrants to send money home. According to qualitative information from the fieldwork in Romania, this is the preferred method even though it is more expensive than using ordinary banks because the Roma do not speak English and are unable to communicate with bank personnel, or do not feel welcome in ordinary banks.
When poverty meets affluence. Migrants from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals

FIGURE 8.1. Responses to the question: How often do you send money home?
Homeless street workers from Romania who have stayed for at least 5 of the previous 12 months in Stockholm/Oslo/Copenhagen. Fafo survey 2014. N=55 (Stockholm) N=126 (Oslo) N=130 (Copenhagen)

FIGURE 8.2. Shares of migrants who send money to Romania, by number of months spent in Oslo/Copenhagen/Stockholm during the previous 12 months.
Sending money home is clearly more common among Roma street workers than among non-Roma street workers. This also holds true after controlling for length of stay. Using multivariate analysis (logistic regression) we find that the number of months spent in Oslo/Stockholm/Copenhagen out of the previous 12 months has a strong effect on the probability of sending money home. Young people are more likely to send money than older people. Having children and having a partner also significantly increase the probability of sending money home. We also suspect that the families’ need for money influences remittances. As a poverty indicator we have used the crowdedness of houses – or rather, inverse crowdedness, i.e. number of rooms per person. Street workers from crowded households are significantly more likely to send money home than those from less crowded households. Street workers in Oslo are much more likely to send money home than street workers in Copenhagen, and street workers in Stockholm is less likely. Even after controlling for all these variables, Roma street workers are found to be much more likely to send money home than non-Roma street workers. We interpret this as being a result of migration being more of a family/community-based economic strategy in the Roma population than in the non-Roma population.

\[4\] Not statistically significant at the 5% level, but significant at the 10% level.
We find a positive correlation between length of stay, measured as number of months out of the previous 12 months that the street workers had been in the city where they were interviewed, and the sending of remittances. That does not mean that there may not be a negative correlation if we consider a longer time-span. Earlier research on the remittance practices of migrants shows a negative correlation between length of stay and remittances, but only after as much as 20 years of residence (Carling 2007). Our data obviously do not permit calculations over that kind of time-span. The practice of sending remittances seems to stabilise at a high level after the first year of stay, although with a slight downward trend among the non-Roma. Year of arrival does not have a statistically significant effect in a multivariate model.5

**TABLE 8.1. Results from logistic regression. Dependant variable: Have sent money home.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months of stay</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children &lt;18</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>1.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>1.410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowded. inverse</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 We have tested year of arrival in a model with both Roma and non-Roma street workers, with and without controlling for interaction between ethnicity and year of first arrival. We have also run a model with non-Roma only. Year of arrival is not statistically significant in either model.
What are the earnings from migration spent on?
A major incentive for migrating to the Scandinavian capitals is to earn money to support families at home. Some of the earnings obviously have to be spent on survival in Scandinavia. In this section we present the findings concerning what the migrants report spending their savings on in Romania. Figures 8.5a and 8.5b illustrate the spending of significant sums of the money earned in Scandinavia for various purposes as reported by shares of the migrant groups. The most common purpose is to pay for basic needs, i.e. food and clothes for the families at home. School expenses, medical expenses and paying off debt also figure high on the list. In relation to paying for travel and paying off debt, an ‘Oslo-effect’ emerges for the Roma migrants, reflecting the fact that Roma migrants often borrow money from minibus drivers to travel to Oslo (see Chapter 5). Some migrants also spend money on old or new houses, but hardly any report spending money on buying a car.
**Children left behind in Romania**

A majority of the Roma migrants in all three cities have children under the age of 18 (77 percent of the Roma migrants in Stockholm, 62 percent of those in Oslo, and 65% of those in Copenhagen). Around one in three non-Roma migrants in all three cities also have children under the age of 18 (Oslo 34 percent, Stockholm 33 percent and Copenhagen 38 percent). Among the non-Roma migrants, then, the majority do not have children, and if they do, they rarely have more than two. Among the Roma migrants there is also a large group of people who have only one or two children, but 39 percent of the Roma migrants in Stockholm and 25 and 26% percent respectively of the Roma migrants in Stockholm and Oslo have more than two children. Our estimates of the numbers of children among the Roma families correspond well with the estimates presented by Impreuna 2013 (no children 31.6 percent, 1-2 children 36.6 percent, 3-4 children 17.4 percent and more than four children 6.7 percent).
TABLE 8.2. Shares of migrants by number of children.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th></th>
<th>Oslo</th>
<th></th>
<th>Copenhagen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>Non-Roma</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>Non-Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or two</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or four</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five or more</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Altogether, the migrants in the three cities report having responsibility for 1,837 children under the age of 18. Very few, however, bring their children abroad with them; with very few exceptions, the children remain in Romania. The exceptions are mostly to be found in Copenhagen, where altogether nine children under the age of 6 and six children aged 14-17 were reported to have been brought along. In Oslo two small children were reported (both under the age of 2), and in Stockholm there were two children under the age of 5 and four children aged 14-17. It should also be mentioned that ten of the respondents were themselves under the age of 18. Six of these were interviewed in Stockholm.

FIGURE 8.6. Responses to the question: ‘Who is acting as the main carer for your children while you are here?’.
TABLE 8.3. Shares of migrant who answer that children at home are being looked after by the other parent, by migrants’ sex and ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Non-Roma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the non-Roma migrants, the other parent is the main carer while they themselves are in Scandinavia. For Roma street workers in Oslo, and in particular in Stockholm, grandparents are the most common carers for children left at home. This reflects the migration pattern of the Roma population, and in particular those who go to Stockholm, where couples often travel together. The exception here is the Roma street workers in Copenhagen, who more often travel without their spouses, and who display more or less the same carer practices as the non-Roma street workers. It also reflects the fact that there are very few mothers among the street workers in Copenhagen. The migrant mothers are more dependent on the grandparents to act as carers, while for migrant fathers their spouses are more often the main carers for the children.

The majority of the migrants express confidence that their children feel loved and cared for even though they themselves are abroad. Migrants in Oslo – both Roma and non-Roma – and Roma migrants in Stockholm seem to be those who are the most worried about the wellbeing of their children.
Parents also worry about the behaviour of their children. Almost half of the Roma migrants in Oslo worry that their children might get into trouble while they themselves are away. The percentages are slightly lower in the other groups (see Figure 8.8). In response to the statement ‘I think my children sometimes go to bed hungry because there is not enough food’, 38 percent of the Roma migrants in Stockholm, 60 percent of those in Oslo and 51 percent of those in Copenhagen say that they completely or partially agree.

The majority of the migrants express confidence that their children at home have access to the healthcare they need, but there are also significant shares of parents who do not think that their children get the necessary healthcare. This may be a result of local differences in the healthcare system, but it is also very probably a result of the fact that some children have special needs for healthcare, and that those needs are not necessarily being met. In our fieldwork in Romania we interviewed a young mother whose son needed an operation. She explained that even though the public healthcare system in Romania is officially free of charge, the system of bribery and corruption is so institutionalised that it is practically impossible to get an operation without paying off the medical staff. In order to pay for the operation on her baby, she had migrated to Oslo when he was four weeks old. The sick baby and his sister were left at home in the care of her husband and mother-in-law. She explained that...
she had to go because her husband was not a very successful beggar – ‘No-one gives money to a young and able-bodied man.’ From other interviews in the same village we also learned that his failure as a beggar had resulted in his exhausting his financing opportunities in the village – no-one would lend him the money for the fare.

**FIGURE 8.8. Responses to the statement ‘When I am in Norway/Sweden/Denmark there is a greater chance that my children will get into trouble or do bad things.’**

FIGURE 8.9. Responses to the statement ‘I think my children sometimes go to bed hungry because there is not enough food.’


FIGURE 8.10. Responses to the statement ‘My children get the healthcare they need.’

School enrolment

School enrolment rates for children have for a long time been a major issue in discussions of Roma living conditions and integration. Engebrigtsen et al. (2014) note that the view that Roma parents actively sabotage the schooling of their children out of fear of assimilation is widespread, a view we encountered repeatedly in our interviews at schools in Romania during our fieldwork there. According to Engebrigtsen et al., there is not much empirical evidence to support this view, and the low enrolment rates may be a result of the very poor quality of education in the schools that Roma children attend, and also of significant economic barriers faced by parents. Even though education is free, the children need clothes and shoes to go to school, and the parents also need to be able to pay for food, transportation and paper.

We interviewed the migrants about the kindergarten and school enrolment of all their children under the age of 18. Enrolment rates are clearly lowest among the children of migrants in Stockholm, and highest among the non-Roma migrants in Oslo and Copenhagen. The enrolment rates of the children of Roma migrants in Oslo and Stockholm are highest for children of between 8 and 13 of age. This reflects the common practices that many Roma children start school at an older age than non-Roma children, and that many drop out at an early stage. Roma children tend to have high rates of absence from school, and many have to repeat years, sometimes more than once (World Bank 2012). We find that the enrolment rates of the children aged 7-15 of Roma migrants in Oslo and Copenhagen are 75 and 76 percent respectively, which corresponds well with the enrolment rate of 78 percent calculated by the United Nations Development Programme in 2012.

Whether or not the children are being looked after by the other, non-migrating parent or by grandparents does not seem to be of great significance for whether or not the children go to school. However, the children of the few migrants who have left them to be cared for by other children do seem to be in a particularly vulnerable situation, and have much lower enrolment rates.

The parents have differing views on whether or not their absence affects the attendance and school results of their children negatively. This is also one of the questions with the highest refusal rate, indicating that this is a sensitive topic. Migrants to Stockholm seem to be least worried about the negative effects of migration for their children’s schooling. As shown in Figure 8.11, these are also the children with the lowest rates of attendance. If children were not attending school in the first place, migration is not going to reduce attendance. Also, poverty is a major reason for non-attendance. Migration may therefore also affect attendance positively, through providing money to buy clothes, shoes and school materials.

FIGURE 8.12. Unweighted estimates.
Children of homeless street workers from Romania in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen. Fafo survey 2014. N=862 (children whose parents are in Stockholm) N=540 (children whose parents are in Oslo) N=435 (children whose parents are in Copenhagen)
When poverty meets affluence. Migrants from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals.

FIGURE 8.13. Responses to the statement ‘The attendance and school results of my children will suffer because I am away.’


On the basis of our findings so far, we might hypothesise that 1) migration has a negative effect on school enrolment and attendance because the parents are away, or 2) migration has a positive effect on school enrolment and attendance because it generates income that can be spent on the children’s schooling. Using multivariate techniques, we find more support for the second hypothesis than for the first. We find several indications that the school attendance of the children is affected by their parents’ financial situation. Our indicator of poverty – number of rooms per person – shows a strong negative correlation between poverty and school attendance. There is also a tendency for a small (or negative) income surplus generated from migration to be associated with lower school attendance rates, but this is not statistically significant. Furthermore, we find that the children of parents who say that a significant proportion of the surplus money they earn from migration is spent on food and clothes for the family at home are less likely to attend school. We believe that spending a large proportion of the money on food and clothes for the family at home is an indicator that the migrants are living from hand to mouth – there is little surplus money available for spending on anything else. We find a strong positive correlation between parents saying that they spend money earned on school expenses for their children and school attendance by the children. This may, however, be a case of reversed causality – when children go to school, school expenses tend to
increase. Either way, it shows a willingness to prioritise school expenses in spending the money earned from migration, and these findings in combination illustrate that financial constraints play an important role in the low school enrolment rates among Roma children. The parents’ absence from Romania does not seem to affect school attendance, and neither do the care arrangements in Romania: children who are looked after by their grandparents do not have significantly lower enrolment rates than children who are looked after by the other parent, or through other arrangements. Ethnicity and residential segregation do have an impact: Roma children, and children who live in Roma communities, are less likely to attend kindergarten and school. Traditional views on whether it is acceptable for women to wear trousers in public do not seem to impact on children’s school attendance. As expected, we find a strong positive impact of the parents’ educational level as measured in years of education.

Concluding remarks
Not all migrants send money home, but supporting their families at home financially seems to be an established practice among most of the migrants who have lived on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals for more than a few months, and is particularly common among the Roma. The money is reported to be spent largely on daily necessities: food and clothes, school expenses for children, and medical expenses. This picture matches the findings in Chapter 3, where we described the poor living standards and scarcity of sources of income in Romania of the migrants and their families. Most of these families live in outright poverty – a situation where remittances from migrants can potentially make a huge difference.

School expenses rank high on the list of what remittances are spent on, and even more so when we look only at the expenses of parents of children below the age of 18. For parents who prioritise their children’s schooling, migration seems to be a way to finance their children’s education. That does not mean that the practice of migration is necessarily exclusively beneficial for the situation of children at home in Romania. The migrating parents share a number of concerns for the consequences their migration may have for their children. The most serious concern is probably the fear that their children do not have enough to eat. Six out of ten Roma migrants in Oslo and half of the Roma migrants in Copenhagen agree with the statement ‘I think my children sometimes go to bed hungry because there is not enough to eat’. Roughly one third of the migrants in Oslo and Copenhagen worry that the school attendance of their children will suffer because of their absence.

School enrolment rates in Romania today indicate an increase in educational levels and literacy, but enrolment rates are still substantially lower among Roma children than among non-Roma children, and start to drop at an early age. Also, absence from
TABLE 8.4. Results from logistic regression. Dependent variable: Child aged 0-18 goes to kindergarten, preschool or school in Romania.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sig</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>1.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent’s education</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooms per person (proxy for household income)</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>1.829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child’s age. Reference category: age 16-18</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 0-3</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 4-6</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 7-9</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>1.713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 10-12</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>2.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 13-15</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>1.665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Money from migration spent on:

- Food and clothes for family at home .000 .440
- School expenses for children .000 7.379
- Medical expenses .063 .746
- Repairing an old house .096 .727
- Buying or building a new house .205 1.407
- Buying a car .172 .491
- Paying for travel .071 .749
- Paying off debts .079 1.307
- Live in Roma community .001 .617
- Parent positive to women wearing trousers .447 1.125
- No. of months parents lived in Oslo/Stockholm/Copenhagen in previous year .936 1.002
- Year of parent’s first arrival in Oslo/Stockholm/Copenhagen .156 1.113
- Low surplus income from migration .149 .813
- Grandparent(s) main carer .186 .836

Cox & Snell’s R Squared 0.367 Nagelkerke’s R Squared .490 Prediction 78.3 correct
school is high. The World Bank (2012) has estimated that only about 25 percent of Roma children complete the 8th grade. Poverty is in itself an impediment to education, as some families cannot afford shoes, clothes and paper. As mentioned above, during our fieldwork in Romania a number of teachers and school heads expressed concerns that some Roma parents do not want their children to go to school, because they see the school system as a threat to their culture and way of life. None of the Roma parents we spoke to in Romania expressed a direct wish to prevent their children from going to school. Their enthusiasm for schooling did vary, however. Some expressed very strong wishes for their children to get an education, while others seemed to be more disposed to accept that schooling may not be accessible to their children. In the survey data, we find that both Roma and non-Roma parents express solid support for education: all the non-Roma parents in Stockholm, and eight out of ten in the other groups, completely agreed with the statement ‘If my children get an education, they will have a much better life.’ This corresponds with the findings of the World Bank (2012) that 80 percent of Roma parents want their children to complete at least primary education. The discrepancy between this expressed aspiration and the actual completion rate of 25 percent in the 8th grade is striking. We can obviously not disregard the possibility that parents conceal their true opinions about their children’s education, but our data strongly support the hypothesis that poverty is an important factor behind the low enrolment and completion rates among Roma children.

**FIGURE 8.14.** Responses to the statement ‘If my children get an education, they will have a much better life.’
We do not know if the small minority that completely disagree with this statement have a negative attitude to schooling *per se*, or whether they expect that discrimination in the labour market will neutralise the potential positive effects of education. We do know that being Roma, being poor, and having parents with a low level of education substantially reduce the probability of children attending school. Breaking this pattern is obviously going to be difficult, but is nonetheless necessary if socio-economic marginalisation is to be prevented from being passed on from one generation to the next. On the other hand, in a context of economic recession and continued discrimination against the Roma in the Romanian labour market, getting an education is not necessarily a guarantee of the promotion of social mobility.
Chapter 9

Temporary or permanent?

It must be fair to say that the Scandinavian public and policy-makers have been less than enthusiastic about the phenomenon of poor migrants from Romania begging in the streets and sleeping in parks, cars and woods. The three cities apply different strategies for catering for immediate needs of the migrants, and Denmark has so far applied the most restrictive policy by putting a ban on begging. So far, little is known about the effects of private initiatives or the actions of public services, NGOs, the police and others with regard to the permanence of the pattern of repeated migration. Does policy affect patterns of migration at all, or are financial needs and opportunities all that matters?

Migration to Oslo and Copenhagen seems to be an established livelihood strategy among a significant share of the Romanian migrants who live on the streets of Copenhagen, and among many of the Romanian Roma in Oslo; in these groups, one out of four arrived for the first time before 2012. Still, newcomers continue to arrive, and four out of ten Roma street workers in Oslo in the summer of 2014 and half of those in Copenhagen arrived for their first visit earlier in 2014. In Stockholm, more homeless street workers arrived shortly before our survey than in the other two cities; eight out of ten migrants in Stockholm had arrived for their first visit earlier in the year.

These data alone give some idea about the degree of permanence of the practice of migrating to and from Scandinavia. But will the same pattern persist in the future – for the migrants currently in Scandinavia, and for others yet to come for the first time?

An overview of the migrants’ responses to the question ‘Do you think you will return to Stockholm/Oslo/Copenhagen after your next visit to Romania?’ is presented in Figure 9.1. The overall picture is that a large majority in Oslo and Copenhagen plan to come back, while migrants to Stockholm express less interest in returning. The results do not give immediate support to the hypothesis that Denmark’s ban has had a deterrent effect, nor that Sweden’s leniency and access to services have had the effect of attracting more migrants.
TABLE 9.1. Homeless street workers from Romania in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen, by year of arrival.
Fafo survey 2014. N=1266

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Non-Roma</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stockholm</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 2012</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oslo</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 2012</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Copenhagen</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 2012</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 2012</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 9.1. Responses to the question ‘Do you think you will return to Stockholm/Oslo/Copenhagen after your next visit to Romania?’.
However, some of the explanation for this pattern may be that some kind of selection among the migrants had already taken place, and that the migrants who were in Oslo and Copenhagen at the time of the interview had already adapted to the local policy and conditions, while those who could not cope had already left. We do find some evidence for this. As we have seen previously, migrants in Copenhagen are on average less dependent on family networks, there is an overrepresentation of men in the population, and they are better educated than the migrants in Oslo and particularly the migrants in Stockholm. They also have more experience as migrants, and we find a strong correlation between length of stay and the intention to return to Scandinavia in the future: those who have spent many of the previous 12 months in Scandinavia probably constitute a selection of people who have learned how to cope, and who perhaps lack better opportunities for earning incomes. The qualitative fieldwork indicated that there are many beggars competing for gifts from the same donors in the centre of Stockholm, and many of them are recently arrivals. We find it likely that in time, many of these migrants will return to Romania and remain there. However, others will keep coming back, and over time the more successful migrants will be selected and form a group with increased migration experience more similar to the migrants in Oslo.

As mentioned previously, the intention to return is probably closely related to how successful people are as migrants. One important measure of success is the level of earnings. We find that in all the cities, migrants who are successful at earning money are more inclined to say they will return to Scandinavia (see Figure 9.2). Street workers in the highest income quintile in Stockholm are less inclined to return to Scandinavia than street workers in the highest income quintiles in Oslo and Copenhagen – but it should be remembered that the income in the highest income quintile in Stockholm is much lower than that in Oslo and Copenhagen.

The kindness of the local population manifests itself in various ways, but the most important in this context is probably people’s willingness to give to beggars. One might think that exposure to unkind behaviour would deter migrants from recurring migration, but we do not find any conclusive evidence that unkind treatment by the public reduces the migrants’ determination to come back to Scandinavia. In Stockholm, the migrants who have been spat at are slightly less inclined to return than those who have not been through this experience, but intentions to return are very low in both groups, and the difference between the groups is not statistically significant.
FIGURE 9.2. Responses to the question ‘Do you think you will return to Stockholm/Oslo/Copenhagen after your next visit to Romania?’ By income quintile. Cityspecific quintiles. Unweighted estimates.

In Oslo and Copenhagen migrants seem to be quite resilient to bad treatment. This resilience is probably related to the ambiguous relationship that the migrants have developed to the majority population: they are harassed by some people, but at the same time they are dependent on the kindness and generosity of other members of the same group. Engebrigtsen (2014:6) quotes a Roma woman expressing this ambiguity: ‘For every time someone kicks my cup over, another person puts a coin in it.’ The share intending to return is actually even larger among those who have experienced being spat at, though the difference between the groups is statistically significant only in Copenhagen. It should be recalled in this connection that the probability of being spat at increases with the (cumulative) length of stay. The migrants who have been spat at on some occasion in the past are, in other words, probably a selected group of long-term residents who have learned to cope with the hardships of street life in Copenhagen. As we shall see later in this chapter, the positive effect of this kind of harassment on the intentions to return to Scandinavia disappears in a multivariate analysis that controls for – among other things – length of stay.
The feeling of insecurity while sleeping is also probably affected by length of stay; the long-term residents are more likely to have found safe places to sleep. In Copenhagen and Stockholm there is a positive correlation between feeling safe when sleeping and intention to return. In Oslo, however, the intention to return does not seem to be affected by how safe migrants feel when they sleep.

FIGURE 9.4. Shares who answer ‘Yes, definitely’ to the question ‘Do you think you will return to Stockholm/Oslo/Copenhagen after you next visit to Romania?’ By how safe migrants feel while sleeping. Not corrected for length of stay.
In a multivariate analysis, we find that income quintile, low amount of surplus income (less than EUR 2 per day) and the feeling of safety while sleeping correlate with the intention to come back to Scandinavia. Migrants who feel unsafe while sleeping, and migrants who make less than EUR 2 per day after paying their own expenses, are significantly less interested in coming back. High income, on the other hand, increases the intention of returning. As indicated in the bivariate analyses, however, these migrants are quite resilient to harassment, and experiences of harassment do not seem to lower their intention to return. The probability of having experienced harassment is much higher for those who have stayed for a long period. We have tried to control for this by entering months of stay and year of first migration to Scandinavia in the analysis. These variables measuring length of stay are, as expected, positively correlated with the intention to return. Another measure of the relations the migrants have with the Scandinavian societies is whether or not they trust Scandinavians in general and the Scandinavian governments. We find that low trust in Scandinavians in general is associated with lower intentions to return, while low trust in the government does not have a statistically significant effect. We cannot know why some members of the migrant population say they trust members of the native populations while others do not, but a possible interpretation is that this stems from positive encounters with Scandinavians, and that such positive experiences affect the intention to come back. However, as mentioned earlier, experiences of harassment do not have a significant effect on intention to return, possibly indicating that the positive encounters are more decisive than the negative ones. An alternative interpretation of the correlation between trust in Scandinavians and intention to return is that this variable functions as a measure of personality traits, and that migrants with trusting personalities have better chances of succeeding as street workers.

Being Roma does not affect the intention to return, but living in a segregated Roma community increases intention to return. We also investigated whether respondents who displayed more traditional values in line with Roma traditions, for instance those expressing the view that women should not wear trousers in public, were more likely to say they will not return, but we do not find that traditional views on gender practices have any effect, and neither does having children.
TABLE 9.2. Results from logistic regression. Dependant variable: intention to return to Scandinavia after next visit to Romania.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>.272</td>
<td>.819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>.397</td>
<td>1.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months spent in Stockholm/Oslo/Copenhagen previous year</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of arrival</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in segregated Roma community</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>1.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive attitude to wearing trousers in public</td>
<td>.957</td>
<td>1.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not trust Scandinavians in general</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not trust government of country where staying</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>.807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has children</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income surplus under EUR 2 per day</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income quintile</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>1.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel unsafe when sleeping</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index for having experienced harassment</td>
<td>.372</td>
<td>1.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>9.155E+230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The migration of poor people from Romania seems to be both a permanent and a temporary practice; many migrants spend a large part of the year in Romania, but still travel several times a year between Scandinavia and home. This pattern is also described by Engebrigtsen (2014). It should be remembered that the question asked here is ‘Do you think you will come back?’. How well the answer to this question will correspond with actual future migratory behaviour is hard to tell. Although life on the streets in Scandinavia can be rough, we know that migrants experience both hardships and harassment in Romania as well. Migrants who state that they do not wish to return to Scandinavia may very well find upon return to Romania that the reasons that they left in the first place have not changed. The actual return rates may, in other words, turn out to be higher than the level of expressed intentions to return. Poverty and a marginalised position in the labour market in Romania leave a lot of families with few alternative ways of making a living, which is what drives people to endure extremely poor living conditions on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals. As long as the living conditions for these migrants and their families in Romania remain as harsh as today, it is very likely that the migration of poor Romanians to Scandinavia will continue in the future. Intentions to return are highest among the street workers in Oslo and Copenhagen, illustrating the limited effect on migration of the local policies adopted. As shown in Chapter 2, however, local policies do seem to influence both the composition of migrant populations and their choices of income strategies.
Chapter 10

Conclusion: Myths and realities about Romanian street workers in Scandinavia

The increasing flows of migrants seen in recent years from highly marginalised segments of Romanian society to a life on the streets in Scandinavia have presented the egalitarian Scandinavian welfare states with unprecedented dilemmas in terms of how to relate to the presence of visible and deep poverty. Policy responses suggested have ranged from the provision of sanitary services and the inclusion of the migrants in the labour market (VG Nyheter 2012), as proposed by actors who have decided that there is a need to alleviate the situation for these migrants, to actively curbing access to basic services (OsloBy Nyheter 2012) and the banning of begging and outdoor sleeping, as suggested by actors who have concluded that reducing the influx of more migrants is the most pressing issue. The debate has been heated, particularly in the social media, and both sides have made insistent claims about the ‘real’ nature of the issue, as well as about the expected consequences of the policy measures suggested. Even so, apart from two qualitative studies conducted in Oslo, no actual empirical knowledge has been available about the characteristics of the group concerned and the way they have adapted to the policy measures in force.

The aim of this report is not to come up with solutions or answers as to how these dilemmas and challenges should be met, but rather to provide systematic descriptions of the Romanian street workers who come to Scandinavia, and to enable readers to acquire knowledge-based understanding of the drivers and consequences of this mobility, and of the strategies that the street workers apply in order to make a living. The lack of systematic descriptions of this group and their activities has produced public and political debates in which all sides draw on popular myths and anecdotal evidence to argue their cases. In this concluding chapter we will address some of the most commonly propounded notions and myths that we have encountered during our study, and illustrate how well our data correspond with – or do not correspond with – these conceptions and assertions. The most widespread assumptions and beliefs are related to the Roma: 1) the Roma street workers are not really poor, but spend the money earned from migration on ‘palaces’ in Romania; 2) the

1 We are most familiar with the public discourse in Norway. Through fieldwork and the monitoring of Swedish and Danish media debates the past year, however, we have identified many of these ideas in Sweden and Denmark as well.
money does not reach those who really need it, but goes to organisers and traffickers; 3) the Roma do not want to work, but prefer to beg; 4) begging is a cover for criminality; 5) Roma people habitually lie and are thus unsuited to participation in surveys as informants; and 6) if we give the Romanian migrants money, more of them will come.

On the other hand, the street workers also have local supporters who oppose these claims, and assert that 7) beggars and street workers earn hardly any money while in Scandinavia; 8) the Roma in particular are discriminated against, chased and harassed by the police, private security guards and members of the general public; 9) that if crimes are committed by the Roma, it is only out of desperation and in order to secure survival for themselves and their families; and 10) if they were given equal opportunities, the street workers would all rather work than beg. Since this last claim is more or less the opposite of assertion 3), we do not deal with it in a separate section as we do with the other nine.

Who is right? What is true? Our study provides some support to both camps, but also quite solidly refutes a number of these assertions and beliefs as being pure myths.

**Assertion (1): The Roma street workers are not really poor but spend the money gained in Scandinavia on ‘palaces’ in Romania**

The overall picture that emerges from our study is one of a population which is extremely poor in terms of conventional socioeconomic resources. They are marginalised from the labour markets at home and in the rest of Europe, they live in poverty and have extremely poor housing conditions in Romania, and when in Scandinavia they mainly sleep outdoors and eat cold tinned or other basic food. It is not necessarily the poorest who migrate, but the bulk of street workers in Scandinavia are definitely not among the wealthier members of the Romanian population. The money they earn from migration is largely spent on daily necessities.

‘Roma palaces’ do exist, among other places in the city of Targu Jiu in the migrant-sending region of Gorj, where some enormous residences have been built. According to local informants, however, these have been constructed using money earned from selling scrap-metal during the process of dismantling several abandoned factories in the wake of the collapse of the Ceausescu regime. We interviewed several people in these areas and found no indications that the Roma who live in these palaces migrate to Scandinavia. That obviously does not guarantee that no examples exist of migrants who live in such palaces. Our data do, however, enable us to reject the hypothesis that the bulk of the migrants on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals enjoy housing standards of that kind. We interviewed a large number of migrants in their homes, and our impression from this qualitative fieldwork confirmed
the results from the survey: most migrants live in severe poverty, in very low quality housing. On the other hand, the existence of such palaces in these areas probably does contribute to maintaining the myth of rich beggars.

Assertion (2) The money does not reach those who really need it, but goes to organisers and traffickers

There is no doubt that the migration of poor people from the countryside in Romania to the Scandinavian capitals tends to be organised in the sociological sense of the word. A majority of the Roma migrants (especially those going to Oslo and Stockholm) travel with family members, and social networks play an important role financially, in terms of security (they take care of each other), and in learning income-earning strategies. Travel routes are also to some extent ‘organised’; for instance, Roma migrants to Oslo often travel by informal minibus services that also offer access to credit. There is also no doubt that many of the migrants are in a situation where they are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by others. They may be robbed or become victims of extortion, and if they are not able to earn enough money to pay back their debts, they are vulnerable to manipulation – for example, being forced to engage in alternative income-earning activities that they did not intend to engage in when they left Romania. In some elements of the population of street workers, particularly in Copenhagen, there are people with drug and alcohol abuse problems that may again leave them vulnerable to exploitation. However, although these factors creating vulnerabilities are clearly present in the survey population, there is no indication of the presence of traffickers or organisers outside the close family who manipulate people into travelling, and who take a cut of their incomes. The vulnerabilities that exist can largely be related to the fact that this group lives on the margins of society while in Scandinavia. The police in Copenhagen and Oslo are not necessarily viewed by street workers as being there to protect them from exploitation. This creates opportunities for extortion and exploitation, particularly in the case of the migrants who do not have family networks to support them while abroad.

We were told some stories of exploitation and abuse. These did not seem to be related to begging for the most part, but primarily to work in the informal labour market. A possible explanation for this is that incomes are higher in the informal labour market than in the market for begging, and therefore the people who are working are more attractive to potential exploiters than those who beg. There are also a number of people who feel that they have been given false expectations about their prospects in Scandinavia, and who regret coming. It is not clear whether the people who gave them these expectations in any way profited from their travel, but we have no indication of this from the more than 1,200 interviews conducted. Overall, we are confident in concluding that the majority of beggars and street workers travel of
their own free will and with at least a rough knowledge of what awaits them, and that most of them are in control of their own activities and their own incomes within the culturally-established expectations defined in family roles. For most, income from begging and street work is shared only within the immediate family and household. The people who organise transport back and forth to Romania obviously make a profit from providing this transport, but the prices appear to be fixed, and we have no indication that the drivers or other agents linked to the transportation companies in any way influence the activities of beggars and street workers. Traditional Roma families tend to be patriarchal, and it can be assumed that abuse within families does take place, both among the Roma families that come to Scandinavia and among those that do not. Migration can increase vulnerability to exploitation among both men and women. However, it should be kept in mind that migration can also provide a way for women to create a distance to patriarchal and exploitative family relationships. As begging is an income-earning strategy where women tend to earn more than men, it has the potential to strengthen the position of women in their families, and can also give them independent incomes that enable them to break away from exploitative family relationships.

Assertion (3): The Roma do not want to work but prefer to beg
There is little doubt that begging and other types of street work have evolved as economic adaptation strategies as part of a more general ‘oppositional identity’ within the marginalised Roma minority population. In a sense, the perceived identity as being Roma, and cultural practices embedded within Roma communities, can in some cases provide a form of protection against the sense of shame and humiliation that is commonly associated with begging in mainstream society. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that begging is a preferred survival strategy. Most of the migrant street workers perceive themselves as labour migrants; they would prefer to have jobs rather than engaging in their present kinds of income-earning activities. In fact, a majority of the street workers do try to find work (some even succeed), and those who are able to get enough income through casual work, music or street performances typically prefer this to begging. However, given their sometimes complete lack of education and formal work experience, combined with discrimination and high barriers to entering the formal labour market in the Scandinavian countries, few actually have any chance of finding jobs while living in Scandinavia.

Assertion (4): Begging is a cover for criminal activities
The truth or otherwise of this notion is more difficult to assess through survey data. Our combined data do shed some light on criminal activities, however. There are clearly subgroups of the population in all three countries that engage in petty crime,
such as shoplifting and pick-pocketing, or who sell prescription drugs smuggled from Romania or stolen copper. There are several indications that such crime is most widespread and serious in Copenhagen, and least so in Stockholm. Our surveys also indicate that criminal activities are more prevalent among those who do not beg than among those who do. That does not mean that people who beg do not sometimes steal, but it shows that even if the authorities should succeed in eradicating begging, that would not necessarily eradicate crime within the homeless migrant population.

**Assertion (5): Roma people habitually lie and are thus unsuited to participation in surveys as informants**

If this was the case it would not be possible to study the situation of the Roma in the Scandinavian capitals on the basis of interviews with members of the group. As we show in Chapter 1 and the methodology appendix, the structure of our dataset shows that it is of a quality that could not be produced if the respondents were systematically lying. Respondents who talk of aspects of their lives where there are problems also tell us of aspects of their lives that work better. The patterns in the data correspond with other characteristics such as age, gender and education in ways that we would expect them to do on the basis of sociological theory. These patterns could not be produced if our respondents were not largely telling us the truth. However, on some issues, such as income and criminal activities, we do not believe that the data produced are a proper reflection of the situation in the survey population, and there is probably extensive underreporting in these areas. On these issues we would usually expect underreporting in surveys of other population groups as well.

**Assertion (6): If we give the Romanian migrants money, more of them will come**

There have been concerns expressed that if Romanian migrant street workers are given money, help and support in Scandinavia, more of them will come, and once having arrived, they will not leave again. There is much to support such a claim. The fall of the Ceausescu regime, discrimination against the Roma in the Romanian labour market and crumbling income opportunities both in Romania and southern Europe as a consequence of the economic crisis all seem to have put the Roma communities in Romania in an even more difficult financial situation than was the case before 1989. The economic crisis also affected the income opportunities of non-Roma Romanians, and a significant proportion of the migrants are non-Roma. The perceived affluence of the Scandinavian societies no doubt attracts these migrants. As long as the income opportunities in Romania remain as difficult as today, it is more than likely that migration from Romania to Scandinavia to engage in street work will continue. Romania is among the poorest countries in Europe, and it is widely accepted that the responsibility for improving the situation for the Roma has
to be a shared one at the European level. The situation for the Roma communities has been high on the EU agenda for years, and a number of projects and action plans have been financed and carried out in cooperation with the Romanian authorities. Nevertheless, so far the difficult situation of the Roma is far from being resolved. The income opportunities in Scandinavia are obviously the decisive factor that sustains these recurring patterns of migration.

**Assertion (7) Beggars and street workers earn hardly any money while in Scandinavia**

Going to Scandinavia to earn is hardly a viable strategy for escaping poverty in the long run. However, for many Romanians their mobility has enabled them to put more food on the table than would otherwise have been possible, and for some, the money has benefitted their children’s schooling.

Not all migrants send remittances home, but many do. The money is sorely needed, and is mostly spent on necessities such as food and clothes, health, and school expenses for children. Quite a lot of the income is also spent on financing the journey, and to pay other debts. Those who accumulate enough to invest usually do so by repairing their houses. In the migrant-sending communities in Romania, it is easy to identify households of established and relatively ‘successful’ migrants by the new tin roofs or newly repaired walls of their houses.

**Assertion (8): The Roma in particular are discriminated against, chased and harassed by the police, private security guards and members of the general public**

Many street workers have experienced being told to move on from public spaces, being refused payment of the deposit on empty bottles, or being shouted at in the street. However, the majority of street workers have not had such experiences. Roma street workers report being more exposed than others to some kinds of harassment, particularly in Oslo, but even in Oslo the majority of the Roma report never having been denied access to a café. The Roma are used to pretty rough treatment when trying to carry out street work in Romania, and this probably colours their evaluations of the Scandinavians. In qualitative interviews, the Scandinavians are typically described as ‘kind’. In our survey, when the fixed section of the interview was over, we invited our respondents to add anything that they wished, anything that we had not asked about and that they felt was important. Almost all of them seized this opportunity to thank the Scandinavian locals and the authorities – in Oslo, on several occasions the Norwegian Queen – for their kindness and understanding. In other words, the experience of being ill-treated does not seem to be the dominant one for the migrants.
Assertion (9): If crimes are committed by the Roma, it is only out of desperation

This assertion is not easily elucidated through the use of survey data – and the interpretation of what is ‘desperate’ is not straightforward. There is little doubt that many of the street workers are in very difficult situations, both financially and otherwise. However, criminal activities seem to be more common among some of the slightly better-off subgroups of street workers than among the very poorest. On the other hand, income from criminal activities seems to be slightly higher than that from begging; in other words, the financially better-off position of those engaging in crime may be an outcome of their income-generating strategy. Nevertheless, the members of our population that engage in criminal activities cannot be very successful criminals – if they were, they would not be homeless and on the streets.

Summary

Key to understanding these groups is the recognition that there is extensive variation within them, and that some of the assertions discussed above may apply to subgroups within the population, but do not describe the population at large. While there is some truth in several of these assertions, our data refute some of the harshest stereotypes about Roma beggars. They are definitely poor, they are not organised by traffickers, the money is sorely needed and spent on necessities, and criminal activities are not closely associated with begging. Some assertions are almost self-evidently true; the generosity of strangers, NGOs and public institutions is critical for maintaining the practice of migration. The claims of the supporters of the Roma are not fully verified either. Discrimination against the Roma may be less common than expected, criminal activities are not necessarily limited to the most marginalised subgroups, and there is definitely money to be gained from migration. The determination to endure the hardships of being a street worker is clearly motivated by the income opportunities available in the Scandinavian capitals, in combination with the very scarce and ever-diminishing opportunities for gaining an income at home. Migration to the Scandinavian countries is an economic strategy. In relation to the general standards of living enjoyed by Scandinavians, it may not seem a very effective economic strategy. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently profitable to make the difference between food and no food, health services or no health services, school or no school, for a number of households.

A last ‘myth’ we need to address is what we believe to be an overly optimistic view of the possibility of curbing this kind of migration through either a ban on begging or restrictions of other kinds. We have not succeeded in making reliable estimates of the sizes of the populations of street workers in the three capitals. Therefore, we cannot draw any conclusion as to whether or not the ban on begging has influenced the total number of Romanian street workers in Copenhagen. But we are quite certain...
that it has influenced on the composition of the migrant population in Copenhagen and their choices of income-generating activities. The migrants in Copenhagen have had to rely on sources of income that make them less visible, and begging is less frequent there than in the other capitals. Even so, in spite of the ban on begging in Copenhagen, there are still many street workers who live from it. As documented in Chapter 2, our results suggest that the tough measures applied to curbing the activities of migrant street workers have had the effect of influencing the selection of migrants that come to Copenhagen: tough measures mean that only those “tough” migrants who are willing to endure risk will brave the journey. It is therefore a plausible hypothesis that the ban on begging in Copenhagen may actually have contributed to increase the level of crime within this population.
Appendix 1
The surveys

This appendix describes the three surveys we conducted in the three Scandinavian capitals, and discusses the use of respondent-driven sampling (RDS). RDS is a sampling method that uses social networks to identify survey respondents and provide representative estimates for hard-to-reach populations. Most widely used in public health research for HIV high-risk populations, in recent years RDS methodology has been extended into other fields, including migration research. It builds on a snowball sampling approach, but incorporates numerous methodological and statistical elements to mitigate the biases which arise in snowball sampling (Heckathorn., 1997; Tyldum and Johnston, 2014). The data must be analysed with specialised software, with estimators that generalise from known parts of a network (our sample) to the entire network. Below we will first describe the processes of data collection, and how the RDS methodology was adapted to our population, before moving on to discuss the more technical aspects of variance, convergence, bottlenecks and homophily.

Data collection
The RDS data were collected during three separate periods of fieldwork in 2014. In Oslo, data were collected between 15 June and 30 July; in Stockholm, between 15 August and 20 September; and in Copenhagen, between 10 October and 15 November. Two supervisors were hired to administer the fieldwork in all three cities. Both supervisors were of Romanian origin, one a social worker and one a psychologist, and both had experience of working with the target population for NGOs in Oslo. Interviewers were hired locally in each city. All the interviewers were Romanian speakers, and most of them had experience of working with the target population in the city being studied.

In each city we rented a space from which to administer the survey. In Oslo and Stockholm, NGOs working with the target population helped us to rent rooms in churches; in Stockholm these were in the centre of the city, and in Oslo 10 minutes’ walk from the railway station. In Copenhagen it proved more difficult to find suitable premises for the six weeks of our fieldwork, and we ended up renting shop premises that were located 45 minutes’ walk from the centre of the city. Considerable effort was put into the creation of an environment for conducting interviews that would feel respectful, safe and welcoming to the respondents. This was essential for both data quality and recruitment.
In all three countries we nevertheless met challenges in recruitment. Due to differences in the target populations, as well as slight differences in the organisation of the surveys, these challenges were different in each city. This is typical of RDS surveys, as survey populations tend to respond differently to incentives, and recruitment tends to be vulnerable to issues of trust and relationships between the minority group surveyed and the majority population (Tyldum and Johnston, 2014).

When we started the survey in Oslo we set the incentives for recruitment at quite a low figure. Due to the marginal position of the street workers, we wanted the incentives to be small enough to make it possible for members of the population to turn down the offer of taking part in the survey. This is important not only for ethical reasons but also for data quality, as respondents who would rather not have been interviewed are less likely to respond truthfully. Thus, we did not want the incentive to be higher than the average income on a good day, even though it could take the respondents up to three hours to take part in the survey, including transportation from the outskirts of town and some waiting time. However, when we started the survey, we had few reliable sources of information on the level of the incomes of the street workers; some claimed that they earned several hundred Norwegian kroner a day, and others that they barely achieved NOK 50 on a good day.

We thus started out paying NOK 50 for participation and NOK 50 per recruit, with a maximum of two recruiting coupons given to each person interviewed. We were prepared to increase these amounts if recruitment turned out to be slow. However, recruitment actually began relatively well – first among the non-Roma population, but after a few days respondents were also coming forward from the Roma groups. We thus did not see a need to increase the incentive. However, as we reached about 250 interviews, recruitment started to slow down, and at 300 it more or less came to a complete halt. To understand why the recruitment had stopped, we walked the streets and talked to people in the target group for a week, contacting people who had received coupons, and trying to find out why they had not passed them on. We realised that NOK 50 was not enough to encourage people to take the time to walk to our location. The incentive of NOK 50 had worked well for those respondents who had some trust in Norwegian society, and in particular those who were familiar, directly or indirectly, with the services provided by the NGOs for which our field staff worked. At this point it would have been reasonable to increase the incentive; however, as our field staff had invested their personal reputations for trustworthiness in convincing respondents to come for interviews, they felt that increasing the incentive for latecomers would be at the expense of their relationship with the population. As our fieldworkers would go back to working with the group after the survey, their concerns had to be respected. Instead of raising the incentive, then, we put in place measures for lowering the inconvenience threshold for taking part in the study,
mainly by establishing mobile survey sites in various parts of the city, interviewing in parks, etc. As we will return to in the next section, this increased somewhat the level of recruitment homophily shown in our data for Oslo, and created somewhat larger variance for some variables.

To avoid a similar situation occurring in Stockholm, we increased the incentive to SEK 100 for being interviewed, and SEK 50 per recruit. In Stockholm, however, we found a very different target population. Expected incomes from begging were significantly lower than in Oslo. In general, the members of the population were not as literate as those in Oslo, and our fieldworkers found it more challenging to explain the rules of recruitment to them. Finally, our survey location was right in the centre of Stockholm, and easy for all to find and reach. Large groups of potential recruits would come to the survey site, hoping to be recruited, leading to substantial problems of logistics and disturbance to nearby shop-owners and restaurants, and we were in danger of being evicted from the location we had rented. Thus, one week into the fieldwork, measures had to be put in place to control the recruitment; for a period we only accepted recruits based on appointments, made either by phone or by the recruiter on leaving after his or her own interview. We also reduced the number of coupons issued to each respondent to one, and recruitment went very well in spite of this.

In Copenhagen we started out with the same incentive scheme as in Stockholm (although with two coupons), but found that it was much more difficult to get recruitment started. Our survey site was about a 45 minutes’ walk from the places in the city where many of the Romanian street workers usually spent their time, and at the same time potential incomes from street work were much higher than in Stockholm. We invested some time in showing potential recruits how to go to the survey site by bus, and increased the incentives twice. At DKK 150 per interview, and DKK 75 per recruit, recruitment finally started to run smoothly. However, in the initial rounds we worked hard to build up the respondents’ trust in our field organisation and the survey, spreading information to street workers who often used one of the soup-kitchens in the centre. This produced a strong overrepresentation of users of this soup-kitchen in the initial waves of the survey, a fact that may have had some consequences for the variance and lack of convergence for some variables in Denmark.
Data quality
One source of information about data quality is the technical estimations based on recruitment patterns, and these estimations are presented below. Another important indicator is the coherence of the data in the analyses. We find that the data ‘make sense’ and produce intelligible results in a way that would not occur if the responses were not reliable. A third indicator of reliability is to compare the findings with other data sources, i.e. information about housing standards and the school enrolment rates of children, as well as with findings from existing qualitative studies. We also conducted qualitative fieldwork in both Scandinavia and the sending communities in Romania in order to contextualise the information gathered in the surveys. All of these sources support the conclusion that our data are reliable and valid.

The quality of all surveys depends on the willingness of the respondents to tell the truth – and on respondents actually knowing the truth. This has certain implications for the construction of questionnaires. It is normally not advisable to pose questions to which respondents are unlikely to know the answers, nor to pose questions which it is suspected that respondents will find it uncomfortable to respond to, or even refuse to answer. Questions about sensitive topics are often included in surveys nevertheless, sometimes because the survey-makers were not aware of the sensitivity of certain topics, and sometimes because it is considered highly desirable to obtain information about a sensitive topic. A typical example is information about income. In standard population surveys the non-response rates on items related to income are typically among the highest. However, information about income is often crucial for the analysis of the survey, so such questions are often included anyway.

In this survey, we included some questions that we expected to be sensitive. These included questions on the economic variables of income, expenditures and remittances. The responses obtained to these questions, however, do produce a coherent picture that corresponds well with what NGO representatives who are in close contact with the target groups told us. The most sensitive questions we included were those concerning criminal activities and prostitution. When people are asked about activities that are either against the law or associated with a high degree of social stigma, we must expect substantial underreporting. In total, 30 individuals reported that stealing is one of their sources of income, and one man and one woman reported that prostitution was one of their income sources. However, substantially more interviewees did report having been fined for theft, drugs offences or violence: ten percent of the sample in Oslo, three percent in Stockholm, and nine percent in Copenhagen. Surveys are not a suitable method to investigate the incidence of criminality in the survey population. Nevertheless, we still chose to include questions on crime, hoping that the resulting data would provide at least some opportunities to an-
alyse the role of criminality in these populations. To some extent we succeeded. One example is that we find that expenditures are higher among those who report having been fined. In other words, criminal activities seem to be more profitable than begging. We also find that those who beg seem to engage less in criminal activities than others, or at least that they are more rarely fined.

Strategic answering is a well-known problem in surveys. In this case, we might expect that the population would find it strategic to portray their situation as even worse than it actually is, in order to evoke sympathy from the future readers of the study, or even from the interviewers. We call such strategic answering with exaggerated stories of suffering the ‘beggar narrative’. When we carried out qualitative interviews prior to the survey, we sometimes met respondents who relied heavily on such ‘beggar narratives’ if they were interviewed while they were actually in the streets begging. We therefore invested considerable resources in creating an interview context that would remove people from their ‘role’ as street beggars and that was marked by trust and mutual respect. In a ‘beggar narrative’ we would expect that our respondents would consistently portray themselves as being deprived in response to all or nearly all our questions about their lives. This could be seen as rational, or even to be expected, in interviews with members of marginalised groups who depend on income from begging. To test for the existence of ‘beggar narratives’ in our survey responses, we compiled an additive index of nine indicators of social deprivation: 1) sleeps outside without a blanket, sleeping bag or tent; 2) does not have a car; 3) does not have a mobile phone; 4) does not have access to cooking equipment; 5) has children in Romania that the respondent fears go hungry; 6) has a dwelling in Romania without electricity; 7) has a dwelling in Romania without access to piped water within 20 meters; 8) is in very poor health; 9) earned less than ten kroner (Swedish, Danish or Norwegian) the day before the interview. If the answers from a significant proportion of our respondents reflected a ‘beggar narrative’, we would expect them to score high on this index. All in all, however, we find no indications that this was the case. Of all our 1,269 respondents, only one person claimed to suffer all of these nine types of deprivation. In Copenhagen and Oslo our respondents report on average 2.6 of these indicators, while the respondents in Stockholm report on average 3.2 of them. As Figure 11.1 illustrates, the indicators of social deprivation are normally distributed for all three cities, and there is no indication of any groups of respondents that consistently report social deprivations. If the ‘beggar narrative’ had been dominant in subgroups of our respondents, we should expect a concentration of responses towards the upper ends of the distributions. As this did not happen, we can conclude that although our respondents did report social deprivation in some aspects of their lives, they also told of aspects of their lives that work well. The ones
who spoke of deprivation in one area also reported other aspects of their lives which were better. This suggests high reliability, as we find no support for claims that this respondent group systematically exaggerates with regard to the deprivation to which they are exposed.

**FIGURE 11.1.** Nine-point index of deprivation: the ‘beggar narrative’ (unweighted proportions in the sample)

The high quality of the data can be attributed to the considerable efforts made by the people in our survey organisation to ensure that respondents were taken out
of the settings where they usually beg or sleep, to treat respondents with respect and dignity, and to give respondents the opportunity to assume a role other than that of beggar. In Stockholm and Oslo we carried out the interviews in churches, while in Copenhagen we rented a shop. We worked hard to make our interview sites appear appealing with flowers and tablecloths, and served hot drinks and some fruit or snacks. In addition to the researchers, we had a team of three Romanian coordinators who were responsible for the day-to-day running of the field organisation. We also employed between five and seven local Romanian-speaking interviewers in each city. Many of our interviewers were social workers who had worked in outreach programmes and already knew many of our respondents. The respondents received an incentive payment to take part in the interviews, but the money was paid in advance, to make it clear that it was not necessary to tell a dramatic story in order to get the money. It was also made clear that the respondents did not need to answer any of our questions in order to receive their payment. The money was given to them for coming in and listening to our questions, and answering was voluntary and not tied to payment. In all three capitals some of the interviewers were of Roma background. Finally, in interviewer training, we gave much emphasis to the idea that all respondents should be treated with respect. Interviewers were always to shake the respondents by the hand, and to look them in the eye. Respondents and interviewers were to sit on chairs on the same level during interviews. All of these efforts seem to have worked to reduce the incidence of the ‘beggar narrative’ in our data.

This does not mean that there are no problems of data quality. One problem is related to the low level of education among sections of our population. Quite a few respondents had never gone to school, and some subgroups had little experience in responding to formal questions. For instance, in response to questions about their age, it was not uncommon for respondents to present their ID cards, as they knew that their date of birth was written there, but could not read it or calculate their age themselves. Many also needed extensive help from the interviewers in adding up the sums earned from different types of activity. This means that for some elements of our survey population, responses to questions relating to time or money may be associated with considerable uncertainty. We also expect that there are strong interviewer effects, as interviewers were often not able to ask questions in a standardised way, but had to adapt and explain questions for substantial numbers of the respondents.

All in all, we find that the data is a rich source of knowledge about the lives of the migrants and their families. As is the case for many other marginalised groups in society, opportunities for our respondents to voice their opinions about their own situation are quite limited. Many of them cherished the opportunity to be heard, and put great effort into telling their stories accurately.
RDS estimators and variance
There are several different estimators that can be used to generalise from an RDS sample to the network, all of which draw on the recruitment matrix and self-reported network sizes. We chose to rely on Giles’ Successive Sampling (SS) estimator, as it corrects for finite population effects; however, for most variables the differences between the SS estimator and the equally commonly used RDS-II estimator are limited.

Table 11.1 gives an overview over the differences between the SS estimator and other RDS estimators for four variables: ethnic identity, gender, and two variables showing the use of services. For most variables we find little variation between the RDS-II estimator and the SS estimator. However, for ethnic identity in Oslo we see that the RDS-II estimator estimates the Roma population at 3.2 percentage points lower. This reflects the facts that the non-Roma population recruited more quickly, and that recruitment seemed to tail off towards the end of the fieldwork. As the non-Roma population was more male-dominated than the Roma population, this also impacted on the gender variable to some extent. Thus, Giles’ SS estimator slightly reduces the non-Roma population size relative to the non-Roma.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 11.1. Discrepancies between the SS estimator and the RDS-II estimator on four indicators</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ate soup-kitchen meals during the previous 7 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used showers, bathroom or other sanitary facilities provided by NGOs in the previous 7 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the assumptions that RDS builds on is that the convenience samples made up of the initial seeds will not influence the composition of the final estimates. However, if the sample does not go through a sufficient number of recruitment waves, a seed bias is introduced in the estimators. To test for this we can investigate the convergence of estimators and bottlenecks. A convergence plot is made, in which the RDS estimators are calculated at the beginning of the survey and then revised for each new observation added. The estimators are said to converge at the point when they stabilise and no longer change substantially from one wave to the next. This can be determined by visual inspection of the convergence plots.
Figure 11.2 illustrates how the estimator for gender converges relatively well in all the three datasets, although it is slightly rising in the Oslo data, reflecting the gradual reduction in non-Roma respondents, who were predominantly male.

For ethnic identity, only the Stockholm data converge well (see Figure 11.3). The Oslo data reflect the reduced impact of the non-Roma respondents at the end of the survey, as the plot shows the large share of non-Roma at the start of the survey that gradually reduced throughout the survey period. In the Copenhagen data, the estimator of ethnic identity first converges at a low level and then increases towards the end of the survey. This may reflect bottlenecks in the networks of Roma and non-Roma in Copenhagen.

Finally, Figure 11.4 illustrates the convergence for a ‘problem’ variable, the use of services. For both Stockholm and Oslo, the estimators converge well for both variables related to service use. The Copenhagen data, in contrast, never converge for the share of the population that used these services during the previous 7 days. This reflects the work done to build up trust and convince people to take part in the survey, which was linked to one of the soup kitchens. Due to the low visibility of the street workers in Copenhagen, we could not just walk around in the city or the woods to talk to people, as we did in Stockholm and Copenhagen. We were highly dependent on one soup kitchen that gave us access and allowed us to talk to their visitors a few times. This influenced recruitment, as our initial respondents were heavily
dominated by people who had visited the soup kitchen in the previous 7 days, while people who had never had heard about the soup kitchen gradually entered the survey towards the end.

**FIGURE 11.4.** Convergence plots for variables measuring the use of services (soup-kitchen and showers, bathrooms or other sanitary facilities) during the 7 days prior to the interview

![Stockholm convergence plot](image)

![Oslo convergence plot](image)

![Copenhagen convergence plot](image)

Bottlenecks between sub-groups of the target population can prevent recruitment spreading from one group to another, and can either prevent or reduce access to elements of the population. Bottleneck plots can be used to show the dynamics of the estimates for each seed. If the estimates for each seed are visually very different, this might suggest that bottlenecks between groups exist. If estimates for different seeds converge, then there are probably no bottlenecks reflected in the sample.

**FIGURE 11.5.** Bottleneck plots for gender

![Stockholm bottleneck plot](image)

![Oslo bottleneck plot](image)

![Copenhagen bottleneck plot](image)

Figures 11.5 and 11.6 show the bottleneck plots of two variables in the Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen data. In the Stockholm data, there are two seeds that produce long recruitment waves, and one seed with a short wave. However, in both Oslo and Copenhagen data, there is only one seed with a long wave, and two seeds with short waves, which makes it difficult to judge the convergence of the estimates for the different seeds.
The degree of homophily within groups can also be used to measure the tendency of respondents to recruit people with the same traits. Homophily is calculated as the ratio of the actual number of pairs (two people linked in a social network) who share a given characteristic (such as gender or ethnic identity) to the number of such pairs that would be expected to be found if the distribution was random (Johnston 2014). There are two types of homophily that can be measured: population homophily and recruitment homophily. Population homophily measures the social ties in the population, while recruitment homophily measures possible bias during the recruitment. Furthermore, while the bottleneck plots show visually the possible absence of links across groups of people by the dynamics of the estimates from each seed, the homophily calculations summarise the tendency for there to be close ties within a sub-group which hinder social contact across sub-groups over the whole sample. The two diagnostic procedures can be combined to detect bottlenecks.

Homophily is generally weak for gender in all the three cities (meaning that men and women do recruit one another). However, there are strong indications of homophily in Oslo for ethnic identity. Population homophily for ethnic identity is 1.7, which means that there is a 70 percent higher than expected number of pairs with same ethnic identity in the population. Recruitment homophily is lower, but still with a 30 percent higher level of recruitment of people with same ethnic identity than would be expected if recruitment was random.

On the two questions about service use, population homophily is fairly similar in the three cities (between 1.26 and 1.44), but recruitment homophily is lower in Stockholm (1.12 and 1.16) than in Oslo (1.29 and 1.22) and Copenhagen (1.28 and 1.32).
TABLE 11.2. Homophily test for four indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Oslo</th>
<th>Copenhagen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Homophily</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment Homophily</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Homophily</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment Homophily</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used services that served free or very cheap means during the previous seven days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Homophily</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment Homophily</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used services that provided shower, bathroom or other sanitary facilities during the previous seven days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Homophily</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment Homophily</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Size estimations

When we embarked on the study, we were aiming at making population size estimates in order to be able to say something about the number of Romanian street workers in the three cities. This turned out to be impossible. Our goal was to produce rough population estimates by comparing the shares of our population that used various services targeting street workers with the numbers of Romanians registered as users of these services. For all estimates, however, one of two problems occurred. For some services, the registers were not of a sufficient quality to make calculations of numbers of users, mainly because the service providers did not register nationality, or because they did not make registers at all, as was the case in Copenhagen. In Oslo some of the services we intended to use were closed during July, when most of our fieldwork was done. Finally, for the services where good-quality registers did exist, we ended up with too strong a sample dependence on these same services. For instance, the shelter where some of the street workers in Oslo sleep keeps good-quality registers. However, as several of our fieldworkers also worked in these night-shelters, the ‘shelter population’ was more easily recruited than other parts of the population, and most of these people were interviewed before we had reached 300 respondents. The same problem occurred with one of the day-shelters in Copenhagen. This violates the assumptions of the RDS survey, as the variable never converges or stabilises, and we are therefore not able to produce good estimates of the shares of the population that use these specific services.
When poverty meets affluence. Migrants from Romania on the streets of the Scandinavian capitals

Figures

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